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I. INTRODUCTION
The structure of the legal framework governing collective bar-
gaining tends to fragment the labor movement and to focus labor's
use of collective resources on economic gains within specific bargain-
ing units.' This fragmentation undermines the sense of shared polit-
ical objectives among workers and contributes to the declining
importance of unions as a political force.2 This Article is concerned
* Dennis 0. Lynch is a Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Ken Casebeer, Michael Fischl, and Pat Gudridge for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts, and Mark Bregar, who generously read and commented upon
multiple drafts.
1. See generally Rogers, Divide and Conquer.: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws," 1989 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with the
University of Miami Law Review; citations will refer to page numbers and notes in draft);
Stone, The Postwar Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1983).
2. See Rogers, supra note 1. In his article, Professor Rogers demonstrates how the
organizational structure of collective bargaining dooms union solidarity. He analyzes the
institutional framework in terms of the ways in which unions act rationally within that
framework and use their collective resources in order to organize at the local level:
Bluntly put, in the American context unions are largely reducible to union locals,
union locals to specific bargaining agreements, and specific agreements to the
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with recent legal developments that further encourage fragmentation
by localizing, within bargaining units, the processing of disputes over
statutory rights of union workers under the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA" or "Act").
3
This Article analyzes both the process of disputing and the rela-
tionship between that process and the substantive outcomes of work-
place disputes. The substantive outcomes of disputes matter because
of the potential impact of any outcome on the relative wealth and
bargaining power of labor and management,4 which will affect the res-
interests and capacities of workers in narrowly defined units. This is an
organizational structure that does not encourage solidarity even across sites,
much less between workers in particular sites and the unorganized.
Id. at 125; see also Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activi-
ties Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM, L. REV. 789 (1989) (arguing that the
statutory interpretation of employee Section 7 rights to engage in workplace protests tends to
undermine solidarity across bargaining units).
I do not disagree with Professor Roger's institutional account of the way that the Labor
Management Relations Act has kept the cost of union organizing high and encouraged frag-
mentation of organized workers. Rogers, supra note 1, at 119-48. Indeed, the focus of unions
on gains within specific bargaining units largely explains why dispute processing is becoming
more localized, as this Article describes. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to continue to
seek institutional structures that will permit workers to have a significant voice in working
conditions, while attempting to supersede the fragmented structure of collective bargaining on
a unit-by-unit basis. My reasons for focusing on the substantive and procedural characteristics
of workplace disputes are twofold. First, it highlights the way in which the state conditions
the bargaining power of labor within the fragmented structures of bargaining through a system
of allocation of statutory and contract entitlements. See infra notes 191-393 and accompany-
ing text. Second, dispute processing provides the institutional setting for ongoing conflicts over
power and hierarchy in the workplace. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. A
shared discourse among workers about the way that power is exercised in the workplace is
fundamental to broader-based political action aimed at altering the institutional structures that
lead to workers' organizational weakness. For the inadequacy of the current statutory struc-
ture to both become more visible and serve as a focal point for political action, unions need to
resist accepting arbitration as a forum for adjudicating statutory rights. As Professor Rogers
himself recognizes, history never stops. This Article addresses the inadequacy of arbitration as
a forum to adjudicate statutory rights.
3. The original National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), was amended by the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, tit. I, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (amending and incorporating 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 and adding 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-200). The National Labor Relations
Act was further amended in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 542 (1959). Hereinafter, "Act" or
"NLRA" refers to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended; "LMRA" refers to the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended.
The federal courts were given subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements by LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See also Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (By enacting Section 301, Congress
authorized federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to govern the enforcement of
collective agreements.).
4. See infra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
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olution of future disputes. The process of disputing is important in
three different ways. First, delays in the process of disputing in either
a public forum or in arbitration, combined with the substantive right
of management to act pending resolution of a dispute, can effectively
undermine the enforcement of a statutory right or contract entitle-
ment.5 When the remedy is delayed, it may provide an empty victory
by the time the dispute is resolved. Second, the structural characteris-
tics and context of the forum selected to adjudicate the dispute tend to
influence the arguments accepted as legitimate justifications for an
adjudicator's decision.6 Thus, the selection of a forum may influence
the substantive outcome of a dispute.' Third, the visibility of a forum
will determine, in part, the relationship between the ongoing process
of disputing and the public discourse over the statutory rights of
workers.8 When disputes are localized within specific bargaining
units, rather than being adjudicated in visible public forums, the dis-
course over workers' rights also focuses on tensions within specific
work settings. 9 The dialogue over shared concerns among workers in
general is weakened, and the potential contribution of the disputing
process to transformations in the values and perspectives applied to
resolve disputes is inhibited.' 0 Thus, bifurcating and particularizing
the discourse over workers' shared concerns tends to undermine the
potential for broader based political action reflecting common goals."I
The central claim of this Article is that the resolution of work-
place disputes among union employees is becoming more localized to
particular bargaining units, and thus more particularistic. This is evi-
denced by the growing reliance on private arbitration, rather than the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") and the fed-
eral courts, as the primary forum in which to resolve disputes over
employee statutory rights under the NLRA once a union has obtained
a collective bargaining agreement.' 2 This transferral of adjudication
5. See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
6. See Sarat, The "New Formalism" in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 695, 708-11 (1988).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 367-93 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 503-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
It. See Rogers, supra note 1; Stone, supra note 1.
12. See infra notes 144-90 & 394-502 and accompanying text. A similar trend exists under
the Railway Labor Act, ch. 247, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (RLA). Recent court decisions have narrowed the category of
major disputes, which are resolved through bargaining in which the parties are obligated to
maintain the status quo prior to impasse, an obligation that is enforced by federal courts under
Section 6 of the RLA. Correspondingly, the courts expanded the category of minor disputes,
which are resolved by adjustment boards and which are not governed by a statutory obligation
19891
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of statutory rights to private arbitrators is problematic for two related
reasons. First, arbitrators are an integral part of the system of private
ordering and thus are not in a position to adjudicate fundamental
challenges to the statutory framework governing bargaining. 13 Sec-
ond, arbitrators tend to explain their decisions in terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, expectations, and ongoing working
relationship, and not in terms of underlying statutory policies.' 4
Thus, disputes over gaps in collective agreements often are resolved
by reference to management rights clauses that are interpreted in a
manner consistent with the values of efficiency and maintenance of
productivity, rather than by reference to statutes that are protective of
employees' rights."5 Therefore, the linkage between the ongoing pro-
cess of disputing in the workplace and public discourse over workers'
statutory rights is less visible.
There is substantial overlap in the subject matter jurisdiction of
the three alternative forums that adjudicate or resolve disputes that
arise in a unionized workplace: the National Labor Relations Board,
the federal courts, and private arbitrators. 6 Each forum's core sub-
ject matter jurisdiction can be easily distinguished, and thus each
forum's jurisdictional role in the labor dispute resolution process is
relatively well defined. Nonetheless, an aggrieved party still enjoys
considerable freedom to characterize the statutory or contract right
being asserted in a way that permits considerable forum shopping.
This potential for parties to forum shop has led to a complex body of
doctrine that governs the allocation of disputes among the forums in a
manner that is consistent with a general theory of collective
bargaining.17
to maintain the status quo. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 2477, 2489 (1989) (When an employer asserts a contract right to take unilateral
action to alter a working condition, the dispute is minor if "the action is arguably justified by
the implied terms of its collective-bargaining agreement."); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.
Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 859-900 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (The district court was without
jurisdiction to enter a preliminary Section 6 status quo injunction for a dispute arising after the
expiration of an agreement; a court must look to the parties' expectations and relationship
under the expired agreement when classifying the dispute, and where the dispute is over the
definition of previously vested rights, the dispute is minor and hence within the adjustment
board's jurisdiction.); Comment, Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern.Air Lines: Can
It Fly?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1989); see also Lynch, Statutory Rights and Arbitral Values:
Some Conclusions, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 619-25 (1989).
13. See infra notes 503-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 507-15 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 511-33 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 38-142 and accompanying text.
17. For a systematic description of this general theory, derived from the doctrine
establishing the legal framework that governs parties' relationships in the formation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements, see Feller, A General Theory of the
(Vol. 44:237
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This general theory of collective bargaining views labor arbitra-
tion as the centerpiece of a democratic workplace in which workers
and employers jointly agree on a set of rules, the collective bargaining
agreement, which governs the conduct of both management repre-
sentatives and employees in the workplace.' 8 Private arbitration is
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973). For a critical treatment of
the assumptions about hierarchy and power in the workplace which inform the doctrinal
model of labor relations, see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW (1983); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Stone, supra note 1. For a
response to Professors Klare and Stone's critical treatment of the labor doctrine, as well as
their replies, see Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984); Klare,
Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining Law.- A Reply to
Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985); Stone, Re-Envisioning Labor Law: A Response to
Professor Finkin, 45 MD. L. REV. 978 (1986).
18. See LMRA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 171; LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185. In Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the United States Supreme Court stated
that Section 301 was a mandate for the federal courts to develop a substantive body of federal
law to govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 456. The Court
made arbitration the centerpiece of the system of private government in collective agreements
in three cases decided in 1960, known collectively as the Steelworkers Trilogy. United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (An arbitrator's award
should be enforced as long as the award draws its essence from the collective agreement.);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (When the scope
of an agreement to arbitrate is ambiguous, courts should resolve doubts in favor of coverage
and order the parties to arbitrate.); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) (Courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate irrespective of the merits of the
grievance as long as the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration clause.).
In Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court, relying on Dean Shulman's Holmes
Lecture, see Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999
(1955), and an article by Professor Archibald Cox, see Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959), described collective bargaining as follows:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government .... But the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government.
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution
in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 580.
For an early vision of the Taft-Hartley Act's objective of creating a "government of an
industry or plant, under which [labor and management] work out together through grievance
procedure and arbitration the day-to-day problems of administration," see Cox, Some Aspects
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Pt. 1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1947). See also
Feller, supra note 17; Shulman, supra.
In addition to giving federal courts the jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments, the Taft-Hartley Act also substantially altered the balance of power between unions
and employers in conflicts over organizing drives, and it placed restrictions on union tactics
aimed at neutral or secondary employers. See NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). Thus,
the costs of organizing increased, causing tensions for unions deciding whether to use their
resources to improve the economic conditions of workers in sectors of the economy which
already had high density union organization, or whether to use resources provided by union
employees to organize workers in less organized sectors. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 126-33.
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the primary vehicle for resolving conflicts over the interpretation and
application of these rules in the context of specific disputes. The the-
ory posits the NLRB's primary functions in terms of protecting the
organizational rights of workers and reinforcing the system of private
ordering through collective bargaining once employees have selected a
bargaining representative.' 9 This theory tends to minimize the
Board's role as a forum for resolving specific labor-management
workplace disputes once the union obtains a collective agreement.
Similarly, the federal courts' powers of adjudication and enforcement
are used primarily to encourage the parties to turn to arbitration to
resolve their conflicts, rather than to encourage the parties to use eco-
nomic and concerted pressure to achieve their respective goals.2z
Thus, federal court doctrine projects a contractarian image of rights
in the workplace that minimizes the impact of Board and court deci-
sions on the relative bargaining power of the parties.
Central to this policy that encourages the parties to rely on arbi-
tration, rather than concerted pressure, to resolve disputes is the
assumption that the union will contract away or waive its statutory
right to strike in exchange for a broad arbitration clause.2' This gen-
eral acceptance of a union's capacity to waive employee NLRA rights
leads inevitably to shared jurisdiction between the NLRB and private
arbitrators over the adjudication of statutory rights.2 2 Thus, for
example, the wording of a collective bargaining agreement becomes a
focal point for determining whether a union has waived an employee's
protection under Section 7 to engage in different forms of protest in
solidarity with other workers.23 Moreover, whether a dispute over the
waiver is to be adjudicated by the Board or by an arbitrator is
decided, in turn, by reference to the Board's deferral doctrine.24 Con-
The new union unfair labor practice restrictions also reflected a set of underlying statutory
values that were in tension with the policies embodied in the original language of Section 7 and
invited reinterpretation of the scope of employee statutory rights. See generally J. ATLESON,
supra note 17; Fischl, supra note 2; Klare, supra note 17.
19. See infra notes 394-502 and accompanying text (describing how the deferral and
waiver doctrines displace statutory disputes from the NLRB to private arbitrators once a
bargaining representative has signed a collective agreement). For a thoughtful argument in
favor of the Board focusing its statutory enforcement powers primarily on protecting workers
engaged in union organizing, see Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
20. For contrasting views on the way that federal common law encourages the peaceful
resolution of workplace disputes rather than the use of economic and concerted pressure,
compare Feller, supra note 17 with Stone, supra note 1.
21. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 445-502 and accompanying text.
24. For a description and analysis of the Board's deferral doctrine, see infra notes 394-444
and accompanying text.
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sequently, the deferral and waiver doctrines interact to increase reli-
ance on arbitration to resolve workplace disputes over statutory
rights.25
To the extent that these doctrines force more disputes into arbi-
tration, there are significant implications for the cohesion of the labor
movement in general. The context of the setting in which parties dis-
pute over their respective statutory and contract entitlements shapes
the way in which a dispute is framed and whether the arguments
advanced are treated as legitimate.26 In the public forum of the
NLRB, it is expected that disputes will be framed in terms of the
underlying statutory values that reflect a societal view of both the
appropriate balance of power between labor and management and the
protection of employee rights to engage in collective action.27 In arbi-
tration, however, the structure of the system of collective bargaining
is treated as a given; the discourse instead focuses on the parties'
working relationship and on their respective expectations as defined
by the collective bargaining agreement and past practices. Funda-
mental values regarding justice in the workplace are an element of the
way disputes are framed in arbitration, but it is a concept of justice
that is bounded by workers' expectations in a specific bargaining unit.
The connection of the dispute to the situation of workers in general is
less visible.28
The visibility and level of the forum in which disputes are adjudi-
cated matters because of differences in the way in which arguments
about disputes are framed before the Board and courts, as compared
with the way in which they are framed before private arbitrators. The
discourse that is accepted as legitimate for resolving disputes is linked
to the ongoing development of an "ideology" of the workplace. The
term ideology, as it is used here, refers to the "webs of values, per-
spectives, and evaluative criteria" that construct the social relations of
the workplace. 29 Disputes between management and labor are not
25. See infra notes 394-502 and accompanying text.
26. See Sarat, supra note 6, at 708-11.
27. See infra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 521-23 and accompanying text.
29. See Trubek & Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies.- Paradox,
Program, or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3, 18 (1989). In contrasting an
instrumentalist approach to research on disputing with an interpretist vision of ideology, the
authors comment:
For an interpretist, the values, the knowledge, and evaluative criteria embodied
in the subjectivity of actors are not individually held units of meaning but rather
are the threads or traces of a collectively held fabric of social relations. Further,
in the interpretivist perspective the individual does not appropriate this fabric
through the conscious selection of values or learning of existing knowledge
[instrumentalism]. Rather, in some sense the fabric "appropriates" the
1989]
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simply static events that need to be resolved so that productivity will
not be interrupted.3" They are also quarrels over the substance of the
ideology that may result in a transformation over time of the values
and perspectives embodied in the ideology.3 ' This relationship has
been succinctly described by Professors Trubek and Esser:
The handling of a dispute is thus a dialectical process that trans-
forms not only the dispute itself but the legal system and the com-
munity as well. Dispute processing not only changes the form and
content of the social relationship in question, but also may alter
law and legal consciousness. "Process" relates social change to
legal change. "Process" (or "practice") sits between law and soci-
ety, providing a site where legal meanings can "flow through" and
become part of community and vice versa.32
This dialectical vision of the process of disputing contributes to
an understanding of the consequences of using private arbitration to
resolve conflicts over statutory rights when they overlap with issues of
contract interpretation. The point is not that the union movement is
more likely to obtain better results through the adjudication of statu-
tory rights in more visible public forums. Indeed, recent experience
suggests that management is much more successful than labor at
obtaining Board and court decisions that embody a management ide-
ology of the workplace. 3  What this Article questions is the conse-
individual so that without self-conscious reflection the actor comes to desire the
ends, use the perspectives, and apply the rationality that makes up the social
fabric.
Id. The web of values in the workplace, which "appropriates" workers and employers, enables
them to respond to a variety of workplace conflicts within certain constraints that are defined
by that web of values. At the same time, their response to new situations will alter the "ideol-
ogy" of the workplace in ways that encourage new responses in the future. See id. (citing
Merry, Everyday Understanding ofthe Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST
253 (1986)).
30. See id. at 22. Dispute resolution does not merely involve individuals who act
rationally in the selection of the most efficient forum for resolving their conflict. It also
involves "transformation." See Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the
Transformation ofDisputes, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 775, 776-77 (1980-81). The authors argue:
Transformations occur because participants in the disputing process have
different interests in and perspectives on the dispute; participants assert these
interests and perspectives in the very process of defining and shaping the object of
the dispute .... By transformation of a dispute we mean a change in its form or
content as a result of the interaction and involvement of other participants in the
dispute process . . . . [T]he transformation of a dispute involves a process of
rephrasing--that is, some kind of reformulation into a public discourse.
Id.
31. See Trubek & Esser, supra note 29, at 23.
32. Id.
33. For the negative reactions of labor leaders to doctrinal trends in Board and court
decisions interpreting the NLRA, see infra note 534.
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quence for the labor movement in general of the displacement of more
disputes from public forums to private arbitration, regardless of
whether unions are obtaining favorable rulings before the Board and
the courts. Public discourse about fundamental rights contributes to
the definition of shared community.34 When that discourse becomes
more localized within particular bargaining units and the processing
of disputes is decentralized, a sense of shared concerns among work-
ers is inevitably weakened.
In order to support the claim that a more expansive use of labor
arbitration inhibits discourse our statutory rights, it is important to
illustrate how the institutional setting of arbitration shapes and limits
the nature of arbitral reasoning. Prior to a comparative analysis of
the reasoning employed in public forums and private arbitration,
however, the reader needs a picture of the forums' overlapping subject
matter jurisdictions and the doctrines that are employed to allocate
disputes among the forums. Section II describes the relationship
among the Board, the federal courts, and private arbitration, and it
illustrates the potential for aggrieved parties to take their claim to
more than one forum. The purpose of this Section is to give the
reader a "road map" for understanding the forums' shared
jurisdiction.
Section III describes two of the doctrines used to allocate claims
among the three forums. In the first instance, it is important to distin-
guish between the principles of federal common law under Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which govern
the respective roles of courts and arbitrators in the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, and the doctrines used to allocate
disputes between the NLRB and arbitrators. Section III only deals
with the former. The two key doctrines are: (a) the interrelationship
between the presumption of arbitrability and no-strike clauses; and (b)
the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. The princi-
ples embodied in the two doctrines limit the courts' role primarily to
determining the arbitrability of disputes, issuing injunctions to
enforce no-strike clauses, and enforcing arbitration awards as long as
the awards derive their essence from collective agreements.3 5
Deferral and waiver, the two doctrines governing the relationship
34. See, e.g., Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417 (1984) (arguing that the
discourse over communal notions of property rights contributed to efforts by unemployed steel
workers to seek creative solutions to purchase steel mills and keep them from closing); see also
Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987);
Perry, Taking Neither "Rights-talk" nor the "Critique of Rights" Too Seriously, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1405 (1984).
35. See infra notes 144-90 and accompanying text.
1989]
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between the NLRB and arbitrators, are the subject of Section V. In
order to illustrate the significance of deferral and waiver, however,
Section IV first addresses why the forum for resolving disputes over
statutory rights matters. In Section IV, entitlement theory is used to
provide a conceptual framework for examining the way that the inter-
pretation of statutory rights shapes collective bargaining by partially
determining the bundle of state protected entitlements that each party
holds at the outset of bargaining. Entitlement theory is used because
it helps to underscore the role of the state in creating, allocating, and
protecting the parties' expectations.36
Section V then examines the relationship between the Board's
standards for the deferral of unfair labor practice charges to arbitra-
tion on the one hand, and the acceptance of a union's power to waive
employee Section 7 rights on the other. The analysis illustrates how
the two doctrines interact to increase the use of arbitration for the
resolution of disputes involving issues of statutory policy. This analy-
sis of the deferral doctrine examines: (a) the Board's standards for
deciding whether to proceed with an unfair labor practice charge,
both prior to and subsequent to an arbitration award; (b) the conse-
quences of limited judicial control over the administration of these
standards in regional offices; and (c) the critical reaction of some fed-
eral courts to the Board's deferral standards. Section V then describes
the way that waiver doctrine shifts the focus of disputes over statutory
rights from a balancing of interests reflecting statutory policies to an
inquiry into the parties' expectations under the collective bargaining
36. The use of entitlement theory as an analytical tool is not meant, however, to suggest
that the concept should become central to the labor movement's public discourse over claims
to rights established by the NLRA. Rights discourse embodies the communication of a
demand that the state recognize a fundamental expectancy based on shared communal values.
In addition, rights discourse may contribute to the formation of community. See Appleby,
supra note 33; Lynd, supra note 33; Perry, supra note 33. For a critique of the communitarian
vision of rights and an argument that a focus on rights is both disempowering and alienating,
see T. CAMPBELL, THE LEFT AND RIGHTS (1983); Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 393 (1988); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
In the workplace, management has been much more successful than labor at using the
rhetoric of rights to shield core entrepreneurial decisionmaking from collective bargaining.
See, e.g., Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2596
(1989) (A decision of a railroad employer to sell its assets with the consequent reduction in
available jobs to zero is not a change in the status quo subject to an obligation to bargain under
Section 156 of the Railway Labor Act.); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666
(198 1) (An employer has no duty to bargain under NLRA § 8(a)(5) over a partial closing of a
business.); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee
Spring II) (Unless there is an explicit clause to the contrary in a collective agreement, an
employer is free to transfer bargaining unit work during the term of an agreement after
bargaining to impasse.) Nevertheless, the claims of the labor movement for state recognition
of shared values in the workplace are appropriately embodied in a demand for the recognition
of statutory rights.
[Vol. 44:237
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agreement based on contract language, bargaining history, and past
practice.
Section VI describes why grievance arbitration is an inappropri-
ate forum in which to resolve disputes over statutory policy due to the
structural characteristics of arbitration and arbitrators' predominant
concern with the ongoing relationship between a specific employer
and union. The principles that arbitrators apply to resolve disputes
are compared with the justifications used by the Board and the courts
to explain their decisions. The student comments published in this
issue provide more detailed illustrations of the reasoning of arbitra-
tors as compared to the Board and the courts in the context of specific
types of recurring disputes. The extent to which the claims of this
Article are, or are not, supported by the findings of the student com-
ments is discussed in my concluding essay.37
Finally, Section VII summarizes this Article's central themes
and conclusions. It is argued that disputes that involve an overlap
between unfair labor practice charges and contract entitlements often
present the adjudicator with the need to allocate an unsettled statu-
tory entitlement. The way the disputes are resolved matters because
the allocation of the entitlement may influence the relative bargaining
power between management and labor. Arbitration is an inappropri-
ate forum for resolving these conflicts because what is accepted as
legitimate discourse to justify an arbitral award is bounded by the
collective bargaining agreement and the parties' expectations, rather
than by statutory policies aimed at balancing the relative power of
labor and management. In arbitration, the structure of the legal
framework is treated as a given rather than as the focal point for
engaging in an ongoing process of disputing about the structure itself.
In addition, arbitration awards are less visible than Board or court
decisions. They are primarily concerned with the disputes in a spe-
cific bargaining unit. Thus, the contribution of the disputing process
to the ongoing formation of an "ideology" of the workplace is local-
ized in the particular bargaining unit. Therefore, the conclusion
argues that the NLRB should adopt an alternative standard for defer-
ral, one which is more protective of the NLRB's jurisdiction to
resolve conflicts over fundamental questions of statutory policy.
II. SHARED JURISDICTION OVER STATUTORY AND
CONTRACT DISPUTES
In enacting the NLRA, Congress chose to create an administra-
37. For concluding observations on the implications of the student comments, see Lynch,
supra note 12.
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tive board staffed by labor relations experts who were to be appointed
by the President and confirmed by Congress.38  The Board was
charged with the responsibility of adjudicating unfair labor practice
charges,39 with all final orders subject to judicial review by the United
States Courts of Appeals before enforcement under a court's con-
tempt power. 4° Thus, the statutory structure contemplated the initial
formulation of statutory policy by an administrative board responsive
to changing political currents within the executive branch and Con-
gress.41 At the same time, the federal courts were to provide an
independent source of continuity in the development of labor policy
through judicial review of final Board orders.42
There are now two additional avenues by which the federal
courts shape labor policies governing collective bargaining. First,
under Section 301 of the LMRA, the courts have jurisdiction to
enforce collective bargaining agreements through actions filed in the
federal district courts. 43 As a part of this power to enforce collective
agreements, they also review arbitration awards as a precursor to
deciding if an award should be enforced by a court order.' Second,
the federal courts share jurisdiction with the Board over claims by
individual employees that their union has failed to represent them
fairly either in bargaining or in the processing of grievances under a
collective agreement.45
In all three avenues of this involvement with the formulation of
38. NLRA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153.
39. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
40. NLRA § 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f).
41. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960) ("[W]here
Congress has in the statute given the Board a question to answer, the courts will give respect to
that answer .... ); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)
("The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of
striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate
responsibility, which Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board,
subject to limited judicial review."). But see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
318 (1965) ("The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into judicial
inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions
properly made by Congress.").
42. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
43. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). State courts
may also hear actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements, but they must apply federal
law, and the actions may be removed to federal court. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390
U.S. 557 (1968); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1967).
44. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
45. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1962) (The NLRB's assumption of jurisdiction
over duty of fair representation complaints against bargaining agents did not "oust the courts
of their traditional jurisdiction to curb arbitrary conduct by the individual employee's
statutory representative."); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962) (A bargaining
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labor policy, the federal courts have been careful to project a con-
tractarian image of labor policy. Court doctrine points to the role of
both the Board and the courts as neutral adjudicators who encourage
the parties to define workplace rights through collective bargaining
and as avenues through which the parties enforce their bargain.46
Their actual decisions, however, establish initial statutory entitle-
ments, fill in gaps in agreements, and balance bargaining power by
regulating forms of concerted pressure.47 Thus, both the Board and
the courts play prominent roles in the formulation of labor policy in
ways that impact on the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements.
Although theoretically neutral contract interpreters, private arbi-
trators also play a role in shaping and implementing statutory policy.
The source of a labor arbitrator's jurisdiction over disputes is the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement.48 These agreements normally
include an arbitration clause that defines the scope of the arbitrator's
power to hear disputes arising under the agreement and that deline-
ates the remedies that the arbitrator may include in an award. This
consensual image of labor arbitration is, however, only a partial
explanation for the expansive role of labor arbitration. To understand
fully the role of labor arbitration, it is necessary to examine the doc-
trine shaping the interlocking relationship among the Board, the fed-
eral courts, and arbitrators.
Through their jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments, the federal courts have developed a substantial body of federal
common law making labor arbitration the centerpiece of a democratic
workplace in which workers and employers jointly agree on a set of
rules governing the conduct of management representatives and
agent's breach of the duty of fair representation violates Sections 7 and 8(b)(l)(A) of the
NLRA), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
46. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
48. For a description of the early rise to "prominence and respectability" of arbitration
and labor arbitrators, and their development as "a distinct professional group who successfully
advocated their role in the collective bargaining process," see Stone, supra note 1, at 1523-25.
See also Shulman, supra note 18, at 1007-09. Shulman explains the importance of
understanding the arbitrator's proper role:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a
community which transcends the parties. He is rather a part of a system of self-
government created by and confined to the parties ....
Id. at 1016, quoted in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
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employees.49 For example, if a union has waived its statutory right to
strike during the term of an agreement, federal courts will presume
that disputes arising under the agreement are subject to arbitration.5"
Similarly, if a dispute is subject to arbitration, federal common law
will imply a union obligation not to strike." Federal courts assume a
coterminous relationship between the breadth of a grievance arbitra-
tion clause and a union's pledge not to strike.5 2 Finally, the auton-
omy of arbitrators in the interpretation of agreements is also
protected by the limited nature of judicial review of arbitration
awards.53 Consequently, federal courts ordinarily enforce arbitration
awards as long as the arbitrator's opinion draws its essence from the
agreement.54
Implicit in this model of labor relations, with arbitration as the
central means by which unions control employer discretion on a dis-
pute-by-dispute basis, is the assumption that the union may waive
employees' statutory rights.5 5 Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees to
49. See supra note 18.
50. Justice Douglas first asserted that arbitration was the quid pro quo for a union's
agreement not to strike in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
He subsequently used an absolute no-strike clause to support the presumption of arbitrability
in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960). In a later
case, the Court found that a strike over a dispute that had been consigned to arbitration
violated the collective bargaining agreement, even in the absence of an express no-strike clause.
Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962); see also
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974). The binding relationship between
arbitration and the no-strike clause was accorded the equitable enforcement power of the
courts in 1970, when the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat.
70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), does not
prevent the federal courts from enjoining a strike over an arbitral dispute. Boys Mkts., Inc. v.
Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The Court provided the final touches to
the concept of the coterminous relationship between grievance arbitration and the no-strike
clause in 1976 when it held that a Boys Markets injunction could only issue to enforce a no-
strike clause if the work stoppage was over an arbitral dispute. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
51. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 464 U.S. 368 (1974); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
52. See cases cited supra note 50.
53. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99
(1960).
54. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987); Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
55. The coterminous relationships between arbitration, the peaceful means of resolving
workplace disputes, and the no-strike clause assumes that a bargaining agent can waive an
individual employee's Section 7 entitlement to be protected when engaged in concerted
activity. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) ("On the premise of
fair representation, collective bargaining contracts frequently have included certain waivers of
the employees' right to strike . . . . Provided the selection of the bargaining representative
remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce and the maintenance of
regular production schedules.").
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employees the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, which includes the right to strike.5 6 Although an individ-
ual employee may not contract with his employer to waive that
employee's Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity,17 once
employees have banded together into a union, their bargaining agent
may waive this right in a collective bargaining agreement encompass-
ing all the employees within the bargaining unit."
This "waiver" doctrine inevitably leads to shared jurisdiction
between the Board and arbitrators in the adjudication of potential
Section 7 violations. Consequently, the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement becomes the central issue in determining both
the extent of the protection provided by the agreement and whether
the agreement waived the protection that the employees would other-
wise enjoy under Section 7. Two similar cases, NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems 59 and American Freight System v. NLRB,6 ° provide useful
examples of this overlap.
In each of these cases, an employee refused to drive a truck that
he thought was unsafe and, as a result, was discharged by the
employer for refusing to follow the order to drive.61 Illustration 1 sets
forth the employee's options at this point: Most employees would
immediately file a grievance claiming that the discharge was not for
just cause, arguing that there was a contractual right to refuse to drive
an unsafe truck.62 Alternatively, or simultaneously, the employee
might file an unfair labor practice charge with a regional office of the
Board, alleging that he had been disciplined for engaging in protected
concerted activity.63 Should the employee attempt to go directly to
court under Section 301 in order to enforce his claimed contractual
right 64 to refuse to drive an unsafe truck, however, the court would
dismiss the complaint and require the employee to first exhaust his
remedies under the collective bargaining agreement.65
56. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
57. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Individual contracts entered into prior to the
employees' selection of an exclusive bargaining agent cannot be used by the employer to
"defeat or delay procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to
collective bargaining." J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944).
58. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
59. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
60. 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
61. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 826-27; American Freight Sys., 722 F.2d at 830.
62. Illustration 1, Box D; see City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 827; American Freight Sys.,
722 F.2d at 830.
63. Illustration 1, Box B; see City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 827-28; American Freight Sys.,
722 F.2d at 830.
64. Illustration 1, Box E.
65. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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If the grievance is resolved in the employee's favor prior to arbi-
tration and if the employee is content with the result, that would end
the matter. If the grievance is arbitrated and the employee wins, the
employer's only alternative is to seek to set aside the award in a court,
but the court would normally treat the award as final and hence bind-
ing.66 The situation becomes more complex, however, if the grievance
is resolved against the employee.
Illustration 1 depicts three different ways in which a decision
adverse to the grievant may be made. First, the union could decide
that the grievance lacks merit and thus decline to grieve; this was the
case in City Disposal Systems.67 Second, the union might initiate griev-
ance procedures and either settle the grievance because it decides that
the employer was justified or because the grievance is not of sufficient
merit to justify the expenditure of union resources to arbitrate. Alter-
natively, the union may agree to a compromise remedy, such as the
employee's reinstatement without back pay.68 If the union either set-
tles the grievance or declines to grieve, the employee-if he is dissatis-
fied with the union's decision-may elect to pursue an alternative
remedy by initiating a complaint in another forum.69 Third, the
grievance could go to arbitration and be denied by the arbitrator.70 In
American Freight System, for example, the grievance was denied after
a hearing by a bipartite grievance committee which the court treated
as equivalent to arbitration.7" At this point, the employee in Illustra-
tion 1 must seek redress in a public forum to challenge the resolution
of the dispute that occurred through private ordering.72
The employee has two options in public forums if the grievance
ends short of arbitration, and an additional third option if it is denied
by the arbitrator: (1) He can file an unfair labor practice charge if one
is not already pending;73 (2) he can file a Section 301 action alleging
that the union breached its duty of fair representation74 and that the
66. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 370-71 (1987);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
67. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 827; Illustration 1, Box F.
68. Illustration 1, Box G; see, e.g., Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v. NLRB, 723 F.2d
169 (5th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1981).
69. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; Illustration 1, Boxes B and L.
70. Illustration I, Box H.
71. American Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 822, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
72. See Illustration 1, Boxes J-B, H-K, and J-L.
73. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a); Illustration 1, Boxes J-B.
74. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Illustration 1, Boxes J-
L. Alternatively, the employee can file an unfair labor practice charge against the union for
breach of the duty of fair representation, either in addition to or instead of a charge against the
employer for interference with Section 7 rights. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 176-83. On the facts of
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employer breached the collective bargaining agreement;75 or (3) if the
grievance has been denied by the arbitrator, he can additionally seek
(through an action filed by the union) to have the award set aside by a
federal district court.76 Thus, the nature of the cause of action is dis-
tinct in each forum, even though the action arises from the same
underlying set of facts.
The discharged truck driver may also pursue the unfair labor
practice charge before the Board either without first filing a grievance
or after he has exhausted his available contract grievance procedures,
as long as the six month statute of limitations for such charges has not
run.77 The unfair labor practice charge poses three issues for the
Board: (1) whether the driver was discharged for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity; 7 (2) whether the collective bargaining
agreement waived the employee's statutory protection by establishing
a contractual standard for the protection of employees who refuse to
drive a truck that is less protective of bargaining unit employees than
is Section 7 or whether the standard is equivalent to the statutory
protection;79 and (3) whether the Board should defer the charge to
arbitration."8
If the employee goes to the Board first or pursues a grievance and
unfair labor practice charge simultaneously, either the General Coun-
sel or the Board, if formal proceedings against the employer have
reached the point of a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), will apply the standards for deferral prior to arbitration."'
Because the same underlying facts of the driver's discharge are the
source of both the grievance and the unfair labor practice charge, the
the discharged driver example, however, the employee will be more likely to file a Section 301
action to avoid Board confusion over the relationship between the employer's interference with
Section 7 rights and the union's duty of fair representation. See infra notes 473-91 and
accompanying text.
75. Cf Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87 (In order to proceed with a breach of contract action
against an employer under Section 301, the employee must show that the bargaining agent
breached its duty of fair representation.).
76. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
77. An unfair labor practice complaint may not issue if the alleged violation occurred
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge. NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
The Supreme Court has adopted Section 10(b) as the statute of limitations for Section 301
actions against both the employer and the union when the employee is alleging a breach of the
duty of fair representation. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983).
78. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
79. See id. at 835-37.
80. See American Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
81. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984) (The Board defers if the
parties' agreement provides for arbitration, the dispute is arbitrable, and the employer is
willing to arbitrate.).
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unfair labor practice proceedings will normally be stayed pending
arbitration, as long as the employer is willing both to arbitrate and to
be bound by the arbitral award. 82
If the employee is unhappy with the arbitrator's award and
requests reinstatement of the unfair labor practice charge subsequent
to the award, the issue posed will be the same as it would have been
had the employee exhausted the contract grievance procedures before
filing the charge. Under current Board standards, as long as the
grievance proceedings are "fair and regular"83 and the arbitrator's
award is not "palpably" inconsistent with the policies and purposes of
the Act,84 the charge will be dismissed.
Following the arbitrator's award in the case of the discharged
driver, the employer can also make a narrower collateral estoppel
argument for deferral based on the similarity of the issues posed in
both forums.85 The employer will claim that the arbitrator's decision
regarding the level of protection that the collective bargaining agree-
ment provides the employee is essentially addressing the same issue
that the Board would face in deciding whether the agreement waived
the employee's statutory protection. Therefore, the employer will
argue that the Board should respect the parties' agreement to have the
arbitrator interpret the contract.
86
In response to either a broad deferral standard based on the same
underlying facts or a more narrow collateral estoppel defense, the
driver will argue that his access to the Board should not be waived on
the basis of the overlap of his contract and statutory rights because
the protection that Section 7 provides an employee who refuses to
drive an unsafe truck reflects statutory policies that are independent
of the collective bargaining agreement. 87 The employee will claim
that he is entitled to a de novo hearing on the facts and the law
because the Board is charged with the responsibility to enforce statu-
tory rights.88 In practice, the Board tends to favor the employer's
82. See id. For a more detailed treatment of deferral standards, see infra notes 394-444
and accompanying text.
83. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (The Board defers subsequent to an
arbitral award if the contractual issue is parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, the
arbitrator is presented with the relevant facts, and the award is not palpably wrong.).
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the
Board may have relied on estoppel as one of four possible theories to justify deferral). For a
discussion of the Darr court's questioning of the theories that the Board had relied on in
deciding to defer, see infra notes 432-44 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408.
87. See id. at 1407.
88. See id.
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position, but some federal courts have reversed the Board based on
reasoning that is more sympathetic to the employee's argument.8 9
When a grievance is decided short of arbitration, such as when
the union decides either not to grieve or to settle the grievance, the
Board's position on deferral is not as clear, but it appears to be mov-
ing toward treating a union settlement the same as an arbitration
award.90 The fact pattern of NLRB v. City Disposal Systems posed the
most difficult case for deferral to grievance proceedings because the
union refused at the outset to grieve on the employee's behalf.91 In
City Disposal Systems, the charged party did not plead deferral as an
affirmative defense; instead, the employer argued for dismissal based
on the driver's failure to exhaust internal union procedures that per-
mitted him to challenge the union's refusal to grieve.92 The ALJ dis-
missed the exhaustion argument with a reference to the statutory
language that states that the Board's powers are not "affected by any
other means of adjustment." 93 Thus, the central issue of the case
became whether the refusal to drive by a sole truck driver, without
any aid or support by fellow employees, constituted protected con-
certed activity.94 Consequently, the Supreme Court majority opinion
in City Disposal Systems focused only on the meaning of "concerted"
under Section 7.95 The union's refusal to grieve is mentioned, but it
played no apparent part in the majority's reasoning.96
The dissent, in contrast, focused primarily on the need to contain
this type of dispute within contract grievance procedures and sug-
gested that the Board, even assuming that the refusal was protected,
should have deferred to the union's initial decision to decline to
grieve.97 The general theory of collective bargaining is more consis-
tent with the dissent in the sense that, under the theory, the Board
89. See infra notes 403-44 and accompanying text.
90. Compare Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985), enforced sub nom. Mahon
v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987) (adopting the same tests for deferral to grievance
settlements as those applied in deferral to arbitration awards, finding the settlements to be "fair
and equitable," and instead focusing on the union's waiver of employees' statutory claims) with
Spann Bldg. Maintenance Co., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1013 (1988)
(refusing to defer to union acquiescence in a remedy unilaterally instituted by the employer).
See Comment, Distinguishing Arbitration and Private Settlement in NLRB Deferral Policy, 44
U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1989).
91. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 839-41 (1984).
92. City Disposal Sys., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 453 (1981), enforcement denied, 683 F.2d 1005
(6th Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
93. Id. (quoting Section 10(a) of the NLRA).
94. Id. at 451 n.2.
95. 465 U.S. at 841.
96. Id. at 827.
97. Id. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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should defer to a union's decision as long as no conflict between the
union and the employee raises a question of whether the union's deci-
sion was made either in bad faith or arbitrarily. 9 Thus, the dissent's
approach implicitly suggests that fair representation protections
should be incorporated into the deferral doctrine99 and that, if the
union has not breached its duty by declining to grieve, the employee
has no statutory right to a Board hearing."'
This description of the relationships among the forums is primar-
ily aimed at emphasizing the critical roles that waiver and deferral
play in making arbitration the central forum for resolving claims
involving both statutory and contract rights. The substance of the
deferral and waiver doctrines and their implications for the protection
and development of statutory rights are addressed in more detail in
subsequent sections."°0
The second type of overlap between the Board's jurisdiction and
the jurisdiction of arbitrators involves mid-term modifications to col-
lective bargaining agreements. Illustration 2 draws on recent develop-
ments in the drug testing area to demonstrate the nature of the shared
jurisdiction in this type of dispute:
98. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967).
99. In order for a grievance settlement by a union to be regarded as "fair and equitable"
for purposes of deferral when the grievant objects to the settlement and continues to pursue a
Board remedy, the Board would need to rely on a waiver theory. In making concessions that
provide a basis for settlement, a union essentially waives employees' statutory rights. See
Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985). Collective control over individual rights is
only valid if the decision is not arbitrary or in bad faith. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). Thus, a collective's waiver of an individual's statutory remedy would be valid only if
the union's decision did not breach its duty of fair representation.
100. See infra notes 482-91 and accompanying text (analyzing the relationship between the
NLRB's standard for deferral to a settlement objected to by the affected employee and the duty
of fair representation). Compare Comment, supra note 90, at 368-69 with Lynch, supra note
12, at 625-28 (arriving at differing conclusions on deferral to such settlements).
101. See infra notes 394-502 and accompanying text.
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In implementing the testing program, an employer may first bargain
to impasse with the union, l° or it may simply implement the testing
plan. 0 3 If the employer implements the plan without bargaining, the
union may file both Section 8(a)(5)" ° and Section 8(d) °5 charges. On
the other hand, if the employer either had first bargained to impasse
or offered to bargain but the union declined on the grounds that the
employer could not implement the plan during the agreement's term
without violating the agreement, then the principal charge would be
based on the employer's obligation to maintain the terms of the agree-
ment under Section 8(d).
106
In either circumstance, the union can file a grievance alleging
that the drug testing plan violates the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 0 7 The union may simultaneously attempt to block implemen-
tation of the plan pending arbitration by seeking a status quo
injunction under Section 301.108 The primary issue for the arbitrator
to decide in this instance is whether the employer has the authority
under the management rights clause to implement a drug testing
plan. 1 9 This clause will be interpreted in the light of other terms of
the agreement that relate to drugs,"10 such as the possession or use of
102. Illustration 2, Box C. For a definition of a bargaining impasse and the pertinent Board
and court decisions, see infra note 228.
103. Illustration 2, Box B.
104. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
105. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
106. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (company could unilaterally transfer
bargaining unit work to non-unionized plant after bargaining to impasse with union). For an
analysis of the implications of the Board and court decisions in this case on future mid-term
modification disputes under Section 8(d), see infra notes 249-87 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Laidlaw Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Allen, Arb.) (union
opposed employer-imposed drug testing program by filing both a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement and an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB). For a
thorough discussion of arbitration awards in grievances filed over unilaterally implemented
drug testing programs, see Comment, Employee Drug Testing: Federal Courts Are Redefining
Individual Rights of Privacy, Will Labor Arbitrators Follow Suit? 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489
(1989).
108. The federal courts are in disagreement over whether it is appropriate to issue an
injunction to maintain the status quo until an arbitrator can rule on the validity of a union's
challenge to a drug testing program. Compare United Steelworkers v. USX Corp., 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3089 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (enjoining a plan that involved substantial privacy
invasion-including a strip search and observed urination) with IBEW Local 1900 v. PEPCO,
634 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986) (requiring a union seeking an injunction to show that
employees have particular current needs, beyond temporary loss of employment, that could
not be addressed fully by a subsequent arbitration award).
109. See Comment, supra note 107, at 516-20.
110. See id. at 519 (describing Gem City Chem., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986)
(Warns, Arb.) (The company argued that unilateral implementation of its drug testing
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drugs in the workplace. In most cases, arbitrators reduce the question
to whether the plan is a reasonable means, under the circumstances,
for implementing policies such as job safety and the maintenance of
productivity. "' The arbitrator balances employees' privacy interests
against the employer's need to manage the workplace, and he makes
an initial assignment of entitlements regarding drug testing which will
provide a basis for future bargaining.
' 2
Should the union elect to strike in lieu of arbitration, it is likely
that the employer will be able to obtain a Boys Markets injunction" 3
to end the work stoppage pending arbitration, as long as the employer
is willing to submit the dispute to an arbitrator." 4 If the employer
then claims that the dispute is beyond the reach of the arbitration
clause because drug testing is not contained in the agreement per se,
then the union can file a Section 301 action to force arbitration." 5
Under the presumption of arbitrability that applies to collective bar-
gaining agreement disputes, the court would normally order the par-
ties to arbitrate. "16
Consequently, the substantive issue of the employer's discretion
to implement drug testing unilaterally during the term of an agree-
ment will be decided by the NLRB or by an arbitrator. If the union
prefers arbitration, the union can simply file a grievance and the arbi-
trator will decide the issue.' Should the union prefer the Board,
however, the employer may be free to choose between leaving the dis-
pute before the Board or forcing arbitration by waiving contract limits
on the filing of a grievance and requesting deferral."' Thus, the stra-
tegic behavior of the parties in forum shopping is likely to reflect the
way in which the two different forums will approach the overlap
between the statutory duties to bargain and to maintain the terms of
program was justified by a clause authorizing annual safety physicals or, alternatively, by the
prohibitions against illegal drugs and intoxication on the job.)).
111. See id. at 520-23.
112. See id. at 518-20 (describing arbitration awards' analysis of the reasonableness of
employer-implemented drug testing programs under management rights clauses).
113. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (A
federal court may issue an injunction to stop a union work stoppage over an arbitral issue
when the work stoppage is in breach of a no-strike clause.).
114. Id. at 254 (quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
115. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
116. Id.
117. There is no procedural avenue which an employer can use to force a union to file an
unfair labor practice charge rather than a grievance.
118. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984). For a more detailed
description of the standards that govern pre-arbitration deferral, see infra notes 394-444 and
accompanying text.
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the agreement and the contractual waiver of the statutory bargaining
entitlement. 119
The NLRB's recent decision in Johnson-Bateman Co. 120 provides
a partial picture of the way in which the Board will deal with a Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) charge. In Johnson-Bateman, the company unilaterally
implemented a policy of testing employees who needed medical treat-
ment for on-the-job injuries.12 1 The employer gave the union neither
notice of the new policy nor an opportunity to bargain prior to imple-
menting the drug and alcohol testing. 22 The union then filed Section
8(a)(5) and Section 8(a)(1) charges.' 23 The union had not previously
filed a grievance over the drug testing policy, and the employer was
unwilling to waive contract requirements regarding the timely filing of
grievances. 124 Given the parties' positions, the Board did not have the
option of deferring the dispute to grievance arbitration.
125
The employer's primary defense to the Section 8(a)(5) charge
was that the union had waived its statutory right to bargain over drug
testing both by agreeing to a "zipper clause" and to a broad "manage-
ment rights clause" and by acquiescing in the past to unilaterally
implemented company rules.' 26 The Board evaluated the parties'
agreement and past practices by relying on the rule of interpretation
that states: "It is well settled that the waiver of a statutory right will
not be inferred from general contractual provisions; rather, such
waivers must be clear and unmistakable."' 127 Under this standard, an
employer will lose on a Section 8(a)(5) charge before the Board unless
he can show "the matter at issue to have been fully discussed and
consciously explored during negotiations and the union to have con-
sciously yielded or clearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the
matter."'12 8 Therefore, because the employer was unable to produce
evidence of bargaining history to show that drug and alcohol testing
was discussed in relation to the management rights clause, the Board
ruled in favor of the union.129 Moreover, the Board also rejected as
evidence of a waiver an earlier arbitrator's award that had interpreted
119. See infra notes 445-502 and accompanying text.
120. 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393 (1989).
121. 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1395.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1395 n.6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1398. For an example of a "zipper clause," see infra note 241.
127. 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1398, 1401 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693, 708 (1983)).
128. Id. at 1398, 1400 (citing Rockwell Int'l Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1347 (1982)).
129. Id. at 1402.
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the management rights clause as giving the employer the "right to
make rules to manage the plant, provided the rules do not violate the
collective bargaining agreement."'
131
Had the employer sought deferral, the outcome could well have
been the opposite. In arbitration, the rule of interpretation that deter-
mines the employer's power under the management rights clause nor-
mally focuses on whether a drug testing policy is a reasonable
company rule given the surrounding circumstances and the legitimate
concern over safety in the workplace.13' Before deciding whether the
employer could implement the drug testing plan without union con-
sent, an arbitrator might refer to the policies of Section 8(a)(5) that
compel bargaining. 132 The predominant tendency, however, would be
for the arbitrator to turn directly to the question of whether the plan
was a reasonable means to implement policies involving job safety.
131
In Johnson-Bateman, the employer would have had an excellent
chance of winning in arbitration, given that the drug testing was trig-
gered by a specific event (an employee injury) and that there was a
prior arbitration award broadly interpreting the management rights
clause.'3 4 If an arbitrator had upheld the company's power to imple-
ment the testing program under the contract, the Board would likely
have declined to reactivate the Section 8(a)(5) charge in response to
the union's argument that the arbitrator failed to follow the Board's
rule of interpretation for finding a waiver of a statutory right. 1 This
130. Id. at 1400-01.
131. For an example of arbitral awards focusing on the reasonableness of drug testing, see
Comment, supra note 107, at 525-28.
132. See, e.g., Laidlaw Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Allen, Arb.) (employer
had a statutory obligation to bargain to impasse before implementing drug testing). An
equivalent issue may also emerge under the collective bargaining agreement if a union obtains
a clause obligating an employer to give the union notice and the opportunity to discuss
proposed changes in work rules prior to implementation. See, e.g., Gem City Chem., Inc., 86
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.) (union objected to drug testing program on the
grounds that all safety matters under the collective agreement were made the subject of
bargaining by the collective agreement). Finally, notice and an opportunity to be heard before
a change in work rules can be implemented is regarded as one factor in evaluating whether an
employer's actions were "reasonable" under the management rights clause. See, e.g.,
Donaldson Mining Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471 (1988) (Zobrok, Arb.) (failure to give union
notice of a plan prior to its implementation was unreasonable).
133. See Comment, supra note 107, at 520-23.
134. For a description of arbitral awards upholding drug testing that was implemented as a
result of employee on-the-job injuries, see id. at 526.
135. See, e.g., Dennison Nat'l Co., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1076
(1989). The Board deferred a Section 8(a)(5) charge to an arbitrator's decision where the
arbitrator did not address the issue of the union's waiver of its bargaining entitlement because
the waiver issue was a statutory question for the NLRB. 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1076. The
arbitrator ruled that the management rights clause reserved to the employer the right to
unilaterally eliminate job classifications. Id. Even though the arbitrator's award was not
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is so because, under the general theory of collective bargaining, it is
the province of the arbitrator to interpret the contract. Once an arbi-
trator has ruled that the company has the power to act under the
collective bargaining agreement, the statutory issues under Section
8(a)(5) fade into the background.
As a result, the significance of the Board's decision in Johnson-
Bateman may be limited to the holding that alcohol and drug testing
of current employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 136 More-
over, future disputes over the implementation of drug testing during
the term of an agreement are likely to be deferred. Because the cen-
tral issue posed by the employer as a defense to the charge was the
claim of "waiver" under two clauses of the agreement, the meaning of
these types of clauses, rather than the policies underlying Section
8(a)(5), can be made the focal point for similar disputes in the future.
Under current Board standards, the interpretation of the contract is
within the province of an arbitrator if the employer will agree to arbi-
trate. In summary, whenever an employer can frame a statutory dis-
pute as a "waiver" issue, the meaning of the agreement-rather than
the NLRA-becomes the central issue, and arbitration becomes the
most likely forum for resolving the conflict.'37 The implications of
this trend for the protection of statutory rights is treated more fully in
Sections V and VI.
If an employer avoids the Section 8(a)(5) issue by bargaining to
impasse before implementing drug testing during the term of an
agreement, arbitration is still the most likely forum to resolve any
Section 8(d) charge.38 The waiver of the duty to bargain is no longer
an issue. Instead, the question is whether the employer failed to
maintain the terms of the contract in accordance with the statutory
necessarily consistent with Board precedent on the waiver of a duty to bargain, deferral was
appropriate unless the General Counsel could show that the arbitrator's award was not
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the NLRA. Id. at 1077. For an empirical
analysis of the impact of Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), on post-arbitration deferrals,
see Greenfield, The NLRB's Deferral to Arbitration Before and After Olin. An Empirical
Analysis, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34, 42-46 (1988). The study found that in two regional
offices, the rate of post-arbitration refusals to defer went from 18.9% to 3.8% of the cases
involving a deferral issue. Id. at 44. The study noted that following Olin, regional offices were
more inclined to find the statutory issue implicitly resolved by the arbitrator and, therefore, to
defer. Id. at 45.
136. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393 (1989).
137. See Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 575.
138. The area in which deferral prior to arbitration has received its greatest acceptance is
mid-term modification charges filed under Subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). See Schatzki, NLRB
Resolution of Contract Disputes Under § 8(a)(5), 50 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1972); Sharpe, NLRB
Deferral to Grievance Arbitration: A General Theory, 48 OH1o ST. L.J. 595, 608-09 (1987).
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obligation of Section 8(d).' 39 Although Board and court doctrine
over mid-term modifications is confused, it is clear that the interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement, particularly the manage-
ment rights clause, will be the central issue. " Therefore, the
employer can normally obtain deferral if the company prefers that the
dispute go to an arbitrator. Regardless of whether the Board or an
arbitrator resolves the question of implied entitlements when the con-
tract is essentially silent on the issue, the neutral adjudicator is placed
in the position of filling in gaps in the parties' agreement by looking to
statutory policy or the common law of the industry.1'" The decision
will give one party the equivalent of a property entitlement granting
control over a working condition that either can be retained by that
party in the future or bargained away.
Thus, a complete understanding of the impact of the deferral and
waiver doctrines requires an examination of the framework of statu-
tory entitlements that governs collective bargaining and an examina-
tion of the way in which the Board and the courts draw on the
policies underlying that framework either to fill gaps in agreements or
to justify the deferral of disputes to an arbitrator. Section IV explores
these entitlements and analyzes the way in which the framework and
the rules of interpretation employed by the Board and the courts
impact on the relative bargaining power of management and labor.
Before that, however, Section III describes the doctrines governing
the relationship between courts and arbitrators in actions to enforce
collective bargaining agreements under Section 301.142
III. THE CENTRALITY OF GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN LABOR
LAW DOCTRINE
The legal framework that shapes the structure of collective bar-
gaining is composed of federal common law under Section 301, which
permits private suits to enforce collective agreements, 14 3 and decisions
by the NLRB and the federal courts that interpret the NLRA in the
context of unfair labor practice proceedings. Both sources of prece-
dent complement each other and reinforce the centrality of grievance
arbitration. It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize this
doctrine completely, but a brief review of the most critical concepts is
139. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
140. For a discussion of current Board and court doctrine on mid-term modifications, see
infra notes 252-87 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 249-307 and accompanying text.
142. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
143. Id.
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important to an understanding of the way in which both of these bod-
ies of law influence the reasoning of arbitrators.
The key concepts in federal common law are: (1) the relation-
ship between the presumption of arbitrability and the waiver of the
union's right to strike, 14" and (2) the limited judicial review of arbitra-
tion decisions.'45 The NLRB doctrine of deferral of unfair labor prac-
tice charges to grievance arbitration complements limited judicial
review of arbitral awards.' 46 In addition, the waiver doctrine permits
arbitrators to determine when private ordering takes precedence over
the policies underlying statutory protections. 147 The federal common
law doctrines are described briefly below, and deferral and waiver are
the subject of Section V.
A. The Presumption of Arbitrability and No-Strike Clauses
Both NLRA doctrine and federal common law governing the
administration of collective bargaining agreements incorporate status
and contractarian images of the relationship between parties. 148 The
status image is embodied in the presumption that there is a quid pro
quo between a broad grievance arbitration clause and a no-strike
clause. If a contract includes either clause, then a corresponding
clause of similar scope will be presumed to be a part of the parties'
agreement; 149 only explicit language to the contrary will result in the
144. The arbitration clause is treated as the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause. See cases
cited supra note 50.
145. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
146. Compare infra notes 158-90 and accompanying text with infra notes 387-435 and
accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 445-502 and accompanying text.
148. The term "status" is used here to refer to the relationship between the parties that
results from the law imposing fixed obligations on a union and employer once the union is
certified and the parties enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Their "status" is in part
defined by obligations under both the NLRA and federal common law. These imposed
obligations are in contrast to the "contractarian" ideology which posits that the parties are
totally free to define, by mutual agreement, their reciprocal obligations and rights. For a
general discussion of the ways in which "status" assumptions about the appropriate
relationship between employers and employees permeate legal doctrine governing labor
relations, see J. ATLESON, supra note 17, at 84-96. See also Klare, supra note 17; Stone, supra
note 1.
149. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974) (labeling the relationship
between the no-strike clause and the arbitration clause the "coterminous application"
doctrine); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement creates an implied prohibition of
strikes over matters subject to the arbitration clause); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960) ("When, however, an absolute no-strike clause is
included in the agreement, then in a very real sense everything that management does is
subject to the agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in the action it takes,
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two clauses not being read as coterminous.1 50 Moreover, even if the
parties agree on a clause that preserves union discretion to strike over
an issue that could be arbitrated, the clause will be read as narrowly
as possible so as to preserve industrial peace while the parties
arbitrate. 15'
The contractarian image emphasizes the parties' freedom to
define their relationship through the collective bargaining agreement
without government intervention in the formulation of the specific
terms of the agreement. 152 It is a basic principle of the NLRA duty to
bargain that neither party can be forced to agree to any terms of an
agreement through governmental intervention in the bargaining.
15 3
Federal labor policy encourages arbitration, but the parties are free to
agree on their own methods of administering their collective
agreement. 
54
These two doctrinal images co-exist in tension with each other.
Although a union cannot be compelled to agree to a no-strike clause,
it is presumed that the union has voluntarily agreed to such a clause if
a broad arbitration clause is contained in the agreement. 155 Similarly,
an employer cannot be compelled to agree to a broad arbitration
clause, but if he wants a broad no-strike clause, then the arbitration
clause will be presumed.1 56 As a result, almost all collective bargain-
or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes."). For an overview of the origins of the
coterminous application doctrine, see generally Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local
Union 480, 727 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); United States Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1983).
150. See Local 787, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Collins Radio Co., 317
F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963) (grievance not arbitrable where there was explicit exclusionary
language).
151. See Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 382.
152. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960) (noting that "it
remains clear that § 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling
the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements"); NLRB v. American Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) ("[T]he Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements."). In H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), the Court commented on the
limited remedial powers of the Board:
While the parties' freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the
Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree
would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private
bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.
Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
153. See cases cited supra note 152
154. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (private adjustment of grievances by "a method
agreed upon by the parties" is desirable).
155. See Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 382.
156. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
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ing agreements include both clauses, and the image of private order-
ing by contract is protected.1
57
B. The Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
Federal common law also preserves the autonomy of labor arbi-
tration from legal control through judicial review. As long as the
arbitrator bases his decision on an interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, a court is constrained to let the arbitrator's deci-
sion stand, even if the court feels that the arbitrator's contract
interpretation or findings of fact are erroneous. 58 The rationale is
that the parties contracted for the settlement of their disputes by an
arbitrator of their choice, and if they are dissatisfied with the decision,
they are free to select a different arbitrator in the future. Thus, the
parties can contract around any single arbitrator's decision that they
do not like, but federal common law discourages the parties from
using the courts to set aside an arbitrator's award.' 5 9
The general deference of the federal courts to arbitral awards has
recently been somewhat weakened in spite of a United States Supreme
Court opinion reaffirming the limited scope of judicial review. 6° The
primary source for the changing scope of review is the public policy
157. See infra note 372 (regarding the percentage of collective bargaining agreements with
no-strike clauses). Although 94% of the agreements in a Bureau of National Affairs sample
included a no-strike pledge, grievance arbitration clauses were found in 100% of the sampled
agreements. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION
CONTRACTS 12 (10th ed. 1983).
158. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 371 (1987) ("[A]s long
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to
overturn his decision."); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960) (An arbitration award should be enforced so long as it "draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement.").
159. See generally St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards.- A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MiCH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
160. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 846 F.2d 827, 828 (1st
Cir.) (Warren H) (On remand after Misco, the First Circuit affirmed its holding that the
arbitrator exceeded her authority in setting aside the discharge because the agreement gave the
company the "sole right" to discharge for particular violations, including possessing drugs on
company property.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 555 (1988); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Misco on the
grounds that federally mandated regulations for nuclear power plants required vacating, on
public policy grounds, the award reinstating an employee discharged for opening a safety door
so as to take a shortcut to lunch); Georgia Power Co. v. IBEW, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531,
539 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (Relying on a public policy denouncing the operation of potentially
hazardous equipment by employees under the influence of drugs, the Court refused to enforce
an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee who was discharged for violating the company's
anti-drug policy.); Delta Air Lines v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (setting aside an adjustment board's reinstatement of a pilot discharged for flying a
passenger plane while intoxicated), aff'd, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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exception to judicial deference to arbitration.16" ' In United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.,162 the Supreme
Court described the limited scope of this exception as follows:
"[A] court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that
is contrary to public policy" .... We cautioned, however, that a
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of such con-
tracts is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted
would violate "some explicit public policy" that is "well defined
and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests."'
6 3
Exactly what this means is unclear. In Misco, the Supreme
Court relied on two grounds as it reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision
to set aside an arbitrator's award that reinstated an employee dis-
charged for possession of drugs on company property."6 First, the
Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit had substituted its judgment of
the facts for that of the arbitrator.165 Second, the Court noted that
the Fifth Circuit did not point to any well defined public policy that
would prohibit an employer from continuing to employ a worker who
was caught with marijuana in a car on company property. 166 In spite
of the Misco decision, which narrowly construed the public policy
exception to judicial enforcement of arbitral awards, federal courts
are continuing to set aside arbitral awards on public policy
grounds.167 For example, the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed a dis-
trict court's refusal to enforce an award reinstating a pilot who had
flown a commercial airliner while under the influence of alcohol.' 68
The adjustment board had found that the pilot in question had been
treated differently than other similarly situated pilots, and it ordered
reinstatement, without back pay, because the airline had failed to
161. See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 373; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983). See generally Douglas, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1 (1988); Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988); Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitraon Award: The Public
Policy Defense, 10 INDUs. REL. L.J. 241 (1988); Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance
Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the Search for a Well-Defined Public Policy
Exception, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (1988).
162. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
163. Id. at 373 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
164. Id. at 374.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 160.
168. Delta Air Lines v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 861
F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988).
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administer its alcohol rehabilitation program uniformly and fairly. 169
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to enforce the
award, citing federal regulations and state statutes that obligated the
airline to prevent a plane from being piloted by someone under the
influence of alcohol.170 The court concluded that this public policy
embodied in the federal regulations and state statutes removed from
the jurisdiction of the adjustment board any power to reinstate the
pilot, even if other employees were treated differently. 7'
The opening created by the public policy exception has also led
some courts to look more closely at the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements by arbitrators.'72 A recent decision of the
First Circuit illustrates this tendency. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Local 27, United Paperworkers International Union,1 73 an arbitrator
reinstated an employee who had informed his employer that he could
not report for work due to an injury. 174 The employee had said that
his arm hurt and, therefore, that he could not work; the employee,
however, then traveled 150 miles to play eighteen holes of golf. 
71
The collective agreement provided for progressive discipline, but a
specific disciplinary clause provided for immediate discharge for dis-
honesty. 176 The union argued that the clause providing for immediate
discharge was an exception to normal progressive discipline, but that
this exception did not remove the arbitrator's authority to determine
whether the degree of dishonesty engaged in by the employee consti-
tuted just cause for the discharge. 77 The arbitrator agreed with the
union's argument and found mitigating circumstances in the
employee's excellent prior work record during his twenty-five years
with the company.' 78  The arbitrator therefore reinstated the
169. Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 668.
170. Id. at 672-74.
171. Id. at 674.
172. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 846 F.2d 827 (1st Cir.)
(Warren H), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 555 (1988); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union, 845 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.) (Warren I), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 555 (1988). In Warren I and
H, the First Circuit disagreed with the arbitrators' interpretations of a clause governing the
employer's right to discharge and found that the employer had the "sole right" to discharge
for particular rule violations, rejecting the arbitrators' rulings that the contract was ambiguous
and that the employer therefore had to show "proper cause" for discharge. See Warren HI, 846
F.2d at 828; Warren 1, 845 F.2d at 8; see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1988).
173. 864 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 941.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 944.
178. Id.
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employee, but without back pay. 179
The First Circuit disagreed with the arbitrator's interpretation of
the agreement and reversed. 80 The court concluded that the contract
provided "two independent justifications for dismissal: (1) just cause,
and (2) a list of offenses, including dishonesty, for which immediate
discharge is appropriate."1 81  The court found the language of the
contract to be unambiguous so that "once dishonesty is established,
no further showing is required."'' 82 The opinion constitutes a straight
forward disagreement with the arbitrator's interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, despite the Supreme Court's caution
that the parties had contracted for the arbitrator to interpret the
agreement and that the arbitrator's interpretation should be
respected. 183
The growing number of cases in which federal courts have
refused to enforce arbitration awards presents a challenge to the tradi-
tional model of labor relations that is embodied in federal common
law.184 Implicit in these decisions is an assumption that arbitrators
should be more sensitive to bodies of legal doctrine and public policy
external to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, including
court precedent governing contract interpretation.1 85  It remains an
open question whether this trend will influence arbitrators to conform
their opinions to statutory precedent interpreting the NLRA when
they face either questions of statutory waiver or of implied contrac-
tual limits on management discretion.
1 86
In spite of the public policy exception, most courts still apply a
very limited scope of review to arbitration awards. 8 7 In addition,
most arbitrators prefer to justify awards by reference to the parties'
179. Id.
180. Id. at 946.
181. Id. at 944-45.
182. Id. at 945.
183. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 370 (1987).
184. See generally Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. PROC. 97 (1976).
185. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864
F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1988); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 846 F.2d 827
(1st Cir. 1988) (Warren H).
186. See Comment, Arbitration and Selective Discipline of Union Officials After
Metropolitan Edison, 44 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Selective
Discipline of Union Officials]; see also Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting After
Milwaukee Spring II: Much Ado About Nothing?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting].
187. See, e.g., Florida Power Corp. v. IBEW, Local Union 433, 847 F.2d 680 (1lth Cir.
1988) (sustaining award that reinstated employee arrested for drug possession and drunk
driving); United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (sustaining award that reinstated letter carrier who failed to deliver thousands of
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agreement, and to interpret the agreement so as to avoid any conflict
with external law."' 8 Consequently, arbitrators integrate court deci-
sions into their awards by combining the values underlying public
policy with traditional arbitral values in order to interpret the mean-
ing of the parties' agreement.'8 9 They still reason, however, as if their
award is bounded primarily by the collective bargaining agreement. 190
IV. STATUTORY AND CONTRACT ENTITLEMENTS
IN THE WORKPLACE
Common law doctrine, symbolized by the discharge at will doc-
trine, assumed that the appropriate hierarchy in the workplace was
for the employer to control the terms and conditions of employment
unless the employer agreed, by contract, to limit the exercise of its
managerial discretion.191 A substantial body of federal and state legis-
lation now operates to limit this discretion in such areas as discrimi-
pieces of mail); Northwest Airlines v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988) (sustaining award that reinstated alcoholic pilot).
188. The way that arbitrators should deal with a conflict between "external law" and the
parties' agreement has been a source of competing views since the debate was begun by two
distinguished arbitrator-scholars. See Howlett, The Arbitrators, the NLRB, and the Courts, 20
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 67 (1967) (Law is an overriding element of every collective
bargaining agreement and should be considered by the arbitrators whenever applicable.);
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545
(1967) (Arbitrators should follow the contract and ignore the law.). For a middle position,
that the law is relevant only when it forbids something that the contract permits, as opposed to
permitting something that the contract forbids, see Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration,
21 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 42 (1968); Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal
Law?, 23 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 29 (1970).
189. See J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW
AND PRACTICE 198-99 (1988).
190. See id.; see also infra notes 298-332 and accompanying text.
191. For a history of the "at will" doctrine, see Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). Even limits agreed to in written
contracts were often unenforceable. In contrast to the case with commercial contracts, the
duration of the employment had to be fixed in the agreement and could not be implied from
circumstances surrounding the agreement. Id. at 128-29 (reviewing thirty New York decisions
between 1895 and 1915 in which the duration of an employment contract was central to the
courts' decisions). When a contract of employment did contain an express duration clause, it
still might be held unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation. In the absence of a
promise that an employee would not leave his employer, the employer was not bound by a
promise to retain the employee in accordance with the express duration clause. See Pitcher v.
United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932). For an excellent treatment of the
ideological premises underlying the doctrine, and its elevation to constitutional status by the
Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), see Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog
Old Tricks.- Coppage v. Kansas and At- Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 765
(1985). For a review of the recent doctrinal developments limiting the scope of the "at will"
doctrine, see Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
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nation, 112 minimum wage and hour standards,193 health and safety, '94
social security,'"g and welfare benefits. 96 When working conditions
meet or exceed these statutory minimums, however, labor law doc-
trine limits the government's involvement in the substantive terms of
collective bargaining agreements. 97
Through their interpretation of the NLRA, the Board and the
courts shape the framework for collective bargaining by setting limits
on the parties' use of coercive power, by defining the scope of bargain-
ing, and by allocating statutory obligations and spheres of protected
rights which shape the parties' expectations.' 98 The decisions of the
Board and the courts influence the parties' relative power and help
determine the outcome of bargaining. 99 One way to focus on this
relationship between statutory interpretation and the relative power
of the parties is to treat the NLRA as establishing a set of statutory
entitlements. 2"
192. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(a), 81 Stat.
602, 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982)) (private right of action for age
discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1982)) (creating a private cause of action for
victims of race and sex discrimination in employment).
193. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 376, §§ 6-7, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-1064 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1982)) (minimum wage and maximum hour provisions).
194. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 5(a)(1), 6(a), 84
Stat. 1590, 1593 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(1), 655(a) (1982)) (obligating
employers to furnish employees with "employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm"
and requiring the Secretary of Labor to promulgate national consensus standards for employee
health and safety).
195. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397 (1982)).
196. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at scattered provisions of 15 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 45 U.S.C.).
197. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) ("The object of [the Wagner] Act
was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but
rather to ensure that employers and their employees could work together to establish mutually
satisfactory conditions."); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) (It is
"clear that the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit
in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("The theory of the Act is that free opportunity
for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial
peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not
attempt to compel.").
198. For a classification of statutory protections and obligations in terms of the nature of
the entitlements they create, see infra notes 217-324 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
200. For a view of the law as assigning entitlements protected by rules that provide for
different types of remedies that depend on the nature of the entitlement, see Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For an application of this framework to authoritative
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Some NLRA entitlements are inalienable in the sense that they
cannot be bargained away.2"1 Most, however, may be exchanged
through bargaining. 20 2 When these entitlements are appropriated
without the consent of the entitlement holder-that is, not bargained
for or not exchanged-the remedy available to the holder varies
depending on whether the entitlement is protected by a "property
rule" or by a "liability rule. '20 3 When an entitlement that is protected
by a property rule is taken without consent, the holder can obtain
equitable relief in the form of an injunction to prevent the taking.2°
In contrast, an entitlement that is protected by a liability rule may be
appropriated without consent, and the only remedy that is available is
an award of damages assessed by a court or other neutral adjudica-
tory body.20 5
Most statutory protections that unions can waive through collec-
tive bargaining are treated by the Board as being subject to property
rules. The Board is formally limited to providing make-whole reme-
dies, primarily reinstatement with back pay, but it cannot award dam-
ages.2 6 The Board's orders are only enforceable by the equitable
powers of the courts.20 7
Entitlements allocated through collective bargaining are nor-
mally also protected by property rules. Arbitrators issue orders to
cease and desist from contract breaches, orders that are enforceable
by the equitable powers of the courts.20 8 In some situations such as
interpretations of the NLRA, see Wachter & Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective
Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial
Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1988).
201. As used here, "inalienability" means that the statute has been interpreted so as to
prevent this entitlement from being transferred. Any clause transferring this entitlement
would be unenforceable and could be removed from an agreement by an NLRB order that is
enforceable by a court. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text; see also Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
202. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). See generally Edwards,
Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting
Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985); Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights
Under the NLRA: Part I, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 335 (1981).
203. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 200, at 1092.
204. See id.; see also Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200, at 1370-71.
205. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 200, at 1092; Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200,
at 1368-69.
206. Section 10(c) sets forth the Board's powers to remedy unfair labor practices by taking
"such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this [Act]." NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). See generally D.
McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (1976).
207. Section 10(e) provides a mechanism for enforcement of Board orders when the Board
petitions the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
208. The parties may petition either a state court or a federal district court to enforce the
award of an arbitrator. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185. If the action is initially filed'in a state
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work rules, however, it is more convenient for the parties to simply
provide for liability rule protection in the form of damages should an
employer breach a clause that protects bargaining unit work.2 °9
Labor doctrine also incorporates two types of entitlements that
court, however, the defendant may remove to a federal district court under federal question
jurisdiction. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
209. There are two situations in which a union might seek to use a liquidated damage clause
rather than a clause that simply prohibits unit work from being assigned to non-unit
employees. The first is a situation in which an employer would be able to contract away
control over the work in question so that union activity aimed at forcing the employer to
return the work to the bargaining unit could be classified as secondary under the "right to
control" doctrine. See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, Local Union No. 638, 429
U.S. 507 (1977). Union concerted activity is secondary when it is directed not only at the
party with whom the union has a labor dispute, but also at a third party which the union seeks
to compel into discontinuing business with the employer, the party with whom the union has
the dispute. For the most celebrated definition of a secondary boycott, see IBEW, Local 501 v.
NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). Union concerted
activity to enforce a contract clause aimed at protecting bargaining unit work from being
transferred to other employees is secondary if the union's employer has contracted away the
right to control the assignment of the work to another employer. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 521-
23. It is an open question whether enforcement of a work preservation clause in an agreement
to obtain compensation may also be classified as coercive within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(B), and therefore secondary. The work preservation clause is primary, and thus valid,
if the union and the employer entered into it while the employer controlled the work. Id. at
525-26; see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). The problem is
whether, because of the logic of Pipefitters, enforcement of the clause becomes coercive after
control is contracted to a second employer. Generally, the Board has not classified arbitration
that is not accompanied by a work stoppage as coercive within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(B). See Sheet Metal Workers, Local 2 (Doubarn Sheet Metal, Inc.), 9 NLRB Advice
Mem. Rep. (LRP) 19,117 (July 15, 1982); see also California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n,
227 N.L.R.B. 269, 274 (1976); Carrier Air Conditioning Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 727, 730 (1976),
modified sub nom. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 28 v. Carrier Air Conditioning Co.,
547 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Hughes Mkts., Inc., 218
N.L.R.B. 680, 683 (1975).
Similar issues arise when the employer does not contract away control over the work, but
instead assigns the work to another bargaining unit, and the union in the bargaining unit that
lost the work threatens to engage in concerted pressure if the work is not assigned to that
union's members. The employer may request the Board to resolve the jurisdictional dispute
over the work under Section 10(k). NLRA § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k). A question can again
emerge as to whether the first union can seek damages in arbitration for the transfer of the
work in violation of the union's collective bargaining agreement. Current Board decisions
hold that a union grievance seeking arbitration prior to a Section 10(k) Board hearing to
determine which group of employees should be assigned the disputed work is not coercive
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(D). See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union
No. 49 v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 473 (1973). If the grieving union does
not win the Section 10(k) hearing, there is a greater chance that arbitration will be treated as a
Section 8(b)(4)(D) violation and enjoined by the NLRB. See Local 32, ILWU (Weyerhaeuser
Co.), 271 N.L.R.B. 759 (1984), enforced sub nom. Local 32, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n,
773 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1985). Asking for compensation for the loss of work, rather than for
the work itself, puts the union in a better position to argue that they are simply enforcing their
collective agreement, not challenging the Board's ruling in the Section 10(k) hearing. See
Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 529 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976); Iron Workers Local 55 (Lathrop Co.), 292
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are not found in other bodies of law.21° First, Section 8(a)(5) grants
bargaining representatives an entitlement, protected by a "bargaining
rule," that seeks to give employees a collective voice in setting the
terms and conditions of employment.2 '" Second, the Board and the
courts have inferred from the structure of the NLRA an individual,
inalienable employee entitlement to "fair representation. '21 2 Employ-
ees within the bargaining unit are entitled to fair representation by the
union both in the judgment calls that the union makes while bargain-
ing,213 and in the processing of grievances under the collective agree-
ment. 1 4 The following is a brief description of how the framework
that labor law doctrine establishes to regulate private collective bar-
gaining can be conceptualized in terms of these five categories of enti-
tlements.215 The contours of the bargaining rules are described first
N.L.R.B. No. 7, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1239 (1989); Carpenters Local 33 (Blount Bros.), 289
N.L.R.B. No. 167, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1311 (1988).
210. The conceptual treatment of employer obligations under Section 8(a)(5) as a limited
"bargaining entitlement" was first developed in an excellent article by Professors Michael
Wachter and George Cohen that applied theories on internal labor markets to collective
bargaining over work preservation clauses. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200, at 1371-72.
211. See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984) (arguing that the
principal contribution of unions in the workplace is to provide employees with a voice in the
rules that govern work, thereby enhancing worker satisfaction and productivity); Leslie, Labor
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984) (comparing the collective goods model of labor
relations with the price theory and relational contract models).
212. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (Board's jurisdiction to enforce the duty of
fair representation as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA not preemptive of court
jurisdiction to enforce the same obligation under Section 301); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (duty to represent fairly all bargaining unit members
under the NLRA); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (duty of bargaining agent to
represent all employees, not merely its own members, fairly); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944) (The RLA imposes on statutory bargaining representatives a "duty to
protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a
legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates."); Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding
bargaining representative's failure to represent fairly all bargaining unit employees to be a
violation of Subsections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2)).
213. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953). See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64
MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980); Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, A Reply to Hyde, Can Judges Identify
Fair Bargaining Procedures?, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (1984); Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions,
Fairness and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1983); Hyde, Can
Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?: A Comment on Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions,
Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 415 (1984); Leffler,
Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance
Handling, 1979 ILL. L.F. 35.
214. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See generally Feller, supra note 17; Finkin,
supra note 213; Leffler, supra note 213.
215. The five types of entitlements referred to are property entitlements, liability
entitlements, inalienable entitlements, bargaining entitlements, and the entitlement to fair
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and are then followed by a description of the property, liability, and
inalienable entitlements embodied in the NLRA. The individual
employee's inalienable entitlement to fair representation is discussed
last. The conceptual framework is then used to assess the impact that
the assignment of the statutory entitlements has on the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties.21 6 The relationship between statutory
bargaining obligations and the formation of a collective agreement
creating property and liability contract entitlements is treated first.
A. Bargaining Rules
Bargaining rules guarantee employees a voice in determining
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ' 217
The two central concerns of bargaining rules are the scope of the sub-
jects about which parties must bargain and the obligations that flow
from the duty to bargain in good faith over those subjects both during
the initial period of contract formation and during the administration
of the agreement. The rules that the Board applies to define the scope
of bargaining are described first, followed by an assessment of the
implications of these rules for the strategic behavior of the parties
engaged in bargaining.
Case law divides the subjects of bargaining into three categories:
(1) mandatory, (2) permissive, and (3) illegal. 218 The third category is
another way of stating that the entitlement in question cannot be
transferred. If a clause transferring such an entitlement were
included in a collective bargaining agreement, it would be a violation
of the statute and hence unenforceable. 219 Therefore, the critical dis-
tinction is between mandatory and permissive subjects. If an issue is a
mandatory subject, the parties must bargain over it in good faith,22°
representation. Bargaining entitlements can be viewed as a type of property entitlement,
unique to labor law, that is protected by an equitable remedy only. The fair representation
entitlement can also be regarded as a type of inalienable entitlement owned by individual
employees.
216. The framework set forth here draws heavily on excellent articles by Professor Douglas
Leslie, see Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REV. 241 (1989), Professor
Stewart Schwab, see Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 245 (1987), and Professors Michael Wachter and George Cohen, see Wachter & Cohen,
supra note 200.
217. Section 8(d) defines the subjects about which the parties have a duty to bargain.
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." NLRA
§ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
218. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
219. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
220. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
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exchange information about the cost of their proposals,22 and the
employer may not take unilateral action on the subject until the par-
ties have reached an impasse in bargaining.222 On the other hand, a
permissive subject can be placed on the bargaining table for discus-
sion, but the opposing party is not obligated to bargain over the
issue.223
In order to protect the autonomy of employer decisionmaking in
responding to product market changes and in developing efficient pro-
duction methods, the Supreme Court has held that "bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the contin-
ued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process,
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. ' ' 224 The
NLRB has interpreted this language to mean that the decision as to
whether a subject is mandatory or permissive should be determined
by asking "whether it turns upon a change in the nature or direction
of the business, or turns upon labor costs; not its effect on employees
nor a union's ability to offer alternatives.
225
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
221. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See generally Bartosic & Hartley, The
Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study of the Interplay of
Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (1972); Shedlin,
Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the American
System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1980).
222. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See generally Schatzki, The Employer's
Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REV. 470 (1966); Stewart &
Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining and Action, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 233 (1970).
223. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
224. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). For a thoughtful
criticism of this case, see Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982). For an
economist's perspective on the Court's reasoning, see Alchian, Decision Sharing and
Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v.
NLRB, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 235 (1982).
225. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1984) (plurality opinion) (Otis Elevator 11),
rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) (Otis Elevator I). By making the test for the duty to bargain
depend on whether the decision turns upon labor costs or upon other factors related to the
direction of the business, the plurality protects management prerogatives. The plurality held
that the employer had no duty to bargain over a decision to transfer research operations
because the decision was motivated by factors other than labor costs: outdated technology at
the old plant and the consolidation and streamlining of operations at the new facility. Id.
Member Dennis concurred, but he applied a two-pronged test. Id. at 897 (Dennis, Member,
concurring). Relying on First National Maintenance, he concluded that an issue is mandatory
if the General Counsel can demonstrate: (a) that the union has control over a factor that is a
significant consideration in the decision of the employer and (b) that "the benefit for labor-
management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on
the conduct of business." Id. (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679). Member
Zimmerman concluded that an issue was mandatory if only the first part of the test applied by
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The test is constructed so as to keep unencumbered manage-
ment's discretion to respond to the product market unless the change
that management contemplates relates primarily to the cost of labor
and does not involve a basic change in the production process. 226 It
should be emphasized, however, that the effects on employees in the
bargaining unit of a permissive decision impacting on job security are
still a mandatory subject, even though the decision itself is not.227
The true significance of the mandatory-permissive distinction on
the outcome of bargaining is difficult to assess. The obligation to bar-
gain only means that the employer must bargain to impasse before
implementing a proposed change.228 When the parties are bargaining
Member Dennis was satisfied; that the decision was "amenable to resolution through collective
bargaining." Id. at 901 (Zimmerman, Member, concurring).
In subsequent opinions, the NLRB has failed to choose among the three alternative tests.
Instead, the Board has generally found that all three of the tests are satisfied or none of the
three are satisfied. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1130
(1989); Connecticut Color, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1211 (1988)
(view of Chairman Stephens and Member Bobson); Dubuque Packing Co., 287 N.L.R.B. No.
52, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151 (1987) remanded, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l v.
NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (remanding for a reasoned justification of the test that
the NLRB is applying to determine if an issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining and for an
explanation of how that test applies to the facts of the case). The remand of the District of
Columbia Circuit in United Food & Commercial Workers is explicitly aimed at forcing the
Board to articulate the test that "is in fact guiding agency behavior rather than merely serving
as a cover for arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking." 880 F.2d at 1439.
226. Otis Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 893-94; see also First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at
686; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
227. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681. See generally Kohler, Distinctions Without
Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance 5 INDUS. REL. L.J.
402 (1983).
228. Impasse is normally defined as that point at which future negotiations would be
fruitless. The "parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan,
Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963). In Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967),
the Board defined the factors it applies in deciding when an impasse exists:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is
disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an
impasse in bargaining existed.
Id. at 478. Following impasse, the employer may only institute benefits that are consistent
with the employer's prior offers See Atlas Metal Parts Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1981); Bradley Washfountain Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1950), enforcement denied, 192 F.2d 144
(7th Cir. 1951).
The extent to which these rules constrain employer behavior during bargaining is open to
question. The vague nature of the test for impasse is likely to constrain employers from imple-
menting changes that reduce benefits when the parties are engaged in. concession bargaining.
Should the NLRB rule that there was not an impasse, the employer could be ordered to reim-
burse employees in an amount equivalent to the reduction. See, e.g., Cauthorne Trucking, 265
N.L.R.B. 721 (1981), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 691 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir.
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over the initial terms of a collective agreement, the distinction
between a mandatory and a permissive subject may only be of sym-
bolic importance. At the initial bargaining stage, both mandatory and
permissive subjects may be placed on the table.22 9 The importance of
both types of demands may be communicated although the party that
is proposing a clause on a permissive subject avoids formally insisting
on its inclusion in the agreement. Only if the parties reach agreement
on all mandatory subjects will the constraints on the use of concerted
pressure to obtain a clause on a permissive issue inhibit the strategy of
either a union or an employer. Because agreements over mandatory
subjects are partially under the parties' control, however, an impor-
tant permissive subject is not likely to be isolated on the bargaining
table. When a strike or lockout occurs and a mix of mandatory and
permissive subjects is involved, the parties will understand and apply
the tradeoffs among all the issues on the table in order to arrive at a
final agreement. In short, classifying a subject as permissive does not
mean that a union will be unable to obtain a clause restricting
employer discretion to act unilaterally on that subject during the term
of the agreement.
2 30
Once an employer's discretion is constrained by specific language
in an agreement, the union can seek enforcement through grievance
arbitration. At that point, the critical issue is whether the assump-
tions about the importance of protecting the employer's
entrepreneurial discretion to respond to market forces, which underlie
the mandatory-permissive distinction, will influence arbitrators to
1982). A situation in which there was a prior increase in benefits, however, works very differ-
ently. Should the employer be found to have implemented the increase prior to impasse, the
Board could order the employer to cease and desist, but there is no monetary risk beyond the
cost of litigation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). In any case, it is likely that
the parties will have settled on a new agreement prior to the Board adjudication of the impasse
issue, and the unfair labor practice charge will normally be dropped as a part of the final
settlement on the new agreement. The unilateral increase that is less than the union has
demanded is only significant if the union strikes in response to obtain its demands and if the
union can characterize the strike as being an unfair labor practice strike in response to a Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) violation, instead of simply an economic strike for better terms. Then, should the
employer replace the strikers and should the union fail to win a favorable settlement of the
strike, the replacements would be classified as temporary, and the strikers reinstated with back
pay from the time that they offered to return to work. To avoid this obligation, the employer
must show that the strike would have occurred even without the employer committing the
unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th
Cir. 1956), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 356 U.S. 342, applied by Board after remand,
121 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1958). Consequently, a remedy for unilateral employer increases primar-
ily comes into play as additional job security, for employees who are willing to strike to obtain
demands in excess of the increases.
229. See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
230. See J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 189, at 123.
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construe narrowly the clause in the agreement.231 It is important to
note that the union's only remedy to enforce a clause that governs a
permissive subject is grievance arbitration. The breach of a clause
governing a permissive subject is not a violation of the employer's
duty to maintain the terms of the agreement under Section 8(d).23 2
Because the obey and grieve doctrine permits employers to act pend-
ing arbitration,233 the enforcement of some clauses regarding permis-
sive issues can prove to be illusory. No meaningful remedy may be
available once circumstances have changed as a result of an
employer's unilateral actions prior to the arbitrator's decision.234
A union may attempt to preserve the integrity of arbitration on
the issue in question by seeking an injunction to maintain the status
quo pending arbitration, but because federal courts are hesitant to
become involved in or to influence contract interpretation, there is
disagreement over the propriety of issuing status quo injunctions. 235
231. See Comment, Successorship Doctrine, the Courts and Arbitrators: Common Sense or
Dollars and Cents?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403 (1989). For a thoughtful treatment of the core
values that inform the mandatory-permissive distinction, see J. ATLESON, supra note 17, at
111-35.
232. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 188 (1971).
233. See infra notes 303-07 & 527-53 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). In Howard
Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the purchase of a business with a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement that binds successors to adopt the existing collective agreement does not
bind a purchaser who had notice of the clause prior to completing the purchase. Id. at 262-63.
The Court suggested that the union's remedy for the breach of the successor clause was to
enjoin the sale pending arbitration of the seller's obligation under the clause. Id. at 258 n.3; see
also Local Lodge 1266, IAM v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981). A court may
deny the injunction, however, on the grounds that the Court's interpretation of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Buffalo Forge does not permit a court to usurp the arbitrator's role by
interpreting the successor clause. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,
410-11 (1976); Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, 529 F.2d 1073
(9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 807, on remand, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.) (reversing, in light
of Buffalo Forge, former decision sustaining a preliminary injunction pending arbitration), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). The union may also fail to learn about the proposed sale in time
to seek an injunction because the decision to sell will not be a mandatory subject of bargaining;
only the effects on employee job security will be the mandatory subject of bargaining. See First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See generally Kohler, supra note
227. To the extent that a union's primary concern in seeking a successor clause was to obtain
job security for its members, an arbitrator will not be able to provide any meaningful remedy
for the breach once the sale is complete. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 286; Lever Bros. v.
International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1976); see
also Comment, supra note 231, at 420-22.
235. See Columbia Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. Bolger, 621 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.
1980) (refusing to enjoin merger of work shifts within the same facility); Amalgamated Transit
Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.) (reversing district court
injunction of changes in work cycles pending arbitration), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
But see Local Lodge No. 1266, IAM v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981); United
Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring employer to
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If a court refuses to issue the injunction, then the union's only option
will be to seek damages from an arbitrator.236 Consequently, many
contract clauses on permissive subjects operate more as liability rules
than as property rules.
The major practical difference between mandatory and permis-
sive subjects emerges once an agreement is in place. An employer is
totally free to act unilaterally on a permissive subject if he is not con-
strained by specific contract language.237 The statutory treatment of
mandatory subjects during the term of an agreement creates the
potential for shared jurisdiction between the Board and arbitrators as
indicated earlier in the discussion of Illustration 2.238 If there is a
clause on point, a breach of that clause may be the subject of both an
unfair labor practice charge under Section 8(d) and grievance arbitra-
tion.239 As long as an employer is willing to arbitrate, however, an
pay hospitalization and insurance premiums during strike despite dispute over employer's
obligations); Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th
Cir. 1976) (enjoining plant relocation). Even if a court accepts the Lever Brothers position that
injunctions should issue if arbitration will otherwise be a "hollow formality," Lever Bros., 554
F.2d at 123, the standards remain difficult to meet unless the employer's actions will result in
an "irretrievable loss of workers' primary employment." IOCW of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., No. Civ. A 88-2048MC (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds)
(1988 WL 105625) (refusing to enjoin employer changes in work shifts, safety, and employee
dress pending arbitration), aff'd, 864 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1988). In order to obtain an
injunction, the union must show that the dispute is arbitrable, that arbitration will otherwise
be a "hollow formality" or irremediable injury, and that success on the merits is likely. See
Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d at 930. The category of irremediable injury has been regarded as
equivalent to the irretrievable loss of jobs. Bolger, 621 F.2d at 618 (injunction vacated where
work shift eliminated but job security remained, despite threats to seniority, time off, vacation,
and convenience factors); Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d at 931-32. See generally Cantor, Buffalo
Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980
Wis. L. REV. 247.
236. See Comment, supra note 231, at 422-28. Compare Martin Podany Assocs., Inc., 80
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.) (awarding damages for breach of successor
clause based on back wages, pension contributions, and health and welfare funds) with Wyatt
Mfg. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.) (denying remedy because
successor clause did not include specific language obligating seller for buyer's failure to adopt
the collective bargaining agreement).
237. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1971).
238. See supra notes 102-41 and accompanying text.
239. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The facts of Milwaukee Spring Iand
II aptly illustrate a union's options. In order to obtain relief from comparatively higher labor
costs under a collective bargaining agreement with the union, the company proposed
relocating assembly operations to its non-unionized plant. Id. at 207. The parties bargained
over the transfer, but when the union rejected making wage concessions, the company
announced that it had decided to transfer the work anyway. Milwaukee Spring II, 268
N.L.R.B. at 601. The union could have filed a grievance claiming that the company lacked the
power, under the management rights clause, to transfer the work. See UAW, 765 F.2d at 178,
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unfair labor practice charge will probably be deferred to
arbitration.2 °
If there is no clause on point, a union's bargaining entitlement
obligates the employer to bargain to impasse with the union prior to
implementing the change. The union, however, may waive its bargain-
ing entitlement by agreeing to an "entire agreement" or "zipper
clause" whereby the parties waive their statutory obligations to bar-
gain over subjects not included in the agreement. 24' The Board sees
these clauses primarily as a means by which employers are able to
obtain protection from new union demands presented during the term
of an agreement. Thus, when a union asks to bargain over a subject
not contained in the agreement, the employer can refuse on the
grounds that the zipper clause waives the union's right to force the
employer to bargain over new issues raised during the term of the
agreement. In contrast, when an employer takes unilateral action to
impose a new working condition not contemplated by the agreement
and asserts that the union waived its entitlement to bargain over the
change, the Board looks to see if there is specific language indicating a
waiver of the duty to bargain over that subject. Without the union's
agreement to a specific clause giving the employer discretion to alter
that particular working condition without bargaining, the general rule
of interpretation is that the employer remains obligated to bargain.242
182 n.26 (union did not contest the company's right to make the transfer under the contract,
but instead filed charges under NLRA Section 7, and Subsections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), and
8(d)).
240. UAW, 765 F.2d at 182 n.26 ("It is not clear why this case was not submitted to
arbitration pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire [192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971)].").
241. The zipper clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement in Milwaukee
Spring is typical. It provided as follows:
[Each party] waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be
obligated, to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to
or covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter not
specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement, even though such subject or
matter may not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either or
both of the parties at the time they negotiated or signed this Agreement.
Id. at 182 n.27.
242. "While the Board acknowledges that a labor organization may waive the statutory
rights granted to it and to the employees it represents, we will not lightly infer such a waiver,
which must be in 'clear and unmistakable' language." Universal Sec. Instruments, 250
N.L.R.B. 661, 662 (1980) (quoting Allied Mills, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 281, 286 (1975)), enforced
in relevant part, 649 F.2d 247, 256 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (requiring that the intent to waive a statutorily protected right be
"explicitly stated"); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963).
But see Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., Litton Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 868 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1989), rev'g 283 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1081 (1987) (denying
enforcement of Board order to bargain based on the requirement of clear and unmistakable
language and holding that the broad management rights clause combined with the union's
[Vol. 44:237
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In any event, unless an employer has some need for either speed
dr secrecy in making and implementing a decision, a bargaining obli-
gation during the term of an agreement is not a major constraint. All
that an employer needs to do is give the union notice, bargain to
impasse, and then make the change.2 43 At this point, the freedom of
the union to strike in response to the change is questionable because
the employer may claim the right to implement the change under the
management rights clause of the contract.244 If so, the change in
working conditions will be arbitrable, and the employer may obtain a
Boys Markets injunction to enforce the no-strike clause should the
union engage in a responsive work stoppage rather than complying
with the change and filing a grievance.
2 45
If a court action under Section 301 is filed to compel arbitration
and to enforce a no-strike clause, the courts normally would read
together the zipper clause, the no-strike clause, and the grievance
arbitration clause as suggesting that the parties intended to resolve
disputes over implied contract obligations by means of arbitration.246
If arbitration is mandated, the arbitrator will resolve the dispute
based on the wording of the management rights clause and on the
parties' expectations derived from past practice. 247 Thus, the issue of
prior failure to request bargaining over prior management relocation decisions constituted
evidence that the union believed the company could relocate production unilaterally without
bargaining during the term of the agreement). See generally Nelson & Howard, The Duty to
Bargain During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 27 LAB. L.J. 573 (1976).
243. For a discussion of the criteria the Board uses to determine when the parties are at
impasse, see supra note 228.
244. See UAW, 765 F.2d at 180-83. In affirming the Board, Judge Edwards argued that a
zipper clause "has the effect of incorporating all possible topics of bargaining-both those
actually discussed and those neither discussed nor contemplated during bargaining-into the
contract." Id. at 180. Judge Edwards concluded, contrary to the Board, that the zipper clause
prevented the employer from altering the status quo on any mandatory subject unless the
company had the contractual right to make the change under the management rights clause.
Id. at 182-83. Thus, the arbitrator determines the issue and the union is obligated to obey and
grieve.
245. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (A federal
court has jurisdiction under Section 301, without violating the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, to issue an injunction to enforce a union's agreement not to strike if
the strike is over a dispute subject to arbitration.).
246. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960) ("An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute.").
247. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spr ng I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 80 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 212, 216-17 (1982) (Klein, Arb.); Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 353, 357
(1964) (Ross, Arb.); see also Abrams & Nolan, Subcontracting Disputes in Labor Arbitration:
Productive Efficiency Versus Job Security, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 7 (1983); Comment, Arbitral
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bargaining entitlements tends to drop to the background, and the
focus shifts to the implied property entitlements that grow out of a
collective bargaining agreement. Arbitrators are therefore faced with
the task of assigning property entitlements by filling in gaps in collec-
tive agreements.248
B. Statutory and Contract Property Entitlements
The legal system protects property entitlements with the equita-
ble remedy of an injunction, rather than simply compensating the
holder, when the entitlement has been infringed. 24 9 These entitle-
ments can be transferred by contract, but they cannot otherwise be
appropriated. From the perspective of an arbitrator, all entitlements
are normally assumed to be incorporated into the parties' contractual
relationship. If a collective bargaining agreement is silent on a partic-
ular entitlement and the employer, without union consent, takes
action that impacts adversely on bargaining unit work, the arbitrator
will have to determine how the entitlements involved in the contro-
versy are divided. The arbitrator looks to implicit restrictions on
management action that flow from other clauses in the agreement, to
the parties' expectations as evidenced by past practice, and to the
wording of the management rights clause. 5 0 The arbitrator's decision
establishes a set of property entitlements that not only settles that
controversy but also provides a basis for the parties' future bargaining
over the same issues. The arbitrator's reasoning and decision are,
however, specific only to that particular bargaining unit. Although
the decision may influence other parties in the same industry in terms
Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 186. For a thoughtful comparison of arbitrator and
NLRB reasoning in work transfer cases, see Comment, The Bases and Limits of Arbitral
Decisionmaking in Plant Relocation and Transfer of Work Disputes, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 362
(1985) [hereinafter Comment, Bases and Limits of Arbitral Decisionmaking]. For a discussion
of the implications of the effects of Milwaukee Spring I and H on collective bargaining over
work preservation clauses that limit the discretion of employers to transfer work, see Schwab,
supra note 216.
248. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200, at 1408-15 (proposing a sunk-cost-loss rule
approach by arbitrators to set default entitlements during the terms of collective bargaining
agreements).
249. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 200, at 1092.
250. Arbitrators normally interpret the management rights clause from a perspective of
good faith, reasonableness, past practice, and bargaining history to determine if management is
acting within the scope of the clause. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 247; Comment,
Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 186, at 386-89; Comment, Bases and Limits
of Arbitral Decisionmaking, supra note 247, at 369. For an argument that an economic
approach based on the sunk-cost-loss rule would provide arbitrators with a reasoned and fair
means to determine whether an employer is seeking to violate a wage clause or simply
responding to market forces without attempting to increase the rate of return to capital at the
expense of agreed-upon wages, see Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200, at 1412-14.
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of their expectations with respect to similarly worded agreements, the
consequences are very different from those of an NLRB opinion
which establishes a property entitlement for all parties similarly
situated.
When an employer unilaterally acts to reduce unit work, the
union may file an unfair labor practice charge, as well as grieve the
action. Under the NLRA, the question for the Board is whether the
employer has failed to maintain the terms of the agreement under Sec-
tion 8(d).252 Because employers may act unilaterally at any time with
respect to a permissive subject of bargaining without violating the
NLRA, the classification of a subject as permissive gives the employer
a property entitlement in that area. The only way a union can con-
strain unilateral employer decisions regarding a permissive subject is
by bargaining for an explicit clause enforceable through arbitration.
The relationship between the parties' statutory obligation to
maintain the terms of an agreement under Section 8(d) and mid-term
changes in a working condition classified as a mandatory subject is
more complex. There are four ways in which Section 8(d) can be
interpreted with reference to an employer action implicating a
mandatory subject that is not addressed in the agreement. First, the
Board could hold that management is free to act unilaterally on any
mandatory subject unless it is explicitly constrained by the contract or
unless the decision violates Section 8(a)(3).2 13 This interpretation of
the NLRA embodies a protective view of management rights; collec-
tive bargaining provides workers with a means to restrict manage-
ment discretion, but the restrictions must be explicitly incorporated
into the agreement or else management is free to act.254 This view of
Section 8(d) obligations also assumes that the NLRA was not meant
to alter the traditional common law presumption that management
possesses all the property entitlements in the operation of its business
and in the establishment of work rules unless explicitly restricted by
statute.2 5 This is the strongest management rights position.
251. See infra notes 253-94 and accompanying text.
252. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co.,
268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); see Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604
(citing University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 1975)).
254. Milwaukee Spring H1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602.
255. For a pristine version of management's reserved rights, see Phelps, Management's
Reserved Rights. An Industry View, Management Rights and the Arbitration Process, 9 NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. PROC. 117 (1956). Phelps stated that:
When we speak of the term "management's rights" .. we are referring to the
residue of management's pre-existing functions which remains after the
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Second, the Board could hold that the mandatory classification
does more than simply create a bargaining obligation; in fact, it
requires the parties either to reach agreement on any change in a
mandatory subject or to maintain the status quo in accordance with
past practices followed during the term of the agreement. 6 Under
this view of Section 8(d), a union has a property entitlement during
the term of the agreement in working conditions established by past
practices unless the union agrees to a clause granting management the
discretion to alter prior conditions.25 7 It forces the employer to incor-
porate an explicit clause into the agreement authorizing employer
control over the mandatory working condition if the employer wants
the discretion to act in a manner inconsistent with past practice. 258
This is the weakest management rights position.259
A third approach is to make the employer's discretion to act uni-
laterally turn on a combination of past practice, the parties' intent,
and the wording of the management rights clause.26 ° This approach
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. In the absence of such an
agreement, management has absolute discretion in the hiring, firing, and the
organization and direction of the working forces, subject only to such limitation
as may be imposed by law ....
Id. at 105.
256. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206, 209 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I) (refusing to permit the transfer of work to save labor costs because it
would be an indirect breach of the wage clause and would undermine the binding nature of
collective bargaining agreements), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring
II), aff'd sub noma. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Mandatory subjects are
now narrowly defined by the Board as decisions that turn on labor costs. See Otis Elevator
Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893-94 (1984) (plurality opinion) (Otis Elevator !). Therefore, unless
explicitly authorized by the agreement, unilateral changes in "mandatory subjects" would
always be an indirect violation of a clause related to labor costs and a violation of Section 8(d).
257. See Schwab, supra note 216, at 256-65.
258. Id. Professor Schwab used the Coase Theorem to analyze whether the initial
assignment of the entitlement, as per Milwaukee Spring I or Milwaukee Spring II, influences
efficiency or wealth distribution when the union and employer bargain and allocate the right to
transfer work according to which party places the highest value on the presence or absence of a
work preservation clause. Id.
259. This position reflects the statutory policy of encouraging the parties to bargain about
all mandatory issues related to labor costs and job security and to arrive at an understanding
that is incorporated into the collective agreement. If the employer wishes to maintain
discretion to reduce labor costs in response to new technology or shifts in the product market,
the employer needs to obtain language in the agreement which grants the employer that
flexibility. See Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210 (Management rights clause reserved
to management the "right to decide whether, and how, its products will be manufactured."
The Board, however, found "nothing in this clause which expressly grants Respondent the
right to move, transfer, or change part of its operations ... to avoid the comparatively higher
labor costs imposed by the collective agreement."), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring H), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
260. See Stein, Management Rights and Productivity, 32 ARB. J. 270 (1977), reprinted in C.
CRAVER, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR
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poses a different type of statutory issue: whether the Board should set
forth general rules of interpretation, reflecting underlying statutory
policies, to guide the analysis of past practices and the parties' intent
in particular disputes.2 6'
The fourth approach is similar, except that it explicitly views the
question as one that is reserved for the arbitrators and that is
independent of statutory policies, so long as agreements include an
arbitration clause, a no-strike clause, and a zipper clause.26 2 This
leaves the role of gap filling during the terms of agreements to arbitra-
tors acting on a unit-by-unit basis, with no statutory vision of man-
agement rights in the background.
The best illustration of Board and court reasoning when con-
fronted with a case that presents issues raising these alternative ways
of interpreting Section 8(d) is Milwaukee Spring 1263 and Milwaukee
Spring I.264 In Milwaukee Spring I, an employer facing financial dif-
ficulties sought mid-term concessions from the union.265 When the
union refused to make concessions, the company decided to relocate
bargaining unit work to one of its non-unionized plants.2 66 There
was, however, no explicit clause in the parties' agreement that either
limited relocation or obligated the employer to maintain the work in
question in the bargaining unit.2 67
The union responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge
under Section 8(d),268 claiming that the relocation was a breach of
ARBITRATION 488-90 (1988). Stein characterizes this view as a "modified residual rights
theory" that includes the following modifications: "1) that management prerogatives be
exercised in a reasonable and rational form; 2) that the intent of an action be not to subvert the
letter or spirit of the agreement; and 3) that long-established practices are not easily
discontinued." Id., reprinted in C. CRAVER, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, supra, at
489.
261. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605-12. In his dissent, Member
Zimmerman first analyzed the company's discretion to transfer bargaining unit work without
violating Section 8(d) from the perspective of both the policies underlying the mandatory
classification and the statutory policy that encourages parties to reach mutually agreeable
solutions through bargaining. Id.
262. See UAW, 765 F.2d at 175, 182 n.27.
263. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee
Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd sub nom.
UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
264. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
265. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 210.
268. Altogether, the union filed unfair labor practice charges under Subsections 8(a)(1),
8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), and 8(d) of the NLRA. Id. at 207. On rehearing, however, the parties
stipulated that the decision to relocate work was economically motivated and that the
employer had satisfied its bargaining obligation in regard to the decision to transfer the work,
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implied obligations derived from the wage and union recognition
clauses.2 69 The NLRB found that the employer was transferring the
work to avoid obligations under the wage and recognition provi-
sions. E7 ° Consequently, the Board held that the employer's unilateral
act violated his statutory obligation to refrain from modifying the
agreement prior to its expiration;271 without an express clause that
authorized the employer to transfer unit work without union consent,
the employer was not free to transfer the work. 72 This holding was
consistent with the second approach described above, 273 and it
embodies a limited view of management rights.
While that decision was pending on appeal, the NLRB decided
to reconsider its decision and requested that the case be remanded for
further consideration. 7 4 In Milwaukee Spring II, the Board reversed
itself in an opinion that is consistent with the first approach described
above, that which is the most protective of management rights.275
The NLRB held that the employer was free to transfer the work after
bargaining to impasse, as long as there was no explicit clause in the
agreement that restricted its discretion to transfer work.276 The
underlying assumption of the Milwaukee Spring H opinion is that Sec-
tion 8(d) does not limit the traditional discretion of management to
make unilateral alterations in any term or condition of employment
absent specific limiting language in the contract.277 Indeed, the
Board's opinion suggested that all property entitlements necessary to
manage a business remain with the employer unless explicitly
waived.278
In a dissenting opinion in Milwaukee Spring I, Member Zim-
merman argued for the adoption of the third approach-evaluating
the dispute in light of past practice, the parties' intent, and the con-
thus mooting the charges under Subsections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) and leaving only the
Section 8(d) charge to be determined by the Board. See Milwaukee Spring HI, 268 N.L.R.B. at
601-02.
269. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
270. Id. at 208-09.
271. Id. at 208.
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
274. For a procedural description of the case, see UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 178-79
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
275. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
276. Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 603-04 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
277. This interpretation of Section 8(d) reflects the concern of protecting core management
decisions from union demands, a concern expressed most clearly by the Supreme Court in
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See supra notes 224-27 and
accompanying text.
278. Milwaukee Spring I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603.
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tract's management rights clause. 279 He would have found that the
transfer violated Section 8(d) if the "relocation decision [was] moti-
vated solely or predominantly by a desire to avoid terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. ' 280  Specifically, he would have looked to
the facts of the particular case to determine whether the employer was
seeking to avoid the wage bargain embodied in the agreement.28 ' In
his view, the Board should interpret labor contracts so as to
encourage the parties to resolve issues over work relocation through
bargaining, 2 2 and thus he would have interpreted the parties' under-
standing of their agreement in light of the statutory policy favoring
279. Id. at 605-12 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting); see supra note 261.
280. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
281. Id. at 610. This approach does not yield much predictability for future similarly
situated parties. It is favored in labor arbitration because an arbitrator deals with a specific
dispute within a particular bargaining unit and his decision will have no precedential effect on
other unrelated parties. The Board, however, must worry about administering a rule based on
a case-by-case analysis, and the parties will not know where they stand until the Board's post
hoc analysis is made, at least a year after the employer's decision. Given the potential for a
large award of back pay if the employer is found to have violated Section 8(d), the case-by-case
analysis may tend to deter employers from acting without union consent. If, due to the
uncertainty in outcome, this approach has the same practical consequences as option two,
supra notes 256-59, the more predictable rule would arguably be preferable to save
adjudication costs. But see Wachter & Cohen, supra note 200 (arguing for the application of a
sunk-cost-loss rule on a case-by-case basis). Professors Wachter and Cohen would apply a test
that focuses on whether an employer is engaging in strategic behavior in response to the
product market in order to obtain deferred compensation owed to workers under the collective
bargaining agreement:
The sunk-cost-loss suffered by the firm is the loss of expected profits
accruing to the firm's sunk investments in labor (through specific training and
monitoring) and in physical capital. The sunk-cost-loss rule deters strategic
behavior by both parties. The firm is less likely to act strategically, by
expropriating the workers' deferred compensation, if in order to cut its wage bill
the firm must simultaneously suffer lost expected profits. In addition, workers
are less likely to retaliate strategically by increasing monitoring costs because the
sunk-cost-loss incurred by the firm provides objective evidence to the workers
that supports the firm's claim of a product market decline.
Id. at 1379. The authors applied this test to the facts of Milwaukee Spring and concluded that
the result was correct because: (1) the firm was responding to the loss of a contract from a
major customer; (2) it was likely that the firm would reduce work production hours in addition
to wages, thereby reducing returns to capital as well as to labor; and (3) that the loss of one-
third of the work performed at the Milwaukee Spring plant implied a large sunk-cost-loss in
equipment. Id. at 1406-07.
This approach is arguably more objective than Member Zimmerman's focus on motive,
but it essentially unpacks the type of considerations one would look at to determine motive.
Moreover, there will continue to be substantial uncertainty as to how the Board would view
the evidence and resolve factual conflicts. The concepts should prove to be helpful to arbitra-
tors dealing with disputes within particular bargaining units, but they are more questionable
when the Board seeks to provide predictability and to minimize the costs of case-by-case
adjudication.
282. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 608-09 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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bargaining.28 3
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed, essentially taking the fourth approach.28 4
In an opinion authored by Judge Edwards, the court held that the
combination of the zipper clause, the no-strike clause, and the broad
arbitration clause meant that the parties anticipated that issues arising
over the transfer of work would be decided by reference to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 2 5 In the court's view, the Board should
normally defer a Section 8(d) charge of this sort to arbitration because
the parties, by their agreement, have consented to have an arbitrator
interpret the labor agreement.28 6 In the absence of a request to defer
by the employer, however, the burden was on the union to produce
proof during the Board proceedings that the parties understood the
management rights clause as not authorizing the company to transfer
work without the union's consent. Because the union had not met its
burden, the court affirmed the NLRB's decision.28 7
Both the second NLRB opinion and the District of Columbia
Circuit decision make arbitration the central forum for resolving
future disputes over mid-term modifications of a working condition
that is not explicitly addressed in the agreement. The Board's opinion
is sufficiently strong in its vision of management rights so as to dis-
courage a union from filing an unfair labor practice charge in a simi-
lar circumstance. The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion
reinforces the centrality of arbitration for mid-term disputes by
encouraging the Board to defer if a union does file charges. Both
opinions tend to make arbitration the principal forum in which dis-
putes over gaps in agreements will be resolved based on an arbitrator's
assumptions about the appropriate balance in management and
worker influence over workplace decisions.
The other major set of property entitlements under the NLRA
are employee Section 7 rights.2 8  As noted below, although a few
employee Section 7 rights are inalienable, once the employees have a
bargaining agent most of these rights may be transferred by the union
through bargaining.2 9 The most significant Section 7 right is the pro-
283. Id. at 612.
284. UAW v, NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 179-84 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
285. Id. at 182-83.
286. Id. at 182 n.26.
287. Id. at 183.
288. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
289. The traditional distinction in this area has been that a union may bargain away an
employee's economic rights, but not the representational reinforcing rights. See NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974) (A union cannot waive employee rights to
distribute literature and post notices on company bulletin boards.). In Metropolitan Edison
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tection that employees enjoy when engaged in a strike for better work-
ing conditions. 290 This is, however, the one entitlement that a union is
presumed to transfer if the union enters into an agreement with a
broad grievance arbitration clause.291
It is important to note that most employee entitlements that con-
certed pressure are limited in the sense that interpretations of Section
7 have given employers certain entitlements that enable them to
respond to employee concerted pressure in ways that may place
employee jobs in jeopardy.292 Thus, for each employee property enti-
tlement under Section 7, there is a set of corresponding employer enti-
tlements that places limits on the employee's statutory protection.293
Co., however, the Supreme Court indicated that a union could waive a union leader's statutory
right not to be differentially sanctioned for participating in concerted activity, with little
analysis of the nature of this statutory right. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693,
705-07 (1983). The Court found the right to be more closely analogous to giving up the right
to strike for economic gains than to an interference with union members' statutory right to
select whomever they choose as their leaders. Id. at 706. At the same time, however, the
Court recognized that the statutory protection is based in part on the adverse impact which
differential sanctioning can have on the rank-and-file's willingness to assume positions of
leadership. Id. at 702-03. The Court's approach suggests a willingness to characterize most
Section 7 rights as economic in nature, rather than representational, and therefore subject to
waiver unless a right is directly related to selecting, decertifying, or criticizing a bargaining
representative. See generally Harper, supra note 202.
290. Section 7 protects the right of employees "to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the Court limited
the protection provided by this right by permitting employers to permanently replace
employees who are striking to improve their economic working conditions. Id. at 345-46.
This far-reaching decision was not actually necessary to determine the issue before the Court,
and it had been reserved for later determination by the Board. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
I N.L.R.B. 201, 216-22 (1936). For a thoughtful and vigorous criticism of the Court's decision
in Mackay, see J. ATLESON, supra note 17, at 21-24.
291. See, e.g., Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06
(1962) (A strike over a dispute that is to be arbitrated under the collective bargaining
agreement violates that agreement even if the agreement does not include a no-strike clause.);
see also Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974) (The obligation to arbitrate
under a collective agreement gives rise to an implied no-strike obligation enforceable by an
injunction.).
292. The right of an employer to permanently replace an economic striker under Mackay
can be conceptually treated as an entitlement that the employer can transfer to the union.
Normally, employees engage in an economic strike between contracts so that the question of
employer waiver does not emerge. It will occur during the term of an agreement, however, if a
union seeks contract protections that go beyond the statutory protections that are provided for
an activity such as refusing to cross a stranger picket line. See, e.g., Butterworth-Manning-
Ashmore Mortuary, 270 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1984) (An agreement not to discharge or discipline
an employee who refuses to cross a stranger picket line does not waive an employer's right to
permanently replace the employee in order to continue the efficient operation of the employer's
business.).
293. The employer entitlements are justified by the employer's need to maintain the efficient
operation of its business. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (An
employer may temporarily replace an unfair labor practice striker, but the employer must
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The discretion of either party to transfer their entitlements through
bargaining produces the overlap described earlier between Board and
arbitral jurisdiction in the interpretation of contractual waivers.29 4
C. Liability Rules
Statutory rights protected by a liability rule are not common as a
matter of strict interpretation of the NLRA, but as a practical matter,
the slowness of NLRA procedures often converts entitlements pro-
tected by property rules into entitlements protected by liability
rules.295 A liability rule permits an opposing party to appropriate an
entitlement and later pay compensation for the taking in an amount
determined by a neutral third party;296 the entitlement holder is not
entitled to injunctive relief.297 Formally, all statutory protections are
protected by property rules because the Board may only issue orders
enforceable by equitable relief.298 As a practical matter, however,
reinstate the striker to his original position if the employee presents an unconditional request
for reinstatement.); Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345 ("Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace
the striking employees with others in an effort to carry on the business."); Redwing Carriers,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), (An employer can replace an employee who refuses to cross a
stranger picket line if the employer can show that it acted to preserve the efficiency of the
business operations and that there was no alternative to the discharge.), enforced sub nom.
Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964).
294. There are statutory limits on a union's power to waive some entitlements, particularly
if the entitlements go to the selection of the bargaining representative. See supra note 289. In
addition, a union may only waive an employee's Section 7 right to strike in protest of a "non-
serious" unfair labor practice. See Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 807 (1961). What
constitutes a "serious" unfair labor practice, making a waiver ineffective, is unclear. See Dow
Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 212 N.L.R.B. 333 (1974), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. NLRB,
530 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), on remand, 244 N.L.R.B. 1060
(1979), rev'd sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 818 (1981). For a description of the overlap in jurisdiction, see supra notes 59-99 and
accompanying text.
295. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., THE FAILURE
OF LABOR LAW-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984). The Report
set forth the following median days from the "Filing of Charge to Issuance of Board
Decision": 484 days in 1980; 490 days in 1981; 633 days in 1982; and 627 days in 1983. Id. at
13. The Report also stated: "It now takes nearly a year and a half (501 days was the 1981
average) after the Board issues its decision before the decision is enforced by a federal court."
Id. This data suggests that the minimum time to obtain a remedy for an illegally discharged
worker if the employer refuses to settle earlier is at least three years. Id. For the extent and
impact of NLRB delays, see HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, DELAY,
SLOWNESS IN DECISION-MAKING, AND THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP. No. 1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See generally Weiler,
supra note 19.
296. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 200, at 1092.
297. See id.
298. Section 10(c) authorizes the Board to remedy unfair labor practices by issuing an
"order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take
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back pay awarded two or three years after the appropriation of an
employee's statutory right may be the only meaningful remedy
because an employee may no longer have any interest in being rein-
stated.299 Moreover, the Board rarely uses its power to request an
injunction to end the appropriation of a Section 7 right while the
unfair labor practice charge is being adjudicated." °
The parties are free, of course, to protect the entitlements that
they allocated through the collective bargaining agreement either by
property rules or by liability rules, but where an agreement is silent,
the entitlements are normally treated as protected by property
rules.3"' Unless the contract specifies otherwise, the usual remedy in
arbitration is to cease and desist from the breach and to compensate
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act." NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). The order, however, is
not self-executing. If compliance is not forthcoming, the Board may seek enforcement of the
order by petitioning the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. NLRA § 10(e), 29
U.S.C. § 160(e). In addition, "any person aggrieved" by a Board order may seek judicial
review in the court of appeals. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
299. See West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1. For the 1970 through 1979 period, the NLRB's official figures indicate that 32% of all
employees who were offered reinstatement declined to return to work. Id. at 28 n.132 (citing
annual N.L.R.A. statistics on "Remedial Actions Taken in Unfair Labor Practice Cases
Closed"). Even the back pay may be relatively insignificant because the proper measure of
back pay is not the wages that the employer committing the unfair labor practice failed to pay,
but is instead the net loss in wages of the employee (after deducting wages earned in the
interim). See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935). Delay, however, may
be the most important factor limiting the impact of NLRB remedies. See supra note 295
(providing data on the median days from the filing of a complaint to the issuance of an
enforceable remedy). One study of the effectiveness of Board remedies found that after six
months had passed, less than five percent of the reinstatement offers made to employees as a
result of an unfair labor practice were accepted. See Stephens & Chaney, A Study of the
Reinstatement Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31, 40 (1974); see
also Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357 (1981).
300. Section 10(j) authorizes the Board, upon the issuance of a complaint, to seek
"temporary relief or a restraining order" from a United States district court in order to halt the
alleged unfair labor practice pending adjudication of the charge by the Board. NLRA § 10(j),
29 U.S.C. § 1600). Historically, the Board has not used its discretionary power in this area
very frequently. See Weiler, supra note 19, at 1798-1803; Note, The Use of Section 100) of the
Labor Management Relations Act in Employer Refusal to Bargain Cases, 1976 ILL. L.F. 845.
From 1985 through 1988, the Board authorized a total of 161 petitions for Section 10(j)
injunctions, or an average of 40 cases a year. General Counsel Report on 10(j) Injunctions,
Memorandum GC 89-4, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at D-1 (April 14, 1989). This average
was slightly below the average for the prior ten years. Id. From 1975 through 1979, the Board
averaged 48 Section 10(j) cases per year, and from 1980 through 1983, the average was up to
59 cases. Id. The General Counsel attributed the decline to the increase in the settlement rate
for meritorious unfair labor practices. Id. Between 1976 and 1981, the settlement rate was
83%; between 1982 and 1988, the rate was 94%. Id.
301. For the definition of a property rule, see supra note 249 and accompanying text. For
the definition of a liability rule, see supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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for the harm caused by the breach.30 2 As a practical matter, however,
the obey and grieve doctrine 30 3 of arbitration often converts union
property entitlements under collective agreements into liability rules.
The obey and grieve doctrine permits employers to act unilaterally
pending arbitration, and it requires that employees follow orders and
limit their opposition to grieving, even if the employer's actions are
clearly in breach of the agreement.3°  Equitable relief to maintain the
status quo pending arbitration is difficult to obtain unless the union
can show substantial irreparable harm.30 5  The changed underlying
circumstances flowing from the contract breach may make delayed
equitable relief from an arbitrator meaningless, leaving compensation
as the only meaningful relief.30 6 This is normally the case with work
preservation clauses which lead unions to bargain for liquidated dam-
age clauses in their agreements.30 7
302. See generally 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR
ARBITRATION 494-556 (1983); M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION (1981).
303. The principle of "work first, grieve later" was established early by Dean Harry
Shulman. See Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.). In
establishing the principle, Dean Shulman allowed for a limited number of exceptions to the
rule. An employee, for example, need not obey an employer's order if obedience would require
the commission of a crime or would create an unusual health or safety hazard. Id. at 780. The
acceptance of the "obey and grieve" obligation among arbitrators is close to being axiomatic.
Arbitrators often deny or limit a remedy for a meritorious grievance if employees have initially
resorted to self-help rather than grievance procedures. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 199 n.216 (1985) (citing numerous arbitration awards). For an
excellent discussion of the limited "health and safety" exception, see Gross & Greenfield,
Arbitral Value Judgments in Health and Safety Disputes. Management Rights over Workers'
Rights, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 645 (1985).
304. Ford, 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 780; F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 303, at 199-
203.
305. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), the Supreme Court
seemed to disapprove of status quo injunctions because a court issuing such an injunction
would have to interpret the contract and hold hearings on the likelihood of the union
succeeding in arbitration. Id. at 410. This would involve the court in the dispute and tend to
displace the role of the arbitrator. Id. Courts, however, have been inconsistent in their
interpretations of Buffalo Forge. See cases cited supra note 235.
306. See, e.g., IOCW of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., No. Civ. A 88-2048
MC (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds) (1988 WL 105,625), aff'd, 864 F.2d 927
(1st Cir. 1988) (A union unsuccessfully sought an injunction pending arbitration, alleging that
the change in work schedules would force employees to quit second jobs and encounter child
care problems, and that there was no adequate remedy available through arbitration once the
employees had adjusted to the changed schedules.). See generally Cantor, supra note 235.
307. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490 (1980)
(clarifying the difference between work acquisition and work preservation under Section 8(e)
as applied to International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) "Rules for Containers," which
included a $1000 per container liquidated damages clause for containers loaded or stripped by
anyone other than ILA labor within a 50-mile radius of the local port); see also supra note 209.
DEFERRAL, WAIVER, AND ARBITRATION
D. Inalienable Entitlements
Inalienable entitlements are rights which are established by stat-
ute and which the parties cannot bargain away.30 8 The most signifi-
cant group of inalienable entitlements belongs to management and
grows out of the statutory prohibitions on secondary pressure that are
embodied in Subsections 8(b)(4) and 8(e). 3 09 The primary-secondary
pressure distinction is a murky doctrinal area that is open to widely
varying interpretations. 310 As a result, this distinction has become a
doctrinal battleground for quarrels over the total removal from the
bargaining table of some aspects of core entrepreneurial control.31
308. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 200, at 1110-15.
309. For a definition of a secondary boycott, see sources cited supra note 209. Section 8(e)
makes illegal any clause in an agreement whereby an employer agrees to refrain from doing
business with another employer. NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). An employer may
voluntarily support a union conflict with another employer, but the first employer cannot
contract away in advance his discretion to refuse to support a union cause .when a specific
dispute occurs between another employer and that employer's union. See Truck Drivers
Union Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964). For a
discussion of the difference between inducing employees not to perform designated tasks in
order to influence the labor relations of another employer and asking supervisors to exercise
their discretion to support a union cause, see NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50-54
(1964).
310. See Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 U.
KAN. L. REV. 651 (1971); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1363 (1962); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA
§§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000 (1965).
311. Although bargaining over work preservation is permitted, the use of concerted activity
in the context of bargaining to acquire work that is not traditionally performed by employees
in the bargaining unit is characterized as secondary. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
447 U.S. at 504; NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507,
528 n. 16 (1977). If an employer contracts away the right to control work to another employer,
then union demands for that work may be classified as secondary even if it is work that is
traditionally performed by the bargaining unit. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447
U.S. at 504 (citing Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 517). The test of Pipefitters has also been used to
challenge the ability of unions to obtain a clause from construction industry employers
whereby an employer will agree not to "double-breast" (or operate a parallel non-unionized
company). Construction sector unions seek protection from employers' double-breasting by
bargaining for work preservation clauses in which employers agree to apply the terms and
conditions of the union agreement to on-site construction work performed by a business entity
that is either directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the same persons or corporations as
the signatory company. See, e.g., D'Amico v. Painters Dist. Council 51, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3473, 3476 (D. Md. 1985). Employers usually claim in response that the clauses are
secondary, a form of top-down organization, and an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board to
determine appropriate bargaining units. See Carpenters' Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens, 743
F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985); Carpenters' Local Union No.
1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983);
D'Amico, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3477. These arguments all have the practical consequence
of removing the issue of the formation of a competing double-breasting company from the
bargaining table by making the clause illegal under Section 8(e) or by making it an invasion of
the Board's primary jurisdiction to resolve representational issues under Section 9. In either
case, the clauses become unenforceable through arbitration and Section 301.
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From an individual employee's perspective, Section 7 rights are
inalienable until the employee is represented by a certified bargaining
agent.31 2 At that point, most employee Section 7 rights may be trans-
ferred by the collective. Those entitlements that remain inalienable,
even by the union, normally involve a potential for conflict between
the interests of individual employees and those of the bargaining
agent.31 3 They include the statutory right of employees to distribute
literature in the workplace, the access of employees to bulletin boards,
and the use by employees of other forms of communication to
exchange information over internal union matters.31 4
E. The Employee's Entitlement to Fair Representation
Employee demands are expressed through the "collective
voice." 315 When employees vote to have a union represent them in
collective bargaining, they are agreeing to exclusive representation by
the union in the formulation of collective preferences concerning the
proper balance between wages, benefits, opportunities for promotion,
and job security.31 6 It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
bypass the union and deal directly with individual employees.31 7 If a
discontented group of employees use concerted pressure to seek direct
negotiations with an employer, their actions are not protected by Sec-
tion 7, and the employees may be disciplined.31 ' Moreover, unions
decide whether individual employee grievances based on claimed con-
tractual entitlements have sufficient merit to justify using union
resources to process the grievances.31 9
312. See supra note 57.
313. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (A union cannot waive the statutory
right of employees to distribute literature on the employer's premises.).
314. See id. at 329 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Board's
principal function is to preserve employee free choice and noting that a union may not waive
employee rights related to the "[s]election, retention, or displacement of the collective
bargaining agent").
315. See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 211, at 7-11.
316. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
317. See J.P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding Board finding
of a Section 8(a)(5) violation based on management bargaining strategy that kept a union in
the dark and precluded meaningful negotiations over changes before they were announced),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969)
(The employer committed an unfair labor practice by pursuing a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining
strategy that denigrated the union's status as the exclusive representative.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 965 (1970).
318. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975); NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970).
319. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Black-Clawson Co. v. IAM Lodge 355, 313
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). Section 9(a) makes the designated representative the exclusive
representative of all bargaining unit employees. The proviso provides, however, that "any
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This power that the collective exercises over individual employ-
ees in both bargaining and grievance processing is limited by the
employees' corresponding right to fair representation by the union.
In choosing among competing interests within a bargaining unit, a
union must not make invidious, discriminatory, or arbitrary distinc-
tions among employees. 320 This employee right to fair representation
is inalienable. 321 A union, however, may force employees to challenge
union decisions through internal union procedures as long as the
union is in a position to provide a prompt and meaningful remedy and
the procedures are fair and impartial.3 22 Finally, individual fair repre-
sentation rights are enforceable through the courts323 or through
Board proceedings.324
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer." NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Initially, there were
contrary views as to the meaning of this proviso. Compare Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956) with Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1962). Several early decisions
interpreted the proviso as creating an employee statutory right to utilize contract grievance
procedures through arbitration, even if the union did not support the employee's claim and
had refused to take the grievance to arbitration. The union had the right to be present
throughout the procedures to protect collective interests, but as long as the employee was
willing to bear his share of the arbitration cost, he could go forward. See Donnelly v. United
Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82
N.W.2d 172 (1957); see also Summers, supra, at 366-67. The alternative view was that the
purpose of the proviso was only to modify exclusive representation from the perspective of the
employer-not from the perspective of individual employees. If an individual employee
wished to present a grievance to his employer without going through the union, the proviso
enabled an employer, at his option, to hear and adjust the grievance without being charged
with an unfair labor practice in violation of the doctrine of exclusive representation. Under
this interpretation, the employer could bargain away this option by a clause in the collective
agreement and could refuse to deal with any employee not represented by the union. See
Black-Clawson, 313 F.2d at 185-86; see also Cox, supra, at 624. Eventually, the interpretation
advocated by Professor Cox became the accepted interpretation of the proviso. See Emporium
Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61 n.12; Black-Clawson, 313 F.2d at 184-85.
320. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 247-50 (1964).
321. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) ("So long as a labor union
assumes to act as the statutory representatives of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the
duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation conferred upon it, to represent the
entire membership of the craft.").
322. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981). To determine if an employee must
exhaust internal union procedures before filing a court action for the union's breach of the duty
of fair representation, the court should consider three factors: (I) Is the union so hostile that
the employee cannot obtain a fair hearing; (2) can the union's appeal procedures provide the
employee full relief; and (3) will the internal appeal procedures unduly delay the employee's
opportunity for a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. See id.
323. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 188.
324. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
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F. The Initial Assignment of Entitlements and Relative
Bargaining Power
The relative power of the parties at the outset of collective bar-
gaining is influenced both by bargaining entitlements and by the ini-
tial assignment of statutory property entitlements.125  The rules
governing bargaining facilitate the exchange of property entitlements
by reducing the transaction costs of bargaining and by obligating the
parties to exchange information about the costs of proposals.3 26 The
obligation to exchange information empowers unions at a symbolic
level and influences employer behavior by constraining bargaining
tactics that would undermine a union's representational role.327 An
employer must meet with its employees' union to discuss all
mandatory issues raised by the union, 328 and prior to impasse, it may
not alter pre-existing working conditions. 329  This prevents an
employer from bypassing the bargaining agent and dealing directly
with employees so as to undermine union solidarity.33°
If an employer fails to fulfill any of these bargaining obligations,
then its employees can strike both to protest the unfair labor practice
and to obtain their bargaining demands.33" ' By striking partly in pro-
test of their employer's failure to bargain in good faith, employees
may be classified as unfair labor practice strikers, and thus, they can
only be temporarily, rather than permanently, replaced. 332  As a
result, an employer who refuses both to recognize a union's legitimacy
325. See infra notes 348-93 and accompanying text.
326. See infra notes 339-43 and accompanying text.
327. The most significant negative impact of bargaining rules on a union is the exclusion
of core management decisions from the mandatory classification under the test of First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The emphasis on protecting
entrepreneurial discretion reflects traditional assumptions about hierarchy and control in the
workplace. The practical impact is difficult to measure because of the tactical options of
unions seeking clauses on permissive subjects, but some importance must be attributed to the
employers' ability to claim that a subject is permissive and to refuse to discuss it. See generally
J. ATLESON, supra note 17, at 125-35; Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 65, 78-79 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid
Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 402-03 (1979); Stone, supra note 1, at 1547-50;
Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political Imagination,
97 HARV. L. REV. 474 (1983).
328. See Borg-Warner Controls, 198 N.L.R.B. 726 (1972).
329. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
330. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 965 (1970).
331. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956),
aff'd and modified on other grounds, 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
332. For a discussion of the different treatment of economic strikers as compared with
unfair labor practice strikers, see supra note 228. In this type of circumstance, employees
pursuing economic objectives seek the additional protection accorded unfair labor practice
strikers. In order to prevent the Board from treating the employees as unfair labor practice
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as a bargaining agent and to discuss mandatory issues in good faith is
more limited in the tactics that it can use in response to a work
stoppage.
The impact of the assignment of statutory property entitlements
to unions and employers is more difficult to assess. The Coase Theo-
rem suggests that, assuming zero transaction costs and perfect infor-
mation, the parties will contract for their preferred allocation of
property entitlements irrespective of their initial assignments.333 The
party who places the highest value on a particular entitlement will
either purchase or seek to retain that entitlement so that resources in
the workplace will flow to their "efficient," or most valued, use.334
strikers, the employer must show that the strike would have occurred even in the absence of its
unfair labor practices. See Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d at 197.
333. The theorem is set forth in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960). It has spawned a large body of scholarly literature. See Zerbe, The Problem of Social
Cost in Retrospect, 2 RES. L. & ECON. 83, 84 (1980).
334. See Leslie, supra note 216, at 250-54; Schwab, supra note 216, at 256-61. The
applicability of the Coase Theorem to collective bargaining has been thoughtfully analyzed by
both Professors Leslie and Schwab. Most of Professor Schwab's article is devoted to an
analysis of whether the initial assignment of entitlements influences the outcome of bargaining
in a way that would prevent the parties from agreeing on the most efficient allocation of the
entitlement.
By efficiency, Professor Schwab means that resources flow to their most valued use. Id. at
253. In the context of collective bargaining, this means that the party that most values the
entitlement winds up possessing it when the parties agree to a final contract. Id. at 257-61.
Professor Schwab concludes that in most situations the parties are likely to arrive at the most
efficient allocation by bargaining. Id. at 286. He accepts the most efficient initial allocation as
a legitimate goal of Board decisions only in those circumstances in which strategic behavior,
unequal information, or some other impediment is likely to prevent the parties from agreeing
to the most efficient result. Id. Otherwise, he concludes, the Board should concern itself
primarily with the distributional implications of its decisions and their impact on the relative
bargaining power of the parties. Id. at 287.
Professor Leslie's observations lead him to a contrary conclusion, that is, that "there are
serious transactions costs involved with labor-management gap-filling." Leslie, supra note 216,
at 254. He identifies three types of obstacles to parties bargaining around allocated statutory
entitlements which fill gaps in agreements: (1) trivial entitlements,' which result "when the
costs of talking about and reducing a tailor-made rule to writing are greater than the gain from
having the rule," id.; (2) batch theory, which is "the difficulty of comparing the gain of a
specific asset with the loss of another when collective bargaining negotiations deal with
'batches' of assets," id. at 255; and (3) framing device theory, which is based on studies which
suggest "that individuals are generally risk averse when gains are at stake and risk preferrers
when losses are at stake," id. at 257. He concludes, therefore, that the allocation of statutory
entitlements which fill gaps in agreements should be guided by the principle of adopting the
gap-filling rule favoring that party who "would value the contractual right more highly." Id.
at 200.
A thorough treatment of the helpful analyses of Professors Leslie and Schwab is beyond
the scope of this Article, but a brief discussion of the principal issues they raise is useful to an
understanding of the relationship between the framework of collective bargaining and the
outcome of private ordering. The primary concern of this discussion is not efficiency.
Moreover, my comments reflect some disagreement with Professor Schwab, by suggesting that
the assignment of entitlements is likely to influence outcomes more often than he suggests, and
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The following discussion examines the assumptions underlying the
Coase Theorem in the context of collective bargaining and the way
that the assignment of statutory entitlements impacts on the parties'
relative wealth and bargaining power.
There are major empirical questions about the validity of the two
basic assumptions of the Coase Theorem-zero transaction costs and
perfect information-in the context of collective bargaining. The
assumption of close to zero transaction costs is less problematic.335
Unions are institutional mechanisms for formulating and communi-
cating the collective preferences of employees to employers. This
group mechanism overcomes the normal transaction costs that are
associated with bargaining between employers and employees. 336 The
duty to bargain in good faith obligates the parties to conduct an ongo-
ing dialogue, 337 facilitating the communication of desired preferences.
This duty forces the parties to develop an efficient means by which to
meet and confer, thereby minimizing bargaining transaction costs.
The assumption of perfect information is more questionable
empirically.33 Courts have interpreted the statutory duty to bargain
as mandating an exchange of information that permits each party to
assess accurately the costs of their respective offers. 33 9 This exchange
of information allows each party to understand how the other values
certain clauses in the agreement, such as wage and fringe benefit
clauses. In order to determine how management values the exclusion
of clauses that guarantee future employee job security, however, a
union must independently assess the employer's likely future
with Professor Leslie, by concluding that the assignment of entitlements has wealth effects. I
do agree, however, with Professor Schwab's conclusion that the Board should be primarily
concerned about justifying the allocation of entitlements in light of the impact of the initial
assignment on the parties' relative wealth and bargaining power, rather than in light of who
would value the entitlement more highly.
335. For an argument to the contrary, see Leslie, supra note 216, at 254-58. The two
principal transaction costs Professor Leslie identifies flow from the "batch theory" and the
"framing device theory." See supra note 334. In this Article, these transaction costs are
treated as a part of the problem that unions face in valuing an entitlement in terms of the
difference between "realized income" and "opportunity costs," and in justifying an agreement
to exchange a visible entitlement, such as job security, for other benefits to the membership
when there are a substantial number of issues on the bargaining table. See infra notes 344-62
and accompanying text.
336. For a description of the manner in which unions express employees' job benefit
preferences with a "collective voice" and the positive impact of this union role on the
productivity of labor, see J. FREEMAN & R. MEDOFF, supra note 211, at 7-16; Leslie, supra
note 211, at 354-60.
337. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1345, 1347 (1982) (duty to bargain continues
during term of existing agreements).
338. See Schwab, supra note 216, at 278-80.
339. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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responses to potential changes in technology and in the product mar-
ket. This is because the law does not obligate the parties to exchange
the information from which they project future behavior.3" As a
result, a union often bargains over issues related to job security with-
out adequate accurate information about possible employer responses
to product market changes. 4 ' Without adequate information, a
union cannot accurately assess the value of clauses restricting future
employer actions. 342 Thus, in this circumstance of asymmetric infor-
mation, the initial assignment of the entitlement to control job secur-
ity issues may influence who retains the entitlement following
bargaining.
343
340. An employer must provide all information relevant to a union's performance of its
duties as exclusive bargaining agent, but in determining what is relevant, the Board and the
courts distinguish between wage data and financial data. Wage data includes data from all
factors that enter into the computation of wages. See Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB,
234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir.) (requiring that an employer provide information on job rates and
classifications), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 942 (1956); NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 227
(2d Cir. 1953) (time study data); Electric Furnace Co., 137 N.L.R.B 1077 (1962), enforcement
denied, 327 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1964) (pension information). Information which goes beyond
the costs of wages and other benefits to include financial data on an employer's overall revenue
and costs only has to be revealed if the employer makes an issue of his ability to pay. Empire
Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B 1359 (1965), aff'd sub nom. Dallas Gen. Drivers, W.
& H. Local No. 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (A company was not required to
reveal financial data when it made no claim of its inability to pay but instead claimed that the
rates it paid exceeded the rates of its competitors.).
Decisions that focus primarily on the future "economic profitability" of a company
constitute a part of management prerogatives and are permissive subjects of bargaining. See
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Management's duty to disclose
information reflects the same management prerogative rationale. See Shedlin, supra note 221,
at 448.
341. Schwab, supra note 216, at 279.
342. If a union, rather than an employer, initially possesses the job security property
entitlement, then the asymmetry might not create such a problem. For example, under
Milwaukee Spring I, if the employer wanted the discretion to transfer bargaining unit work
without union consent, then the employer would have to bargain for the inclusion of a specific
clause providing that power. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206
(1982) (Milwaukee Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II),
aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The request for the clause
would alert the union to management concern over the issue and force the parties to discuss
more fully the likelihood of a transfer to facilitate bargaining. The exchange of information
produced by such bargaining should lead to a more accurate valuation of the work transfer
clause by each party. Under Milwaukee Spring II, the employer initially possesses the
entitlement. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603. The union can learn how much
management values the entitlement only by proposing a work preservation clause that tests the
company's resistance. Thus, management's initial entitlement to control mandatory subjects
will keep unions from learning of management's potential future plans regarding these
subjects, unless the parties bring up these subjects in bargaining. Because unions, unlike
management, are not likely to contemplate long run shifts in unit work, the lack of information
may cause unions to undervalue work preservation clauses.
343. If a union does not know that a company plans to reduce labor costs by transferring
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Although the statutory regulation of collective bargaining helps
to lower transaction costs, it also increases the likelihood of strategic
behavior. 344 The certification of unions and the protection of con-
certed activity help to create a bilateral monopoly in the collective
bargaining process.345 When negotiations break down, neither party
can go elsewhere to strike a bargain.346 Instead, both parties are
essentially single purchasers without a competitor for their immediate
offers, even though the business enterprise operates within a competi-
tive product market. Consequently, the parties engage in bluffs and
threats about strikes and replacement of strikers in an effort to force
the other party to agree on a method for dividing the surplus gener-
ated by union labor and employer capital. In this bargaining environ-
ment, a union and an employer might not accurately assess the true
value that each assigns to the right to control job security.347 There-
fore, without an accurate assessment, one cannot assume that bargain-
ing will generate an agreement that reflects the true value of job
security to the parties.
The initial assignment of an entitlement also partially determines
the value that the parties place on that entitlement. 348 There are two
unit work to another plant, then the union will undervalue a clause that protects union job
security by restricting management discretion. See Schwab, supra note 216, at 279.
344. Id. at 268-72.
345. A bilateral monopoly exists when there is no more than one seller and one buyer in the
relevant market. See Leslie, supra note 211, at 364 ("Unionization of a firm having
monopsony power in the labor market creates a bilateral monopoly.").
346. When a union strikes, the employer can hire replacements and the employees may be
forced to seek employment elsewhere, but NLRA obligations create very high transaction
costs which severely restrict the employer's ability to seek employees outside of the members of
the certified unit. Moreover, strikers remain eligible to vote in any decertification election for
one year. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). The courts employ a presumption that the
union continues to represent replacements until either a decertification election occurs or the
employer shows that the union does not enjoy majority support. See Pennco, Inc., 250
N.L.R.B. 716 (1980), enforced, 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982). But
see Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1988) (employer was
justified in good faith doubt as to union's continuing majority status where over 80% of the
bargaining unit work force was replaced by employees who crossed a picket line each day),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989).
347. As a result, a party can use threats and lies to capture a larger share of the surplus
generated by firm production than it could in a truly competitive market. See Schwab, supra
note 216, at 268-69.
348. Scholars differ on whether the initial assignment of an entitlement will affect the
outcome of bargaining. Compare Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, I
J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972) with Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). For
a list of scholars on each side of this debate, see Schwab, supra note 216, at 273 nn. 107-08.
Those who claim that the initial assignment will affect the outcome argue that productive
resources shift over time to the activity favored by the initial assignment. Furthermore, they
argue that the initial assignment influences the value that the parties place on the entitlement.
Id. at 274. The valuation issue proves most significant in the collective bargaining arena.
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types of arguments that are made to justify this claim. The first is that
people value "realized income" differently than they value "opportu-
nity cost."34 9 That is to say, people demand more in payment to give
up something that they already possess than they would willingly pay
to purchase the same thing.350 The second argument is based on the
"wealth effects" of the assignment.
With respect to the first argument, assume, for example, that
Milwaukee Spring 1351 is the governing precedent when an employer
seeks to transfer work to save labor costs during the term of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Under this case, employees possess an
entitlement (realized income) that protects their job security from the
transfer of bargaining unit work to other employees in order to lower
labor costs. 352 In order to have the discretion to transfer this work
without union consent, an employer must purchase the entitlement
from the union in the form of an explicit contractual clause permit-
ting such transfers.353 In contrast, in a world governed by Milwaukee
Spring II, the employer is allocated the entitlement; in order to be
protected from work transfers, a union must purchase a clause explic-
itly restricting the employer's discretion.354 To purchase the clause,
the union must sacrifice future wages or other benefits (opportunity
costs). The argument based on the difference between realized income
and opportunity cost is that in a world governed by Milwaukee Spring
I, employees will demand more in wages to give up their entitlement
(realized income) than they would be willing to sacrifice in wages
(opportunity cost) to purchase the same entitlement in a world gov-
erned by Milwaukee Spring H. 35 When employees possess job secur-
349. This rests upon the premise that people treat "opportunity cost" income differently
that they treat "realized" income. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979). Some criticize this premise by
explaining the difference between opportunity cost and realized income as simply another way
of stating the wealth effect of initial entitlement assignments. Thus, they essentially arrive at
the same conclusion. See Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (1980).
350. See infra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
351. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 264-73 and
accompanying text.
352. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208; see supra notes 270-73 and accompanying
text.
353. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208; see supra notes 270-73 and accompanying
text.
354. See Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603-04; see also supra notes 274-78 and
accompanying text.
355. Professor Leslie arrives at a similar conclusion through his analysis of empirical
studies which show "that individuals are generally risk averse when gains are at stake and risk
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ity, they value it more highly than if they had to purchase the
security.
There are a number of reasons why union negotiators might
value a realized entitlement in job security differently than they would
the opportunity to purchase that security. 3 6 The primary reason is
the political risk assumed by a union leader who bargains away an
entitlement as visible as job security.35 7 It will be difficult for a union
leader accurately to assess the overall preferences of the membership
regarding job security versus immediate income and other benefits,
and there are risks for union leaders in explaining the tradeoffs made
in bargaining when it appears that the union has taken a backward
step on such an important issue as job security.358 As a result, it may
be a safer political strategy for a union leader to preserve pre-existing
benefits and settle for smaller gains in the wage and benefit package.
Moreover, the distinction between realized income and opportu-
nity costs may apply with even more force when the parties bargain
over statutory entitlements that reflect shared values of worker soli-
darity, such as the right to refuse to cross a picket line of another
bargaining unit, 359 the right to request the presence of a union repre-
sentative during a disciplinary interview, or the right of a union
leader to lead a protest against an employer's order without being sub-
jected to more severe discipline than the other participating work-
preferrers when losses are at stake." Leslie, supra note 216, at 257 (citing Tversky &
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE
CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds.
1987)). He concludes that "if courts or the Board have adopted a contractual gap-filler
favoring management, the union may see an attempt to secure the alternative tailor-made gap-
filler (explicit contact clause reallocating the entitlement to the union) as a risky prospect for
gain." Id. at 258. The results are similar to a union valuing the entitlement from the
perspective of opportunity cost. When the gap-filler is allocated to the union, "the union may
see a management attempt to secure the alternative tailor-made gap-filler as presenting the
union with a risk prospect of preventing loss." Id. The risk preference in preventing loss will
lead the union to demand more before it will give up realized income in the form of a job
security entitlement.
356. Professor Schwab argues that the impact of this argument in collective bargaining is
limited because all that a union trades is an unwritten entitlement. Thus, employees will
probably use former written contracts, not Board decisions assigning statutory entitlements, as
bench marks for their expectations. By employing such benchmarks, union leaders can
emphasize the gains in wages or benefits obtained by conceding the entitlement. Schwab, supra
note 216, at 277.
357. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B.
601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd sub. nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
358. See Leslie, supra note 216, at 255-57.
359. See infra notes 370-74 and accompanying text.
360. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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ers.361  Because of the potential intensity of feeling over these
entitlements among some workers, it will be difficult for a leader to
weigh the strong preference of some workers against the relative indif-
ference of others and to make a judgment reflecting the collective's
preferences.362 On the other hand, if there were no federal legislation
granting workers these entitlements, it seems unlikely that unions
would forego higher wages in order to purchase protection from
employer discipline when the union's members engage in a symbolic
act of solidarity in support of other employees' bargaining demands.
Thus, the Board's position on the scope of employee Section 7 rights
is likely to influence the way in which a union values those rights in
bargaining in terms of how much the union will demand in wages to
forego the statutory protection.
The second argument, in support of the claim that the initial
assignment of the job security entitlement influences the way that par-
ties value that entitlement, is based on the "wealth effects" of the
assignment.363 The assignment of the job security entitlement in Mil-
waukee Spring I enhanced the overall wealth of employees working
under agreements with wage and recognition clauses. After the deci-
sion, they had the same wage and benefits package plus NLRB pro-
tection against the mid-term transfer of work to save labor costs. 364
This argument claims that wealthier employees will value job security
differently than poorer workers because they have more income and
361. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1985).
362. See D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 369, 372-73 (1985); Leslie,
supra note 216, at 205-57.
363. This argument rests upon the assumption that workers will purchase more job security
as their overall income increases. The argument further assumes that the income range of
workers does not exceed the point at which job security becomes less important. See Schwab,
supra note 216, at 276 n.l 19. The actual size of wealth effects, however, constitutes an
empirical issue over which scholars differ. Compare Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter?, I J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 15 n.3 (1972) (wealth effects normally insignificant) with
Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 255 (1967) (using
the illustration of two men in the desert with one barrel of water to demonstrate that the one
who holds the initial entitlement drinks most of the water).
364. It can be argued that the decision in Milwaukee Spring I had no wealth effect since the
employees in the bargaining unit already had an expectancy of job security based on past
practices. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee
Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring H), aff'd sub nom.
UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). To the extent that the outcome of a dispute
over the transfer of work was "uncertain," however, the decision in Milwaukee Spring I
enhanced employee wealth by increasing certainty regarding employee reliance on past
practice as a part of an employer's obligation to maintain the terms and conditions of an
agreement under Section 8(d). In order to alter a past practice without running the risk of a
back pay order by the NLRB, employers would need union consent to alter the established
past practice or would have to purchase a clause permitting the employer to make such
changes unilaterally.
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are in a position to spend more to retain their job security. In eco-
nomic terms, the increased wealth resulting from the initial assign-
ment of job security to workers alters the workers' collective
preferences regarding the tradeoffs between job security and other
benefits. With this increased wealth, workers are able to demand a
larger wage increase to contract away the job security that they enjoy
under Milwaukee Spring I than they would have been willing to forgo
to purchase the same protection in a world governed by Milwaukee
Spring 11.365
These comments on the Milwaukee Spring I and H decisions
illustrate the ways in which Board decisions, concerned with eco-
nomic issues, impact on the relative wealth of labor and management,
their respective bargaining power, and the outcome of negotiations.366
As noted above, Board decisions concerned with employee rights
under Section 7 may have an even greater impact on the parties' rela-
tive power because of their link to basic values of worker solidarity.367
The Board's recent decisions dealing with the statutory protection
accorded to employees who refuse to cross picket lines of other
unions, when working under a collective bargaining agreement with a
general no-strike clause, provide a useful illustration of how this type
of Board decision influences bargaining.
368
The Board has taken three distinct positions on whether a gen-
eral no-strike clause waives Section 7 protections of employees who
refuse to cross the picket lines of employees in another bargaining
365. Professor Schwab suggests that as long as the parties face an "either/or" choice on the
outcome, the initial assignment of the entitlement might not affect the outcome of the
bargaining, even if the initial assignment affects the relative wealth of the parties. Schwab,
supra note 216, at 277 ("In an either/or situation, wealth effects must substantially change the
parties' valuations before a switch in legal rule alters the most valued or efficient outcome.").
In many bargaining situations, however, bargaining over entitlements will not pose "either/or"
choices. Instead, the parties often settle on intermediate solutions that limit employer
discretion in some circumstances but not in others. It is then left up to an arbitrator to sort
through the available solutions to decide a particular case. Thus, resolution of the entitlement
at issue will not pose an "either/or" choice.
366. For the relationship between Board opinions and the assignment of entitlements, see
supra notes 261-87 and accompanying text.
367. Cf. Schwab, supra note 216, at 280-82 (analyzing an employee's entitlement to have a
union steward present during a disciplinary interview under NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251 (1975)). Professor Schwab argues that few obstacles prevent the parties from
reaching an efficient allocation of this entitlement. For this reason, any justification for the
initial allocation of the entitlement must rest upon criteria other than efficiency. Id. In
Weingarten, the Court used the relative bargaining power of the parties to justify the initial
allocation. 420 U.S. at 262 (forcing a lone employee to face the interview without a union
official "perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate"). The Court also found
that the initial assignment of this entitlement to employees amounts to an element of employee
due process rights implicit in "just cause." Id. at 260-61.
368. See infra note 374.
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unit.3 6 9 In the mid-1970's, the Board began to hold that a no-strike
clause will not waive the statutory protection from discipline of
employees refusing to cross unless the clause specifically compels
employees to cross picket lines. 370 Thus, a union could agree to a
general no-strike clause in exchange for an arbitration clause without
losing its option to seek additional compensation in exchange for an
agreement that obligates bargaining unit members to cross picket lines
of other employers. Depending on its business, the primary employer
might have a strong interest in avoiding interruptions in business due
to such activity. Thus, the employer might agree to some increase in
compensation or other benefits in exchange for the union's
concession.
Recently, however, the Board reversed its prior position and held
that a general no-strike clause waives employees' statutory protection
unless there is explicit language permitting employees to refuse to
cross picket lines.371 This ruling effectively transfers the entitlement
from the union to the employer since almost all collective bargaining
agreements include a general. no-strike clause.3 72 Because the Board
assumes that a general no-strike clause waives the statutory protec-
tion, employees who refuse to cross picket lines of other bargaining
units will only be protected from discipline if the union obtains an
explicit clause to that effect in the agreement.373 The burden shifts to
369. See infra notes 370-77 and accompanying text.
370. See W-I Canteen Serv., 238 N.L.R.B. 609 (1978), enforcement denied, 606 F.2d 738
(7th Cir. 1979); Operating Eng'rs Local 18 (Davis-McKee, Inc.), 238 N.L.R.B. 652 (1978).
But see NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1953) (general no-strike
clause waived employees' right to engage in sympathy strike). See generally Note,
Coterminous Interpretation: Limiting the Express No-Strike Clause, 67 VA. L. REV. 729
(1981).
371. Metropolitan Edison Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 313 (1986), aff'd sub nom. IBEW, Local 803
v. NLRB, 826 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1987); Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715
(1985) (Indianapolis Power I), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Local 1395, IBEW v.
NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
372. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., supra note 157, at 79-84. The Bureau of
National Affairs ("BNA") sampled 400 out of 5000 collective bargaining agreements on file
and found that 94% included a no-strike pledge. Id. Sixty percent of the pledges were
unconditional, or general no-strike clauses, and 35% were conditional, primarily because
pledges were unenforceable if the employer refused to comply with contract grievance
procedures. Id. Twenty-five percent of the sampled agreements explicitly reserved the right of
employees to observe a picket line. Id. at 84. Among the agreements with observance clauses,
16% applied to any picket lines at the signatory employer's plant, 53% applied to any plant,
31% applied subject to other conditions, such as approval of the picket line by the local union,
and 12% applied only to lines set up by the employer's own union. Id.'
373. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power I, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1715-16 (The suspension of an
employee who refused to cross a picket line did not violate Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
because general no-strike clauses waive employees' statutory protections unless the contract or
extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the parties agreed to exempt sympathy strikes.).
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the union to purchase the clause by agreeing to forego other benefits.
How much a union will have to give up to obtain a clause protecting
workers who refuse to cross picket lines will depend on the nature of
the employer's business and the extent to which the employer values
the freedom to compel employees to cross picket lines by the threat of
discipline.
A third approach modifies this second ruling in a way that may
transfer the entitlement back to the union. At the urging of the fed-
eral appellate courts, the Board has further clarified its recent position
by holding that a no-strike clause waives the statutory protection
unless a union can show by extrinsic evidence that the parties did not
intend for the no-strike clause to act as a. waiver. 374 The central issue
under this interpretation becomes the type of extrinsic evidence neces-
sary for a union to meet its production burden and to avoid the
waiver.375 There are essentially two alternatives: (a) the union must
show a mutual understanding between the union and the employer
that there was no waiver; or (b) the union must produce evidence that
it unilaterally took the position during bargaining that the general no-
strike clause would not waive the statutory protection for employees
374. On appeal from Indianapolis Power I, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the
case to permit the Board to consider extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' intent on the
waiver issue. Local 1395, IBEW v. NLRB, 797 F.2d at 1036. On remand, Chairman Stephens
and Member Cracraft adhered to the rule announced in Indianapolis Power I, but clarified it by
stating that careful attention should be paid to extrinsic evidence. Indianapolis Power & Light
Co., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001, 1003 (1988) (Indianapolis Power II).
Because the administrative law judge had found that the parties had disagreed as to whether
the no-strike clause waived the sympathy strike protection, the Board members concluded that
it was not waived. 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1003-04. Member Johansen concurred on the
grounds that the waiver has to be express under the standard of Metropolitan Edison. Id. at
1004 (Johansen, Member, concurring); see also Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 144,
130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Arizona Public Service II). In Arizona Public Service II,
the Board relied on the Indianapolis Power II rule that "careful consideration [must] be
accorded extrinsic evidence bearing on the parties' intent, such as bargaining history and past
practice under the no-strike clause." 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1386 (citing Indianapolis Power
II, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1003).
The Board originally held in Arizona Public Service I that the general no-strike clause
permitted discipline of employees who refused to cross a stranger picket line. Arizona Pub.
Serv. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1757, 1758 (1985) (Arizona Public Service I), remanded sub nom.
Electrical Workers Local 387 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1986). On remand, the Board
examined the parties' bargaining history and past practice and found that they did not intend
to waive the employees' right to participate in sympathy strikes. Arizona Public Service II, 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1386; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1439,
293 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1387, 1387-88 (1989) (applying the Indianapolis
Power II rule to reconsider original decision and relying on bargaining history to conclude that
the no-strike clause did not waive statutory protection for sympathy strikes).
375. See, e.g., Arizona Public Service II, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1385
(1989); Indianapolis Power II, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1988).
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who refuse to cross picket lines.376 If the NLRB takes the second
alternative, there is no need for the union to produce evidence that the
employer agreed with this interpretation of the general no-strike
clause. If extrinsic evidence regarding a union's unilateral position is
sufficient to avoid the waiver, then the Board's reliance on extrinsic
evidence has the same practical consequence as the Board's initial
position-that the union retains the statutory protection unless a
waiver is established by explicit language in the agreement.377 As
long as a union is aware that it must merely state during bargaining
that the no-strike clause does not, in the union's view, waive the statu-
tory protection for sympathy strikers, explicit language will be
required to rebut the union's statements and to create a waiver on
which the employer can rely.3"8 The Board's position on the type of
extrinsic evidence that the union must produce to avoid the waiver is
still being defined. In Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,"' the Board
appeared to adopt the position that evidence showing that the union
did not regard the general no-strike clause as a waiver is sufficient,380
but in two subsequent opinions where the NLRB relied on Indianapo-
lis Power II, the Board seemed to assess the evidence in terms of a
search for a mutual understanding that there was no waiver.38 ,
Even if the Board confirms its approach in Indianapolis Power II,
376. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power II, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1001. The Board took
alternative "b" and ruled that the parties' agreement to disagree was sufficient extrinsic
evidence for the Board to conclude that there was no waiver. Id. at 1003-04.
377. See Fischl, supra note 2, at 805-06 n.49; supra note 370 and accompanying text.
378. See Indianapolis Power II, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1003-04.
379. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1988) (Indianapolis Power I1).
380. See 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1004.
381. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1439, 293 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1387 (1989); Arizona Pub. Ser. Co., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 130 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1385 (1989) (Arizona Public Service 11). In Arizona Public Service II, the Board relied
on bargaining history and concluded that "company officials recognized that there was no
agreement that sympathy strikes were covered by the existing no-strike language." 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1386. The Board also looked to past practice and found employer
"acquiescence" in sympathy strikes. Id. Finally, the Board noted that the Board
interpretations in effect when the agreement was ratified would not have found a waiver based
on the language in the no-strike clause. Id. All three points that the Board relied on look to
establishing a "mutual understanding" that there was no waiver based on past practice,
bargaining history, and expectancies. The Board's reasoning in United Food & Commercial
Workers Union is similar. 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1388-89. In United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, the Board relied primarily on bargaining history. The Board found that the
union had rejected a clause that the employer proposed and that was "more comprehensive" in
its restrictions than the clause that the parties included in the agreement. Id. at 1389.
Furthermore, the Board reasoned that the more comprehensive clause "would not have
prohibited employees from joining the sympathy strike in the present setting." Id. Therefore,
the agreement on a less restrictive clause suggests that the parties understood that this clause
would not prohibit the sympathy strike in question. Again, the Board essentially found a
mutual understanding in the extrinsic evidence. Id.
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that does not necessarily mean that unions can be confident of the
outcome of a dispute over statutory protection if they made their posi-
tion clear during bargaining. By making the outcome turn on the
parties' intent as evidenced by bargaining history and past practice,
the Board has shifted the focus of the dispute from a statutory policy
aimed at protecting employees who act in sympathy with fellow work-
ers to the parties' intent in a specific bargaining unit.382 Depending on
the extrinsic evidence that unions produce, there may be different out-
comes in two bargaining units with identical no-strike clauses. Thus,
statutory policies concerned with protecting worker solidarity drop to
the background in favor of a contractarian image of the parties'
intent. The nature of the Board's inquiry is now bounded more by the
parties' relationship, as in arbitration, than by justifications based on
statutory policy. 383 This approach will almost inevitably lead to the
deferral to arbitration of picket line disputes in the future.384 Arbitra-
tors, however, may not give as much weight to the values underlying
worker solidarity as to those protecting productivity; instead, they
will seek compromise solutions that maintain working relationships
when disputes arise within a particular bargaining unit.3" Therefore,
if disputes are left to arbitrators, there may be a greater tendency to
view the entitlement as the employer's unless the union can produce
evidence of a mutual agreement to the contrary.386
The impact of these recent Board decisions regarding sympathy
work stoppages on the parties' relative wealth and bargaining power
depends, in part, on whether the Board will in fact defer future dis-
putes to arbitrators. If the Board retains jurisdiction, it appears that
unions may be able to maintain control of the entitlement based on
the reasoning of Indianapolis Power 11.387 Because of the symbolic
382. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1388-89;
Arizona Public Service H, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1386.
383. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1388-89;
Arizona Public Service I, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1386.
384. See infra notes 394-444 and accompanying text.
385. For a discussion of the values emphasized in arbitral reasoning, see infra notes 503-35
and accompanying text.
386. Arbitrators tend to place a high priority on management's right to run its business,
maintain productivity, and discourage insubordination. For the influence of these values on
arbitral reasoning in disputes over the disciplining of employees who engage in sympathy work
stoppages, see Denver Hilton Hotel, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1017 (1982) (Goodman, Arb.);
National Homes Mfg. Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127 (1979) (Goodstein, Arb.); Manitou
Constr. Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 727 (1973) (Williams, Arb.). But see Allied Employers, Inc.,
84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5 (1984) (Kienast, Arb.).
387. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1988); see supra notes 376-81 and
accompanying text.
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importance of union solidarity,388 a union's leadership will normally
need to obtain specific and substantial gains to justify waiving the stat-
utory protection.38 9 On the other hand, if the Board requires the
union to produce evidence showing a mutual understanding that there
was no waiver, the employer will obtain the entitlement as part of a
general no-strike clause in the absence of such evidence, thereby
enhancing the employer's wealth, particularly if the business is one in
which employees are more likely to encounter stranger picket lines. 390
How much either party would demand or give up in concessions to
reallocate the entitlement will vary with the circumstances of the busi-
ness; the point to be understood is the impact of the initial allocation
on wealth and bargaining power.391
The impact of permitting arbitrators to decide on a unit-by-unit
basis where the entitlement lies is more difficult to assess. The parties'
own evaluations of the way in which their past practices, bargaining
history, and former arbitration awards will be assessed by an arbitra-
tor will shape their respective conclusions as to who controls the enti-
tlement.392 If their relationship does not establish a clear entitlement
that is owned either by the employer or by the union, the parties will
have a more difficult task in determining the relative value of a clause
that will clarify ownership. It also places arbitrators in the role of
influencing the parties' relative bargaining power based on arbitral
values rather than statutory policy.
393
Thus, the initial assignment of property entitlements related to
388. See Local 1395, IBEW v. NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
389. Id.
390. The employer may also obtain damages for the union's breach. See Local 174, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Clauses concerned with the
observance of picket lines are found in 85% of retail agreements, approximately 50% of the
construction and communications sector agreements, and 48% of the service sector
agreements. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., supra note 157, at 84.
391. The Supreme Court oftefi emphasizes that the Board should not be involved in
regulating the economic weapons of the parties and thereby balancing bargaining power. See,
e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278, 283 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). As a
result, the Board often downplays this consideration when justifying its decisions.
Nevertheless, these policy concerns are in fact central to the Act. See NLRB v. City Disposal
Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (relying on "a congressional intent to create an equality in
bargaining power between the employee and the employer throughout the entire process of
labor organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements");
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975) (justifying the right of an employee to
have a union official present at a disciplinary interview by reference to the Act's attempt to
redress the "perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management")
(quoting American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316).
392. See infra notes 503-35 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 386.
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job security and employee concerted activity are likely to be critical to
the relative bargaining power of the parties and to-their psychological
posture at the bargaining table. The forum where the disputes are
resolved also has implications for the way in which disputing impacts
on a shared ideology of the workplace within the labor movement.
The student comments in this issue explore more fully the relation-
ship between the initial assignment of specific statutory entitlements
by the NLRB and the respective roles of the NLRB and labor arbitra-
tors in interpreting clauses that either waive those entitlements or
allocate them when collective bargaining agreements are silent. The
following Section examines the way deferral and waiver doctrines
interact to involve arbitrators in disputes over statutory rights.
V. THE IMPACT OF WAIVER AND DEFERRAL ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Deferral to Grievance Arbitration Under the NLRA
Section II of this Article described the shared jurisdiction of the
NLRB and labor arbitrators over two distinct types of disputes. First,
the example of an employee who refused to drive an unsafe truck was
used to illustrate the overlap between Section 7's statutory protection
of employees engaged in concerted activity and the typical clause in
collective bargaining agreements that prohibits an employer from dis-
charging an employee for reasons other than just cause.394 Some col-
lective agreements further expand the scope of the shared jurisdiction
by including a clause that the employer will not discriminate against
an employee due to union activity. Such clauses essentially incor-
porate Section 7, and Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) into the
agreement. 95
Second, the example of the mid-term implementation of a drug
and alcohol testing program was used to illustrate the overlap
between Subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) and union grievances over uni-
lateral modifications of the agreement.3 96 The Board has traditionally
deferred to arbitration in this second type of dispute on the grounds
394. See supra notes 59-101 and accompanying text. The BNA found discharge and
discipline clauses in 94% of the contracts surveyed; 83% of the clauses used "just cause" while
the remainder listed specific offenses. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., supra note
157, at 6. Moreover, many arbitrators will imply a just cause limitation on an employer's
right to discipline even if the agreement does not include such a limitation. See F. ELKOURI &
E. ELKOURI, supra note 303, at 652 n.6 (citing numerous awards).
395. The BNA found that 50% of the agreements surveyed prohibited discrimination based
on union membership or non-membership and 37% barred discrimination based on union
activity. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., supra note 157, at 112.
396. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see supra notes 102-42 and accompanying text.
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that alleged modifications of collective bargaining agreements are
essentially issues of contract interpretation for arbitrators.397 More
recently, the Board has expanded the deferral doctrine to include
charges involving employee Section 7 rights.39 8 As a result, arbitra-
tion is increasingly the primary forum for adjudicating both contract
and statutory entitlements whenever there is shared jurisdiction.399
The NLRB currently defers adjudication of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge prior to arbitration if: (1) the parties' agreement provides
for arbitration; (2) the dispute is arbitrable; and (3) the employer is
willing to arbitrate.'0 ° An individual employee can defeat deferral,
however, by showing that the interests of the union are adverse to the
397. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
398. The deferral doctrine was extended to Section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice charges in
National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972) (3-2 decision). Five years later, in another 3-2
decision, Chairman Murphy voted with the two dissenters in National Radio to trim the
deferral doctrine back to charges filed under Subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). General Am.
Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977). Seven years later, the Board overruled General
American Transport Corp. by a 3-1 majority and revitalized the National Radio decision calling
for deferral in charges under Subsections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2). United
Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). See generally Edwards, supra note 202; Harper,
Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 680 (1981);
Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355
(1985); Sharpe, supra note 138.
399. Dissenting in Olin, Member Zimmerman cited the Board's statistics that indicated that
2185 pending unfair labor practice cases had been deferred to arbitration as of the end of
December 1983. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 581 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member,
dissenting). From October 1981 to the end of December 1983, over 3800 cases had been
deferred. Id. In only 163 of these deferred cases were complaints issued. Id. Over 1700
deferred cases were dismissed, withdrawn, or settled. Id. The majority challenged the
dissent's interpretation of the statistics and emphasized its focus on deferral by the Board
rather than by the General Counsel. Id. at 575 n.9. For a statement of the guidelines to be
followed by regional directors subsequent to United Technologies and Olin, see Memorandum
GC 85, 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 334 (Mar. 6, 1984).
The differing views of the Board members in Olin regarding the extent of post-arbitration
deferral led Professor Greenfield to examine the rate of post-arbitration deferral in two
regional offices before and after the Board decision in Olin. See Greenfield, supra note 135.
She found a total of 103 case files in which the two regional offices engaged in review of an
unfair labor practice charge subsequent to an arbitral award between January 1983 and June
1985 (13 months before and 17 months after Olin). Id. at 40-41. Thirty-seven of the charges
were reviewed prior to Olin and 66 were reviewed subsequent to the decision. Id. at 42. Prior
to Olin, the regional offices refused to defer in seven cases (18.9%), and in each of these cases,
they made an independent determination of the unfair labor practice charge. Id. The
remaining 30 cases were either withdrawn by the charging party after arbitration (17) or
deferred (13). Id. In the 66 cases examined after Olin, the regional offices independently
reviewed only 2.5 cases (3.8%). Id. at 44. Of the remaining cases, 30.5 were deferred and 33
were withdrawn. Id. at 45. If the withdrawn cases are excluded, the regional offices deferred
in 65% of the cases before Olin and in 92.3% of the cases after Olin. Id. at 41-42.
400. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 560. For an overview of the Board's
inconsistent approach to deferral, see Comment, supra note 90, at 343-52.
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individual employee's interests. 4°" In addition, a union can block
deferral by demonstrating that the employer's conduct is sufficiently
inconsistent with the employer's statutory obligations so as to consti-
tute a rejection of the principles of collective bargaining." 2
Subsequent to arbitration, the charging party can again attempt
to convince the NLRB to adjudicate de novo the unfair labor practice
charge. The standard the Board uses is less deferential to arbitration
than the standard for judicial review, but generally, it still provides
arbitrators with substantial latitude in their resolution of statutory
rights." In Olin Corp.,' the Board announced that it would regard
an arbitrator's decision as an adequate resolution of the unfair labor
practice charge if "(1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the
unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented gener-
ally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice."' '
Moreover, an arbitrator's decision need not be totally consistent with
prior NLRB precedent: "Unless the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e.,
unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act," the NLRB will defer.4°6
Shortly after the Board adopted its revised deferral standards in
United Technologies Corp. and Olin Corp., the General Counsel issued
guidelines, based on the two decisions, for the regional offices to fol-
low in deciding whether to defer charges." The implementation of
this deferral policy at the regional level results in most deferral deci-
sions being made by. regional directors, subject to review only by the
General Counsel, not by a federal court.4°" There is no judicial review
of a General Counsel's decision to dismiss a charge on the grounds of
401. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 560 (quoting General Am. Transp. Corp.,
222 N.L.R.B. at 817 (Penello & Walther, Members, dissenting)).
402. Id.
403. For the judicial standard of review for arbitration awards, see supra notes 158-90 and
accompanying text.
404. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
405. Id. at 574.
406. Id.
407. See Memorandum GC 85, 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 333 (Mar. 6, 1984).
408. Only final orders of the Board are subject to judicial review under Section 10(f).
NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f); see NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 233, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987). When the issuing of a complaint pending arbitration is
stayed, the stay normally occurs at the regional level. Even if a complaint is issued, a regional
director may withdraw the complaint at any time prior to a hearing. The withdrawal may be
appealed to the General Counsel, but there is no Board review. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.18-102.19
(1988). The Supreme Court has affirmed that such decisions by the General Counsel are not
subject to judicial review either under Section 10(f) of the NLRA or under the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides for the review of a final agency action "for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court," 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. at 420-26.
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deferral. 4° 9
The statutory limits on judicial review of decisions made by the
General Counsel mean that the courts only examine a deferral deci-
sion in the more controversial cases in which the General Counsel or
a regional director decides against deferral, but the Board decides
deferral is appropriate.41 0 Thus, the bulk of the deferral decisions are
made under the discretion of the General Counsel and are essentially
insulated from any form of judicial supervision. '1  Consequently, the
somewhat negative reaction of the federal courts to the Board's cur-
rent deferral standards may have only a limited practical impact on
the regional counsels' processing of most cases that raise deferral
issues. Nevertheless, the courts' skeptical responses, particularly to
the Olin Corp. standards, merit careful consideration because of the
courts' underlying concerns about arbitration as a forum for adjudi-
cating statutory rights.412
In Taylor v. NLRB,41 3 a case having a fact pattern similar to that
in Illustration 1 in which an employee refused to drive a truck with
safety problems,4"4 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Olin standards
outright.4"5 The court read Olin Corp. as implying that deferral was
"proper in all cases unless it is affirmatively demonstrated that some
unusual circumstances require that the ALJ conduct an independent
inquiry into a grievant's statutory claims."4 '6 In the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's view, this result could not be reconciled with Supreme Court
opinions that emphasized the right of employees to a de novo adjudi-
409. An exception to the Court's conclusion in United Food & Commercial Workers Union
(that a decision of the General Counsel is not subject to review as a final agency action for
which there is no other remedy) might be found if a court concludes that the Board is using
deferral in a way that constitutes an abdication of the Board's statutory authority, thereby
violating congressional intent. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838-39 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
410. If a regional director defers and the General Counsel affirms the deferral, there is no
court review. See supra note 408. If the regional director goes forward with a charge,
however, the employer will raise deferral as an affirmative defense first before the ALJ and
later before the Board. If the Board either orders deferral or refuses to defer, the Board's
decision may then be reviewed by a federal court under Section 10(f). NLRA § 10(f), 29
U.S.C. § 160(f); see, e.g., Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (remanded because
the Board failed to explain its decision to defer); American Freight Sys., 722 F.2d 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (remanded because the Board failed to explain why the unfair labor practice charge
was not deferred).
411. See supra note 399 providing statistics on deferral.
412. See, e.g., Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d
1516 (11th Cir. 1986); Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986).
413. 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
414. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
415. Taylor, 786 F.2d at 1521.
416. Id. at 1522.
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cation following an adverse arbitration award for claims arising under
either Title VII, 4 17 Section 1983,418 or the Fair Labor Standards
Act.4 19 In addition, the court was troubled by the fact that the
driver's grievance had been denied by a bipartite committee with
equal labor and management representation; there was no neutral
party.42° Consequently, the court was concerned that the union might
have negotiated away the individual's statutory rights "in the interest
of the collective good. ' 42' The logic of the opinion suggests that the
Eleventh Circuit may well respond with similar disapproval to the
Board's deferring to a grievance settlement short of arbitration, a situ-
ation in which there is inevitable tension between the interests of the
individual and the interests of the collective.422
Similarly, in Garcia v. NLRB,423 the Ninth Circuit reversed a
deferral decision of the Board in a case in which an employee had
been discharged for refusing to follow instructions to honk his horn as
an attention-gathering device at delivery stops. 424  The employee
believed that honking the horn under those circumstances would have
violated state law. 425 The decision partly agrees with Olin Corp. in
that the court found the arbitrator's award to be "palpably wrong"
because it violated public policy.426 As an alternative basis for its
holding, however, the court suggested that the Board had read too
broadly the City Disposal Systems' dicta regarding employee insubor-
dination as a waiver of statutory protection.427 The Board read City
Disposal Systems as suggesting that the Board has the discretion to
defer to an arbitrator's decision where the arbitrator has determined
417. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (An employee whose grievance is dismissed at arbitration may
bring a Title VII claim arising from the same set of facts.).
418. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466
U.S. 284 (1984) (An arbitration award does not preclude a subsequent civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.).
419. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (An arbitration of a wages claim does not preclude a later FLSA suit
based on the same facts.).
420. Taylor, 786 F.2d at 1522.
421. Id.
422. The collective has an interest in conserving union resources for those circumstances in
which they are most needed, and the individual has an interest in pressing his grievance as far
as possible to seek relief. Under fair representation doctrine, the union has discretion to refuse
to arbitrate if it feels that the likelihood of success is outweighed by the costs of grieving. See
Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
423. 785 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986).
424. Id. at 808.
425. Id. at 808 n. 1.
426. Id. at 810.
427. Id. at 811.
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that there was just cause to discipline an employee who refused to
follow an employer's order although the employee had a reasonable
alternative means, other than outright refusal, by which to protest the
order.42 As the Ninth Circuit read the dicta in City Disposal Systems,
however, the "reasonable alternative" exception applied only to situa-
tions in which the employee's refusal was accompanied by behavior
that was "abusive or disruptive of company discipline." '429 The court
concluded that a refusal to break state law could not be construed as
an abusive means of enforcing contract rights, and the refusal was
therefore protected concerted activity under Section 7.430 Even the
Ninth Circuit's opinion impliedly suggests, however, that
insubordinate behavior which is not reasonably necessary to the
enforcement of contract rights is outside of Section 7's protection.43'
This interplay between a contractual waiver of Section 7 rights
and the deferral doctrine emerges most clearly in an opinion of the
District of Columbia Circuit in which the court reversed a Board
deferral decision. In Darr v. NLRB,432 an employee who was also a
union steward circulated a petition protesting the discharge of three
shop stewards; the company responded by changing employee break
schedules.433 The employee protested that the schedule changes pre-
vented her from being able to discharge her shop steward duties, and
she refused to observe the changed schedule.4 34 The company took no
immediate action against her.435 Three days later, however, the com-
pany confiscated the petition.4 36 The employee, who was not on an
authorized break, then went to the Company Overseer's office to pro-
test, along with several other employees who were on authorized
breaks.437 The company thereupon suspended her for taking an unau-
thorized break, ordered her off the premises, and after she refused to
leave, discharged her.438 The arbitrator ordered her reinstated
because she had been wrongly discharged for engaging in protected
concerted activity. 439 Because she was insubordinate in refusing to




431. Id. at 808-11.
432. 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986).






439. Id. at 1406.
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ordered her reinstatement to be without back pay.'
An ALJ found the award to be repugnant to the NLRA, but the
Board rejected his findings and instead deferred to the arbitrator's
decision, concluding that it is "the essential nature of the arbitration
process to balance the competing claims of the parties by adjusting
the equities involved to reach a harmonious result.""' The District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the Board's decision, concluding that
the Board had failed to explain adequately the basis for its decision." 2
The court pointed to at least four theories under which the Board's
decision could have been justified: (1) that the NLRA issue was suffi-
ciently identical to the contract issue actually litigated, so that estop-
pel applied; (2) that the Board's function should be to review
arbitrators' awards under an appellate body's more limited scope of
review; (3) that the Board was merely deferring to the arbitrator's
interpretation of a contract clause on which the statutory right
depended; or (4) that by entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the union waived the individual employee's statutory right to
seek redress before the Board for discipline based on insubordination,
as long as the employee had access to grievance arbitration." 3 The
opinion suggests that the court viewed the waiver theory as being the
most likely rationale for the Board's decision to defer, but because the
Board had failed to articulate the basis for its decision, the court
remanded the case."4 Both the third and fourth theories that the
court advanced illustrate the conceptual overlap between deferral and
waiver doctrines. This overlap is the central focus of the following
discussion of waiver.
B. The Waiver of Statutory Property Entitlements
The principle that statutory entitlements may be waived through
collective bargaining lies at the heart of the model of labor relations
that is embodied in both federal common law and the NLRA. The
interrelationship between no-strike clauses and grievance arbitration
assumes the capacity of the collective to waive an employee's statu-
tory protection under Section 7.45 The scope of the Section 7 rights
that an employee retains once the employee is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement will turn, in part, on the interpretation of the
440. Id.
441. Id. at 1406-07.
442. Id. at 1409.
443. Id. at 1408.
444. Id. at 1408-09.
445. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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agreement." 6 Because a union controls both access to grievance pro-
cedures and the arguments presented to arbitrators over the relation-
ship between contract language and employee Section 7 rights, waiver
enhances collective control over employee statutory entitlements." 7
It is important to distinguish the two ways in which waiver con-
tributes to the centrality of arbitration. The most common situation
is illustrated by the prior discussion of the relationship between statu-
tory rights and contractual entitlements that exists when an employee
claims he was disciplined for engaging in an activity protected by Sec-
tion 7, such as taking part in a sympathy work stoppage. 44s When an
unfair labor practice charge is filed, the employer sets up the union's
waiver of the employee's statutory protection under the no-strike
clause as an affirmative defense and requests deferral so as to permit
an arbitrator to determine whether the parties intended the no-strike
clause to include sympathy work stoppages.449 The employer's posi-
tion is that the issue should be resolved by looking to the specific
understanding of the parties when they agreed to the no-strike clause
and that the parties agreed to have an arbitrator resolve disputes aris-
ing under the collective bargaining agreement. 5 ° The employee,
however, will argue that the dispute should be resolved by looking to
446. See supra notes 55-101 and accompanying text.
447. As long as a union does not breach its duty of fair representation by either acting in
bad faith or arbitrarily deciding to settle a grievance short of arbitration, the union can prevent
an individual employee from obtaining a hearing before an arbitrator on the merits of the
grievance. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). Under the NLRA, employers have no
obligation to entertain a grievance presented by an individual employee without the
authorization of the union. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61 n.12 (1975); Black-Clawson Co. v. IAM Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 185-
86 (2d Cir. 1962). For a discussion of whether a union's decision not to proceed with an
employee's grievance should result in a deferral by the Board to the union's decision when
statutory rights are involved in the grievance, see Comment, supra note 90, at 367. See also
Lynch, supra note 12, at 625-28.
448. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715, 1715 (1985)
(Indianapolis Power I); see also supra notes 369-93 and accompanying text.
449. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power 1, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1715. The respondent in Indianapolis
Power I relied on the no-strike clause as a defense to the unfair labor practice but made no
request to defer the dispute to arbitration. Id. The Board will not defer if an employer is not
willing to arbitrate. See supra note 400 and accompanying text. If an employer does request
deferral, the current Board approach to resolving sympathy strike issues, such as looking at the
wording of the no-strike clause and at extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' understanding
when they agreed on the clause, would be identical to the ways in which the issue would be
addressed by an arbitrator. See, e.g., National Homes Mfg. Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127,
1129-30 (1979) (Goodstein, Arb.); Westinghouse Transp. Leasing Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1210, 1212-15 (1977) (Sergent, Arb.). Therefore, under current Board standards, an unfair
labor practice charge over discipline for engaging in a sympathy work stoppage would seem to
be subject to deferral. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); supra notes
382-86 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 394-444 and accompanying text.
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the statutory policies embodied in Section 7 and thus should be
decided by the Board and not by an arbitrator.451
The second circumstance contributing to the centrality of arbi-
tration is the waiver of an individual employee's access to the Board
as a forum for resolving disputes over statutory protections, rather
than a specific contractual waiver of the statutory entitlement. For
example, assume that an employee files an unfair labor practice
charge, claiming that the employer disciplined him for filing excessive
grievances.452 In response, the employer claims that the employee
was disciplined for work-related problems, not for filing excessive
grievances, and requests a stay of the unfair labor practice charge
pending a determination by an arbitrator of whether there was just
cause to discipline the employee.453 The Board would likely defer
under the standards of United Technologies Corp.454 Deferral in this
circumstance is implicitly a decision that the union waived the
employee's right to have the Board determine the statutory claim by
agreeing to grieve and arbitrate "just cause" for discipline.455
Two Supreme Court decisions illustrate the implications of the
expanding waiver doctrine in the first type of circumstance. The most
famous waiver case to reach the Supreme Court is Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB.456 In Metropolitan Edison, the Court rejected an
employer's claim that two prior arbitration decisions, which upheld
the employer's right to sanction differentially union leaders who par-
ticipated in unprotected work stoppages, constituted a waiver of
union leaders' Section 7 rights to be treated the same as other disci-
plined employees.457 The awards had imposed higher responsibilities
on union officials to uphold the no-strike clause of the agreement than
they imposed on rank-and-file union members.4 58 The arbitrators had
not focused specifically, however, on the statutory right of a leader
not to be differentially sanctioned, nor on whether the parties
intended to waive the Section 7 right when they agreed to the no-
strike clause. 459 The Supreme Court refused to regard the former
451. See supra notes 382-86 and accompanying text.
452. See, e.g., United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 557 (An employee who was threatened
with discipline for filing grievances filed a grievance over the threats, withdrew the grievance,
and then filed unfair labor practice charges.).
453. See id.
454. Id. at 560; see also supra note 400 and accompanying text.
455. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 563 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting); see
Edwards, supra note 202, at 29-30.
456. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
457. Id. at 708-10.
458. Id. at 709.
459. Id. at 709 n. 13 (The Court observed that the arbitrators did not specifically find that
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arbitrations as determinative of the issue.46 Instead, the Court
announced a rule of interpretation that the waiver of a statutory right
will not be inferred from a general contractual provision, and it held
that a union leader's protection from a more severe sanction should be
upheld by the NLRB unless the waiver of the right is explicitly incor-
porated into the agreement.461
The Metropolitan Edison doctrine keeps a union leader's entitle-
ment from being transferred automatically when the union signs a no-
strike clause unless there is explicit language to the contrary. More-
over, the opinion implicitly suggested that the question of waiver
should not be deferred to an arbitrator because an arbitrator is likely
to look to the parties' understanding regarding the responsibility of a
union leader in the particular bargaining unit, rather than simply
applying the Metropolitan Edison rule of interpretation.462 In arbitra-
tion, the statutory policies that justify this rule of interpretation will
not play a major role. Arbitrators are concerned primarily with a
union's obligation to obey and grieve in order to maintain the integ-
rity of grievance arbitration; there is little reason for an arbitrator to
be concerned either with a union's autonomy to establish the obliga-
tions of leaders or with qualified union members being discouraged
from becoming leaders.4 63 Thus, in order to preserve the statutory
policies that underlie the standard for waiver which the Court set
forth in Metropolitan Edison, the Board would have to avoid deferring
a dispute over the waiver of a Section 7 statutory right. The waiver
issue will, however, be deferred if the Board follows United Technolo-
gies Corp. and Olin Corp.464
The second relevant Supreme Court opinion is NLRB v. City Dis-
posal Systems,465 the case used in Illustration 1 to demonstrate the
tension between the doctrines of fair representation, waiver, and
deferral.466 The issues before the Court in City Disposal Systems were
the meaning of "concert" under Section 7,467 and whether an individ-
the bargaining agreement imposed an explicit duty to end work stoppages but that they did
attempt to determine the parties' intent in entering into the no-strike clause.).
460. The Court also noted that the agreement did not make the arbitration awards binding
beyond the term of the agreement. Id. at 709.
461. Id. ("We do not think that two arbitration awards establish a pattern of decisions clear
enough to convert the union's silence into binding waiver.").
462. Id. at 708-09; see Comment, Selective Discipline of Union Officials, supra note 186, at
463-64.
463. See Comment, Selective Discipline of Union Officials, supra note 186, at 459.
464. See supra notes 394-444 and accompanying text.
465. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
466. See supra notes 59-101 and accompanying text.
467. 465 U.S. at 825; NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right to...
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
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ual employee who invoked a contractual right to refuse to drive a
truck that he thought was unsafe was engaged in protected concerted
activity.468 The NLRB had held that an employee acting alone in the
assertion of a contract right was engaged in protected concerted activ-
ity under Section 7.469 The majority of the Supreme Court agreed,
finding no meaningful distinction between two or more employees
claiming a contractual right to refuse to drive an unsafe truck and a
lone employee's refusal.47 ° In contrast, the dissent's opinion was as
much a plea to contain disputes arising in the context of collective
bargaining agreements within grievance arbitration procedures as it
was a disagreement about the meaning of "concert. ' 471 Ironically,
however, both the majority and the dissenting opinions tend to rein-
force grievance arbitration as the preferred forum for resolving dis-
putes over employee refusals to follow employers' orders. As the
following analysis of each opinion indicates, the majority and the dis-
sent disagreed on the meaning of "concert, ' 4 72 but both incorporate a
common vision of employee rights that are defined primarily through
collective bargaining and grievance arbitration once a union has been
certified.
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the following analysis
of the two opinions does not focus on the disagreement over the
meaning of "concert," the specific issue before the Supreme Court.473
Instead, the focus is on the relationship between the way the majority
framed the dispute on remand and the dissent's characterization of
the dispute as essentially one to be resolved under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The thrust of the analysis is that both opinions
frame the ultimate resolution of the dispute in a way that makes arbi-
tration the most likely forum to resolve similar conflicts in the future.
After finding that the lone employee's refusal was concerted, the
City Disposal Systems majority remanded for a finding as to whether
the collective bargaining agreement had waived the employee's Sec-
tion 7 protection by the combination of a no-strike clause and a safety
clause which permitted an employee to refuse to drive a truck "unless
and protection."). For a thorough discussion of the meaning of "concerted activities for the
purpose of ... mutual aid and protection," see Fischl, supra note 2.
468. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 824-25 (1984).
469. City Disposal Sys., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 454 (1981), enforcement denied, 683 F.2d 1005
(6th Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
470. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 832.
471. See id. at 841-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
472. Id. at 838-39.
473. Id. at 841. For an analysis of the Court's reasoning on the meaning of concert, see
Fischl, supra note 2, at 826-31, 830 n.158.
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such refusal [was] unjustified. 4 74 Consequently, the Court framed
the central issue on remand as the understanding of the parties when
they agreed on no-strike and safety clauses, rather than the clarity in
contract language that is necessary to waive an employee's statutory
protection when protesting unsafe working conditions.475 The ques-
tion on remand for the Sixth Circuit thus became whether the parties
had agreed to a different standard than the one embodied in Section 7,
and if so, whether the contractually established standard would per-
mit an employer to discipline an employee who refused to drive an
unsafe truck. Prior precedent had established that an employee's
refusal was protected under Section 7 if it was based on a reasonable
and honest subjective belief that the truck was unsafe, but the safety
clause of the collective agreement might only protect the refusal if the
truck was shown objectively to be unsafe.476 As a result, the wording
of the agreement and the parties' understanding became the critical
questions, rather than the policies underlying Section 7.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion on remand further illustrates the
extent to which contract language becomes the focal point for deter-
mining the scope of an employee's statutory protection. That court
interpreted the no-strike clause in light of two contract clauses regard-
ing unsafe trucks and concluded that the union had not waived the
employee's statutory protection under Section 7.477 "In sum, [the
employee's] right under the collective bargaining agreement was to
refuse to operate equipment that he or another employee had reported
to be unsafe until City Disposal demonstrated that the truck's safety
had been approved by the mechanical department."47 The essence of
the opinion is not the policies underlying the protection of employee
Section 7 rights when an employee is protesting unsafe working con-
ditions. Instead, the Sixth Circuit focused almost exclusively on the
intent of the parties regarding the discipline of an employee protesting
an unsafe truck, an intent that was evidenced by the wording of the
two pertinent clauses in the agreement.479 Because the meaning of
contract language is normally for an arbitrator to determine, and not
for the Board, the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit opinions
invite the NLRB to defer to contract grievance procedures when simi-
474. Id. at 840.
475. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) ("[T]he waiver must
be clear and unmistakable.").
476. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 841.
477. City Disposal Sys. v. NLRB, 766 F.2d 969, 972-74 (6th Cir. 1985).
478. Id. at 973.
479. Id. at 972.
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lar charges are filed in the future.48 ° This tendency is reinforced by
federal common law doctrine which holds that the meaning of con-
tract language and the parties' intent should be the exclusive province
of the parties' contractual procedures for resolving disputes.481
In her dissent in City Disposal Systems, Justice O'Connor took
the waiver and deferral doctrines one step further and suggested that
the NLRB might have deferred to the union's determination that
there was no objective basis for the grievance.482 She noted that the
discharged employee pursued his contract rights by filing a grievance
the day after his discharge, 483 but the union found no objective merit
in the grievance and declined to process it.484 The normal model of
labor relations suggests that an employee in this situation has no rem-
edy under the collective agreement unless the employee can show that
the union breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to pro-
cess the grievance.48 5 By asserting a statutory rather than a contract
right through the filing of an unfair labor practice charge, however, a
disciplined employee may be able to avoid the obstacle of proving that
the union breached its duty of fair representation. Thus, because a
union has refused to grieve and is not a party to the NLRB proceed-
ings, the employer is not in a position to raise deferral as a defense to
the unfair labor practice charge unless the Board characterizes the
union's refusal as a settlement of the grievance.4 6  To avoid this
result, Justice O'Connor implicitly suggested that the Board should
have construed the union's refusal as equivalent to a settlement of the
employee's contract and statutory claims, thereby eliminating the
employee's access to a hearing before either the Board or an
arbitrator.8 7
480. 465 U.S. at 838-39; 766 F.2d at 972-73.
481. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1976); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-85 (1960); supra notes 158-
90 and accompanying text.
482. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 827.
484. Id.
485. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
486. In City Disposal Systems, the employer did not plead that the union's refusal to grieve
was equivalent to a settlement. The company instead raised the employee's failure to exhaust
internal union remedies to review the refusal as a bar. See City Disposal Sys., 256 N.L.R.B.
451, 453 (1981).
487. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 844 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Schaefer v. NLRB, 464 U.S. 945 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari)); see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 410 (1976). For
differing views on Justice O'Connor's suggestion that the NLRB defer to a union's settlement
of an employee's statutory charge, compare Comment, supra note 90, at 368-69 (favoring
deferral to reinforce private ordering) with Lynch, supra note 12, at 625-28 (opposing deferral
to protect statutory policies embodied in Section 7 of the NLRA).
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The City Disposal Systems majority, however, avoided any dis-
cussion of the tension between the employee's protection under Sec-
tion 7 and the apparent view of the union that the employee was
disciplined for just cause by emphasizing that the only issue before the
Court was whether the employee's protest was concerted activity.
4 88
Nevertheless, the majority opinion, which remanded the case for a
determination as to whether there was a contractual waiver, tends to
encourage deferral just as the dissent's focus on reinforcing union
control over employee claims of unjust discipline encourages reliance
on private ordering by the parties. If a union supports an employee's
unfair labor practice charge in a future case, the Board will probably
defer to an arbitrator if the employer raises contractual waiver as an
affirmative defense.489 On the other hand, if the union does not sup-
port the charge and either settles the contract grievance or refuses to
grieve, the Board may defer to the settlement unless the employee is
able to demonstrate that the union's decision constituted a breach of
the duty of fair representation.4 90 In sum, the waiver and deferral
doctrines work together to make grievance arbitration the central
forum for protecting both contract and statutory entitlements once a
union is certified. In arbitration, however, the statutory values that
led the City Disposal Systems majority to conclude that the sole
employee's protest was "concerted" will be less of a factor in the reso-
lution of the specific dispute than they will be before the Board. In
the case of a Board deferral to a union settlement, the predominant
policy becomes preserving exclusive representation by reinforcing the
union's control over the enforcement of an employee's statutory
rights.4 9'
The waiver doctrine also applies in a limited way to employer
statutory rights, but only in contexts in which those rights operate as
limits on employee statutory entitlements.492 For example, Section 7
protects an employee who refuses to cross a stranger picket line that is
488. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 841.
489. See supra notes 394-444 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 90, at
355-58.
490. See supra note 99. Compare Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) with supra note 400
and accompanying text (Board's refusal to defer if employee's and union's interests are
adverse to each other).
491. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 841-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
492. The employee statutory entitlements in question are derived primarily from NLRA
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157. The scope of these entitlements, in the sense of the protection for
employees exercising Section 7 entitlements, is limited by the permissible responses of
employers based on a business justification rationale. See, e.g., NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (An employer may permanently replace economic strikers.); NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956), aff'd and modified on
other grounds, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (An employer may only replace unfair labor practice
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primary, but the employer may replace the employee for business rea-
sons. 493 The employer can waive this right to replace, just as the
union can waive the employee's Section 7 protection.494 As with
union statutory entitlements, the general rule of contract interpreta-
tion is that the waiver of the statutory right must be evidenced by
specific language in the agreement. 495 Whether arbitrators tend to fol-
low this rule of construction if the union grieves the replacement
under the just cause clause, however, is open to question.496
The Court's reasoning in both Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB4 97 and NLRB v. City Disposal Systems4 9  also illustrates the
way that disputes reflect and contribute to the ideology of the work-
place.4 99 In Metropolitan Edison, the Court relied on the autonomy of
workers to select their leadership and to protect the judgment of lead-
ers from being influenced by fear of reprisals due to their leadership
roles."° Thus, an employer must act with reference to the employees
as a collective, rather than sanctioning individual leaders, unless the
union has consented to differential sanctions. Similarly, City Disposal
Systems protects the protest of a sole employee by identifying his pro-
test as being in solidarity with all employees working under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.'O° Both opinions confront basic values
about the statutory protection of employees engaged in collective
action to improve working conditions. The cases reinforce values of
worker solidarity, but even if they had been decided in favor of the
employers, the visibility of the decisions would have provoked a
response from unions as a group over the erosion of statutory protec-
strikers temporarily unless the employer can show that the strike would have occurred even in
the absence of unfair labor practices.).
493. See Redwing Carriers Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nor. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
494. See Butterworth-Manning-Ashmore Mortuary, 270 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1015 (1984).
495. See id. (applying the "clear and unmistakable" standard of Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), to an employer's waiver of the right to replace an employee
refusing to cross a stranger picket line). But see Fischl, supra note 2, at 806 n.51 (criticizing
application of "clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement to employer statutory
entitlements).
496. See, e.g., Allied Employers, Inc., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5 (1984) (Kienast, Arb.)
(interpreting no-strike clause as a waiver of the employer's statutory right to replace a
sympathy striker).
497. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
498. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
499. For a definition of the term "ideology" as it is used here, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
500. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 704-15.
501. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 832.
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tions for collective action.5"2 The framing of the dispute and the legal
arguments used to justify the results are part of an ongoing discourse
over workers' rights. Decentralizing the disputes to arbitration in the
future alters the nature of this discourse and its contribution to the
community of union members that exists across bargaining unit lines.
The way that the context of arbitration influences the framing of dis-
putes, as well as the justifications used to resolve the conflicts, is the
subject of the next Section.
VI. A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC FORUMS AND GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION
Prior sections of this Article focused on why the initial assign-
ments of statutory entitlements matter, and they also discussed the
procedures for resolving disputes over gaps in collective bargaining
agreements involving the allocation of contract entitlements and
determinations of waivers of statutory entitlements. The central claim
has been that recent doctrinal developments have converged so as to
encourage unions and management to rely on arbitration to resolve
their mid-term disputes. This Section focuses on the consequences of
this increased reliance on arbitration.
The way that the Board and the courts approach the waiver of
individual Section 7 rights has been described in the context of
employees refusing to cross stranger picket lines, 50 3 employers giving
union leaders more severe sanctions than other employees, 5°4 and
unions exercising their power to waive individual employees' access to
NLRB proceedings. °50  Concerns over the protection of statutory pol-
icies have led the Board and the courts to develop a general rule of
interpretation: To be effective, a waiver must be explicit.50 6 The three
examples illustrate, however, that the Board does not always follow
this rule. Nevertheless, concerns over statutory policies are always a
major factor in the Board's decisions.
When these same types of disputes are resolved in arbitration,
however, the emphasis shifts to an analysis of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties as established by their collective bargain-
502. For examples of union leaders' re.ctions to Board and court decisions eroding the
statutory rights of workers under the NLRA, see sources cited infra note 534.
503. See supra notes 369-92 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 456-64 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 465-91 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); supra notes 126-30
and accompanying text.
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ing agreement.50 7  Arbitrators interpret both the language of the
agreement and the parties' intent in the light of unstated assumptions
about the appropriate relationship between labor and management in
a market economy. 50 8  Additionally, an arbitrator is expected to be
fair and even-handed in resolving disputes and to encourage the par-
ties to carry out their respective contract responsibilities so as to
maintain productivity.50 9 Thus, statutory values such as the institu-
tional autonomy of unions and solidarity among workers tend to drop
away as basic principles to be considered in resolving disputes over
the waiver of Section 7 protections.5"'
507. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)
(An award must draw "its essence from the collective agreement.").
508. Two related areas in which labor arbitration decisions have been examined in some
depth are work transfers and subcontracting. See generally Dash, The Arbitration of
Subcontracting Disputes, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 208 (1963); Fairweather, Implied
Restrictions on Work Movement-The Pernicious Crow of Labor Contract Construction, 38
NOTRE DAME LAW. 518 (1963); Greenbaum, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: An
Addendum, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 221 (1963); Gross, Value Judgments in the Decisions
Of Labor Arbitrators, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 55 (1967); Wallen, How Issues of
Subcontracting and Plant Removal Are Handled by Arbitrators, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
265 (1965). The studies find that arbitrators are willing to place "implied limits" on
subcontracting, but that these limits are overcome if the employer's decision is based on
efficiency. See, e.g., Gross, supra, at 70-72 (finding that the predominant values providing
content to arbitral concepts of good faith and fairness are efficiency and employer control over
the production process); Comment, Bases and Limits of Arbitral Decisionmaking, supra note
247, at 380 ("Arbitrator's recognition of broad managerial rights presumptively including the
right to relocate is further reinforced by their acceptance of market-oriented values and
thinking.").
Two excellent studies focusing on other areas come to a similar conclusion about the
predominant emphasis on maintaining production and protecting employer control of the
workplace. See Atleson, Obscenities in the Workplace A Comment on Fair and Foul
Expression and Status Relationships, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 693, 714 (1985) ("[T]he underlying
notion is that the expression of disrespect for 'authority' is undesirable and also punishable.");
Gross & Greenfield, supra note 303, at 684 (An analysis of 584 reported arbitration awards
dealing with employee health and safety revealed that "the management rights value judgment
is dominant and that this value judgment clearly controls the appearance and use of another
value judgment: the notion that a worker has a right to a safe and healthful workplace.").
509. See Shulman, supra note 18, at 1024. Shulman warns:
To consider . . . arbitration as a substitute for court litigation or as the
consideration for a no-strike pledge is to take a foreshortened view of it. In a
sense it is a substitute for both-but in the sense in which a transport airplane is a
substitute for a stagecoach. The arbitration is an integral part of the system of
self-government. And the system is designed to aid management in its quest for
efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to
secure justice for the employees. It is a means of making collective bargaining
work and thus preserving private enterprise in a free government.
Id.
510. See Comment, Selective Discipline of Union Officials, supra note 186, at 462-63; see also
Gross & Greenfield, supra note 303, at 674-84 (reviewing the limited impact of the policies
underlying the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) on the reasoning of arbitrators in
disputes over employee safety and health).
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In a similar sense, arbitrators will approach problems of filling
gaps in collective bargaining agreements differently than will adjudi-
cators in public forums. An arbitrator looks to the parties' expecta-
tions based on past practice, bargaining history, industry custom, and
implied obligations of fair dealing.51 An arbitral award will be justi-
fied by working through categories of analysis that are internal to the
parties' relationship.512 If the parties do not like an award, they can
negotiate around the arbitrator's decision.51 3
An arbitrator must render a decision that is acceptable to the
parties within the parameters of their expectations. If an arbitrator
reasons from values external to the private regime in interpreting the
contract, one party or the other may strike the arbitrator's name from
future lists as well as challenge the award by filing an action to have it
set aside. 1 4 Moreover, other parties facing a similar conflict will view
the opinion not as precedent, but as an illustration of that arbitrator's
approach to resolving recurring conflicts. Thus, the incentive struc-
ture for arbitrators is to justify the opinion by drawing on values
internal to the system of private ordering, and not to challenge its
assumptions or to render opinions that would substantially shift the
parties' bargaining power. As a creature of the system, an arbitrator
is poorly positioned to deal with statutory issues that could shift the
511. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 303, at 342-65, 437-57.
512. See, e.g., Pacific Southwest Airlines, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1136, 1138 (1978) (Greer,
Arb.); Monarch Rubber Co., 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 246, 250 (1965) (McCoy, Arb.); National
Lead Co., 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 470, 474 (1957) (Roberts, Arb.); see also Torrington Co. v.
Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming district court
decision that vacated the arbitrator's award based on the employer's past practice of paying
employees for time off for voting).
513. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). In support of its decision to refuse to disturb an arbitrator's award, the court noted
that the parties are never without a remedy if they are unhappy with the award: "The parties'
remedy in such cases is the same remedy they possess whenever they are not satisfied with the
arbitrator's performance of his or her job: negotiate a modification of the contract or hire a
new arbitrator." Id. at 7.
514. To challenge the enforceability of the award, the employer will utilize the Supreme
Court's language in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960):
[An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 597; see, e.g., Roadmaster Corp. v. Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504,
851 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming a district court that set aside an arbitrator's award
because the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the agreement by relying on Section 8(d) of
the NLRA to justify an award rather than by relying on the parties' collective bargaining
agreement).
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balance of negotiating power or alter a structural characteristic of the
model of labor relations.515
Conversely, when the Board is faced with a dispute over whether
the employer has violated the obligation to maintain the terms and
conditions of an agreement, the Board is concerned about the poten-
tial impact of its decision on all parties similarly situated. The Board
enjoys the option of drafting an opinion that will fix the entitlement
for all parties who do not have a clause on point in their agreement.
51 6
Alternatively, the Board may base its result on extrinsic evidence
regarding the intent and expectations of the disputing parties without
relying on a general rule of interpretation. 7 When the Board takes
this alternative, however, statutory policy drops to the background,
just as in arbitration, and the Board assumes the arbitrator's role
within the private regime.51
As noted earlier, the Board may also take an intermediate
approach and interpret the parties' agreement and expectations based
on past practice in a way that protects the union's voice in workplace
decisions and the employees' reliance on obligations implied by the
nature of the collective bargaining agreement.51 9 For example, in a
case like Milwaukee Spring, the Board would examine whether the
employer was responding to a change in the product market or simply
attempting to get out of the wage bargain by substituting one group of
workers for another.5 20 This type of analysis is informed by values
such as the decision's predictability for, and influence on, other par-
ties dealing with similar situations, the volume of future litigation that
the opinion will foster, the protection of capital mobility, the encour-
agement and effectuation of efficiency, the institutional integrity of
unions, and the reinforcement of the regime of private ordering
515. See Comment, Bases and Limits ofArbitral Decisionmaking, supra note 247, at 396-98.
516. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring 11) (reversing prior decision granting the entitlement to transfer work to
the union, and instead granting it to the employer), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee
Spring I) (granting the entitlement regarding the transfer of work to the union unless the
employer had language to the contrary in the agreement), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a thorough analysis of how these opinions would influence the
bargaining among all other parties similarly situated, see Schwab, supra note 216.
517. See, e.g., supra notes 368-93 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of
the Board's opinion in Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 130 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1001 (1988) (Indianapolis Power 11)).
518. See supra notes 382-86 and accompanying text.
519. See supra note 281.
520. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text (discussing Member Zimmerman's
dissenting opinion in Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605-12); see also Wachter &
Cohen, supra note 200, at 1406-15 (arguing for the application of a sunk-cost-loss rule on a
case-by-case basis). For a definition of the sunk-cost-loss rule, see supra note 281.
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through collective bargaining. Arbitrators may share many of the
same concerns regarding collective bargaining, because the concerns
are implicit in the regime of private ordering, but the Board is more
compelled to justify its decision within the broader context of statu-
tory policy. The potential for contrary views to be applied to a spe-
cific conflict is greater in the public forum than in the private ordering
regime defined by the parties' agreement and expectations.
Moreover, statutory decisions in public forums which establish
the parameters for private ordering are highly visible.52 In contrast,
parties may quietly contract around the established parameters within
their own bargaining unit. The public image of the preferred way of
structuring the private ordering may, however, be set up in such a
way as to make contracting out of that image unlikely. 22 Thus, the
visibility of public forums permits a more unified reaction among
organized workers. The mobilization of broader-based support can be
a basis either for seeking legislative change or for dedicating resources
to future strategic litigation seeking a more favorable general rule.
523
In short, decisions in public forums are part of a broader political
process by which workers or employers seek to obtain rules of law
that will govern the framework of collective bargaining based on
broadly based shared interests.
Arbitration, in contrast, decentralizes conflicts to the level of spe-
cific bargaining units; shared interests across bargaining unit lines are
less visible. Only employees represented by the same union in the
same industry are likely to pay much attention to an arbitrator's
award, and even then an unfavorable reaction simply results in that
arbitrator not being selected again. Challenges to the assumptions
underlying the model of labor relations that are implicit in the system
of private ordering are less likely to occur as long as the resolution of
521. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 216, at 247 n.7 (describing the extensive public
controversy and debate in response to the Board's Milwaukee Spring opinions).
522. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (implying a no-strike clause
over an arbitral dispute despite the failure of the parties to include such a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement); Electrical Workers v. General Elec. Co., 407 F.2d 253, 259
(2d Cir. 1968) (A contract clause designed to negate the presumption of arbitrability was said
to raise "a substantial question whether a 'national labor policy' may be so blithely diluted."),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969).
523. See, e.g., Construction Industry Labor Law Amendments of 1987: Hearings on S. 492
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (hereinafter Construction Labor Law Hearings); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (testimony on proposed legislation to. protect unions from
operation of dual shops (one unionized and one non-unionized) in the same competitive
market area and to prohibit unilateral repudiation of a pre-hire agreement).
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conflicts is managed on a unit-by-unit basis.5 24
These arguments are not meant to suggest that the management
of disputes through private ordering does not have its advantages for
unions. The model of private ordering gives unions control over the
management of disputes.5 2  Grievances, including those involving
assertions of statutory rights by individual employees, can be negoti-
ated without either the presence or the intervention of a public official
charged with the enforcement of the NLRA. Cohesion and unity
within each bargaining unit is reinforced by this exclusive representa-
tion, and disputing within the unit can lead to a more united front and
a stronger bargaining posture. Employee solidarity within the bar-
gaining unit may be an important element in a union's capacity to
obtain better wages, working conditions, and union security clauses,
thereby providing unions with a viable economic base. The daily
administration of grievance procedures as a form of ongoing employee
participation in the formulation and administration of workplace
rules therefore provides a justification for employees to support their
unions. 526
Arbitration is the principle means of assuring the even-handed
and fair administration of these workplace rules. The central assump-
tion of the private ordering regime is that employees will forgo the
right to protest employer actions through work stoppages in exchange
for the opportunity to take grievances to a neutral third party. Thus,
obey and grieve has become the fundamental tenet of labor arbitra-
tion. 27 This underlying assumption is in sharp contrast to the statu-
tory right of employees to engage in concerted activity. 528  The
inherent contradiction is resolved by the contractarian image of col-
lective bargaining. Employees have exchanged their right to strike for
an arbitration clause,529 and they are therefore obliged to obey and
grieve. The assertion of any contract or statutory entitlement incon-
sistent with the underlying obey and grieve value is likely to be sub-
jected to careful scrutiny, with the union carrying the burden of
justifying the exception to an arbitrator.530 In contrast, if the same
524. See Rogers, supra note 1.
525. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975).
526. See generally R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 211; Feller, supra note 17.
527. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
528. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
529. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
530. See Gross & Greenfield, supra note 303, at 656 (It is the employee who has the burden
of persuasion in establishing that a work environment was unsafe in order to justify refusing an
order: "Reasonable doubts about safety and health are resolved against the employees who
raise that defense.").
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issue were to emerge in a Section 7 adjudication before the NLRB, the
burden would normally be on the employer to show a business justifi-
cation for disciplining an employee engaged in concerted activity.53
Similarly, the parties' and industry's past custom and practice
are seen as the bases for the parties' expectations when entering into
collective bargaining agreements. Thus, arbitrators resolve disputes
over gaps in agreements by looking at the way that similar disputes
have been resolved in the past.5 32 For example, because employers
have traditionally enjoyed substantial managerial control over deci-
sions concerning the appropriate mix of the input factors of produc-
tion, past practice will normally favor employer discretion. The
primary constraints on this employer discretion are the covenants of
good faith, fair dealing, and reasonableness. The analysis of these
concepts further turns on whether an employer has a business justifi-
cation for the action it has taken, which becomes an inquiry into
whether the decision was "efficient.
' 533
These observations are not meant to suggest that interpretations
of the NLRA in public forums tend to be more favorable to unions
than private arbitration. Indeed, many unions have become reluctant
to file unfair labor practice charges for fear that the Board will estab-
lish a new precedent less favorable to labor than the pre-existing inter-
pretation of the statute. 534 In some types of disputes, the perspective
531. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). The initial
burden of proof to show that an employee was disciplined at least in part for engaging in
protected activity under Section 7 is on the General Counsel. Id. at 401. If the initial burden is
met, the employer will then be found to have violated the Act unless the employer can show
that the employee would have been disciplined even had the employee not engaged in the
protected activity. Id. at 401-02. Alternatively, the employer may show that the union waived
the employee's protection under Section 7. See City Disposal Sys. v. NLRB, 766 F.2d 969,
972-74 (6th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the collective bargaining agreement to determine if the
employee's statutory right to refuse to drive a truck based on a reasonable belief that the truck
was unsafe was waived by the collective agreement). In other circumstances, the employer
may meet his burden by showing an economic justification in the form of a substantial adverse
impact on the employer's business resulting from the employee's concerted activity. See
Redwing Carriers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, enforced sub nom. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union No. 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964).
532. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
533. See Gross, supra note 508.
534. Serious disillusionment with the enforcement of the NLRA by the Board has been
expressed by both labor leaders and labor law scholars. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor
Law a Dead Letter, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 2 (AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland
advocating repeal of the NLRA because it no longer serves labor's cause); Construction Labor
Law Hearings, supra note 523 at 36-64 (Testimony of Robert Georgine, President of Building
and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO). Addressing the need for legislation to
protect collective bargaining in the construction sector, President Georgine stated: "This
legislation is necessary because the National Labor Relations Board has failed to enforce
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of an adjudicator seeking an equitable solution by looking to the par-
ties' expectations about their particular working relationship will
favor an employee more than a solution reflecting tensions among
competing statutory policies. The central point is that the criteria
used to allocate disputes among forums should be sensitive to the dis-
tinct perspectives which flow from differences in the institutional set-
ting of the disputing process.
5 35
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the ways in which federal common law
and doctrinal developments under the NLRA interact to enhance the
centrality of labor arbitration. The presumed relationship between
no-strike clauses and arbitrability makes it difficult for labor and man-
agement to rely on any means other than arbitration to resolve dis-
putes arising under collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the
limited scope of judicial review protects the autonomy of arbitral rea-
soning from judicial control.
The combination of the deferral and waiver doctrines has further
contributed to arbitration's central role by encouraging the displace-
ment of disputes over statutory entitlements from public adjudication
before the Board to the private, bargaining-unit-specific forum of
labor arbitration. Examples of this displacement were analyzed under
different statutory provisions.5 36 One example involved the assign-
ment and transfer of Section 7 statutory entitlements which define the
degree of protection due employees engaged in concerted activity. 37
The other example involved disputes over changes in working condi-
tions under Section 8(d) when collective bargaining agreements do
certain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act in the manner which Congress
intended, and instead has interpreted the Act in a manner which has undermined the stability
of labor relations in this vital industry." Id. at 37; see also Stone, supra note 17, at 979
("[D]espite the almost universal consensus that there is a crisis in labor law, there is no current
consensus at all on what is wrong with the Act or how the current deplorable situation,
however defined, came about."); Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures and Future Needs in
Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 18 (1982) (arguing that the assumptions and
purposes of American labor law have not been fulfilled); Sweeny, Is There a Need To Amend
the National Labor Relations Act?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1142, 1143 (1984) (President Sweeny
of the Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO answers the question his title poses:
"No! The National Labor Relations Act .. .is, for all practical purposes, now dead."). See
generally HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. THE FAILURE OF
LABOR LAW-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984).
535. See Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516
(11th Cir. 1986); supra notes 410-44 and accompanying text.
536. NLRA § 8(a)(l), (a)(3), (a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (a)(3), (a)(5), (d).
537. For an example of this type of displacement, see Illustration 1, supra notes 62-101 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:237
DEFERRAL, WAIVER, AND ARBITRATION
not specifically address the respective contractual rights of the parties
in regard to the working condition that the employer plans to alter
unilaterally.1
3 8
The framework governing collective bargaining is treated on two
institutional levels, those of public and private resolution. The public
level is that of the NLRB responding simultaneously both to political
currents arising from the selection and confirmation process of the
executive branch and the Senate,5 39 and to the demands of doctrinal
continuity and predictability imposed through judicial review of
Board decisions."4 The private level is labor arbitration., Arbitrators
must approach a dispute from the perspective of the parties' agree-
ment and past practices, and they must explain the final award in
terms of justifications that both parties will regard as legitimate.
Otherwise, that arbitrator will not be selected again by the parties.
The central claim of this Article is that the increased reliance on
labor arbitration as the means by which these disputes are resolved
has significant implications for the legal framework that shapes the
structure of collective bargaining. The values and assumptions
embodied in the framework determine the Ways in which entitlements
are allocated through the process of both statutory and contract inter-
pretation. The allocation of the entitlements, in turn, impacts on the
relative power of the parties engaged in bargaining.54 1 Deferring
more disputes over the entitlements to private arbitration, rather than
encouraging their adjudication in a public forum, makes the disputes
less visible and inhibits public dialogue over both the result and the
values reflected in the reasoning as justification for the ruling.
A thorough analysis of the deferral doctrine has been beyond the
scope of this Article, but some general conclusions follow from the
foregoing comparison of Board and arbitral reasoning:
1. Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges should not be deferred.
Rather than focusing on the statutory policies embodied in Section 7,
an arbitrator will tend to focus on whether an employer had just cause
to discipline an employee given the work setting and the need to dis-
courage insubordination and to maintain productivity. Even if the
arbitrator does recognize that the employee's protest is arguably pro-
tected activity under Section 7, the arbitrator will normally resolve
the tension between statutory protections and contract justifications
538. See Illustration 2, supra notes 102-42 and accompanying text.
539. The five NLRB members are "appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate." NLRA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
540. NLRA § 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f).
541. See supra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
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for discipline by looking to the parties' intent when they agreed on
particular contract clauses, rather than by looking to statutory policy.
Both the issues of contractual waiver and just cause should be deter-
mined in the light of the statutory policies underlying Section 7 pro-
tections rather than concerns internal to the parties' working
relationships. Arbitrators are not bound to follow a rule of interpreta-
tion derived from statutory policy. Publicly visible Board decisions,
which provide precedent for all collective bargaining agreements, are
critical to maintaining the rule of interpretation established in Metro-
politan Edison: "[W]e will not infer from a general contractual provi-
sion that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right
unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' "542
2. Section 8(a)(5) charges that involve the failure of an
employer to bargain over mid-term modifications of a mandatory sub-
ject should not be deferred. Section 8(a)(5) protects a union's voice in
critical workplace decisions. The Board requires that the waiver of a
duty to bargain through a zipper clause and a broad management
rights clause be clear and unmistakable.543 Arbitrators tend both to
assume that all issues are contained within agreements and to make
the issues turn on whether management's actions are reasonable given
the breadth of an agreement's management rights clause.5" Thus, the
focus shifts from the protection of a union's voice in workplace deci-
sions prior to their implementation to whether the employer's actions
were reasonable given past practices and the parties' expectations
when they agreed on the management rights clause.
3. Section 8(d) charges in which an employer has bargained to
impasse prior to implementing a mid-term modification present the
strongest case for deferral.545 On the surface, the issues appear to be
contractual and to be rooted in the parties' bargaining history, past
practices, and contract language because the question is whether the
employer failed to maintain the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment. If evidence suggests that the parties did in fact bargain over the
working condition being contested and that the resolution of the dis-
pute will turn on evidence of the parties' expectations under the agree-
ment, the dispute should be deferred. On the other hand, if there is
no evidence that the parties contemplated the type of change being
implemented by the employer, the resolution of the dispute essentially
allocates a property entitlement to one party or the other. 546 Disputes
542. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
543. See supra note 242.
544. See supra notes 510-15 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 249-94 and accompanying text.
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that involve gaps in contracts and that are resolved by balancing man-
agement's need for entrepreneurial discretion to adjust to product
market changes on the one hand and employee expectations based on
established working conditions on the other, should be decided in a
visible public forum. The justification for the allocation of the entitle-
ment should be subjected to public scrutiny and debated in terms of
basic values regarding our concepts of justice in the workplace and
the impact of the allocation on the relative bargaining power and
wealth of similarly situated parties.547
These recommendations do not address the undermining of stat-
utory rights and contract entitlements by the substantive and proce-
dural norms of both public and private forums that permit unilateral
employer action pending adjudication of a dispute. The comparison
of property and liability rules illustrated the way that employee statu-
tory and contract property entitlements are often converted, as a
practical matter, into liability entitlements by the employer's freedom
to act pending adjudication. 4 The obey and grieve doctrine of labor
arbitrators reinforces managerial control over the workplace in the
same way.549 The only way to restrict employer conversion of
employee statutory rights is by the increased use of Section 10(j)
injunctions"5 ° by the Board in order to protect workers' statutory
rights pending a final Board order."' Similarly, courts need to be
more willing to issue status quo injunctions to protect employee con-
tract entitlements where the unilateral implementation of a changed
working condition will so alter the prior situation that an arbitrator
is unable or reluctant to grant a remedy that preserves the
entitlement.552
What these proposed standards for deferral do address is the
relationship between the forum and the substantive outcomes of dis-
putes. The burden of the argument in this Article has been to demon-
strate that disputes are framed differently in public and private
forums, and that this difference matters for the substantive results of
disputing. In arbitration, the breadth of legitimate discourse over
contract entitlements which impact on statutory rights is bounded by
the collective bargaining agreement and the parties' expectations.55
Before the Board, however, unions may draw on a broader set of poli-
547. See supra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 300 (discussing Section 10(j) injunctions).
551. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
553. See supra notes 503-35 and accompanying text.
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cies which include encouraging organization, protecting the union's
voice in workplace decisions, and promoting worker solidarity.55 4
These arguments permit the union to challenge the structure of the
legal framework governing collective bargaining because this struc-
ture is not treated as a given before the Board. It is instead the sub-
stance over which the parties are expected to struggle when they
invest in litigation.555 Therefore, the possible range of outcomes is
less constricted.
The visibility of the forum is related, but independently impor-
tant, because it enables the parties to focus on the way that the state's
intervention in the workplace impacts on the relative bargaining
power of the parties, both through the ongoing refinement of the
scope of statutory rights and through the task of filling in gaps in
collective bargaining agreements.5 56 Making public forums the prin-
cipal level for the processing of disputes that influence bargaining
power contributes to a general understanding of the role that the state
plays in balancing the power of labor and management. Focusing on
the substantive outcomes of the disputes and on the way that the out-
comes impact on the relative power of the parties helps to counteract
the image of a neutral state that simply reinforces private ordering in
the shadow of the law.
Finally, and again independently, the public visibility of dispute
processing is also necessary to sustain public discourse over the rela-
554. The legislative "Findings and Declaration of Policy" in justification of the NLRA
state:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
-purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
555. Dispute processing in a public forum leads to "public discourse" labeled "precedent"
when articulated by courts. See Trubek & Esser, supra note 29. The average time from the
filing of a charge to the obtaining of an order enforceable by a federal court of appeals is at
least three years. See supra note 295. By this time, parties engaged in an ongoing bargaining
relationship will have accepted some accommodation in the specific dispute that led to the
statutory charges being filed in Order to maintain production and workers' wages and benefits.
With the exception of those cases that involve a potential for a large back pay award to a group
of employees, the cost of litigation will normally be more than the monetary value of any
award resolving the specific controversy. The parties are primarily investing in litigation to
seek favorable "precedent." For an analysis of the strategic behavior of repeat litigators and
the implications for the allocative efficiency of precedent and the distribution of wealth, see
Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 811 (1980).
556. See supra notes 325-93 and accompanying text.
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tionship between workers' rights and the state. Dispute processing
resolves specific conflicts, and through their resolution, impacts on
the parties' relative power. Disputing also results in the formulation
of norms that will impact on the way similar conflicts are resolved in
the future. Simply put, workplace disputes are quarrels over the sub-
stance of the ideology of the workplace; over time, these quarrels may
result in the transformation of that ideology in ways that can
encourage political action and transform institutional structures.
Localizing dispute processing over statutory rights within bargaining
units fulfills the first function of disputing, but it inhibits the other
two functions and constrains dispute processing as a source of legal
change.
